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Abstract
In a collaborative product development process, specialists from several life-cycle 
prespectives such as design and manufacturing need to interact. To support 
such collaboration, techniques based on software agents have emerged. These 
agents collaborate and carry out certain domain specific activities within these 
prespectives.
Agents in a collaborative process have individual preferences on certain aspects 
of the product. Conflicts occur when these agents differ in their preferences. It is 
important to resolve these conflicts through some rational means of negotiation. 
Most of the existing research in software agents has focused on software issues 
such as interoperability and communication rather than conflict resolution. In 
order to realise the potential of software agents in collaborative product develop­
ment, there is need for domain-independent schemes to support rationalisation 
of agent’s preferences and negotiation.
This research focuses on two inter-related threads of collaborative product devel­
opment:
•  Synthesis of software agents to support collaboration
• Conflict resolution between agents having varying preferences
The concept of Single Function Agents (SiFAs) has been adopted and modified 
using the Habermas’s theory of action for synthesising agents with varying degree 
of complexity. An agent synthesis model has been proposed that uses SiFAs to 
construct complex Multi-Agents. For the resolution of conflicts between agents, a 
novel scheme based on game theory and dependency reasoning is developed. The 
new scheme first identifies the feasible design space and then finds single-point 
solutions within the space such that they represent a rational compromise between 
agents’ preferences. The scheme is implemented by means of a negotiation agent 
and a reasoning agent.
The above scheme has been validated via two engineering case studies in an agent 
supported collaborative product development process:
• C om paritive case study: Collaborative design of a poppet relief valve 
to benchmark the proposed conflict resolution scheme in comparison with 
the previous research in negotiation.
• V alidation case study: Collaborative design and manufacture of a Geneva 
mechanism to demonstrate the feasibility of the approach for agent synthesis 
and validate the novel scheme for conflict resolution involving both software 
agents and humans in a laboratory-based product development process.
The two case studies were mutually supportive in terms of examining the feasi­
bility of software agent synthesis approach and validating the novel scheme for 
conflict resolution between agents. The conflict resolution scheme ensured ra­
tionality in decision making while preserving the preferences of agents. The key 
contribution of this research, extends the previous research with respect to con­
flict resolution in agent-supported product development while exploiting a new 
simplified agent synthesis model. The limitations of the present research and 
avenues for further research have been identified with respect to the scalability 
and generalisation to n-agent conflict resolution.
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Since the beginning of industrial revolution, product development has evolved 
through several stages: from centuries old single-piece craft production to the 
present day Internet based collaborative product development. In order to fully 
appreciate the drivers for such a transition, it is necessary to review the origins 
of product development.
Craft production dates back to the 18th century where production facilities were 
under-developed [Hanson (1984), Meier, et al, (1994)]. Each product was manu­
factured with personal care using skilled labour that resulted in limited produc­
tion and long lead time. In the first quarter of the 20th century, the craft-based 
approach needed modification to suit a production process capable of meeting the 
increasing consumer demand and was referred to as mass production [Womack, et 
al, (1991)]. Mass production was found to be capable of faster production rates, 
and ensured uniformity in both the aesthetics and quality of products. Meier, et 
al ,(1994) noted that fundamental changes which took place in mass production
1
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also led to lean production, a concept introduced by Eiji Toyoda and Taichi Ohno 
in Japan during the early 1960’s.
Lean production was viewed as a major improvement with reference to lead-time 
reduction in the production industry, however, the overall processes still consisted 
of a sequential chain of events that occurred with minimal interaction between 
different life-cycle phases such as design and manufacturing. Such a sequential 
process is often referred to e l s  the traditional over-the-wall approach [Sobek, et 
al, (1999), Womack et al, (1991)]. Several automotive manufacturers such as 
Toyota and Ford were quick to realise that such an over-the-wall approach due to 
its inherent long lead times could endanger their long-term competitiveness and 
limit their ability to develop better quality products1. During the 1970s, ma­
jor automotive manufacturers were already outsourcing a considerable amount 
of jobs (eg., milling, painting, moulding) to reduce cost. However, it needed in­
tense collaboration between partners over various stages of product development 
[Nishiguichi(1994)].
To overcome the drawbacks suffered by the sequential engineering approach, a 
new methodology called concurrent engineering (CE) emerged during the 1980’s 
which relied on parallel activities in the product development process [Ainslie, 
et al, (1985), Walkett, (1989)]. The main requirement of concurrent engineer­
ing (CE) was on collaboration and group decision making. CE drew immediate 
attention of a number of manufacturers due to its emphasis on lead time re­
ductions, quality improvements, scrap reduction and cost reduction [Poolton smd 
Barclay, (1996)]. Subsequent developments in computer based tools for Computer 
Aided Engineering (CAE) [Ainslie, et al,], Design for Manufacture and Assem­
bly (DFMA) [Boothroyd (1988)] and Quality Function Deployment (QFD) [Akao, 
(1990)] encouraged the integration of disparate phases of product development. 
Additionally, development in production methodologies such as agile manufac­
1As pointed out by Smith and Eppinger (1997) modern engineering views iterative prod­
uct development process as largely inefficient excluding situations where optimal sequencing 
between product development phases are inevitable due to inter-dependencies.
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turing [ Meier, et al, (1994)], and the concept of reconfigurable and modular 
manufacturing cells [Alford, (1994)] readily suited the CE philosophy of multi­
function teams and empowerment. Although CE philosophy has not yet been 
fully realised in industry [Waterson, et al, (1999)], certain aspects of CE such as 
specialist team formation and information sharing are now well supported and 
implemented for 88% of the UK industries, as reported by Theobald (1996).
1.2 M otivation
The spread of global computer networks during the 1990’s has been influencing ev­
ery dimension of product life cycle from marketing to design, manufacturing and 
distribution [Bentley, et al, (1994), Sobolewski and Erkes (1995), Dietz (1997) 
Hameri and Nithila (1997)]. Product development processes, whether sequential, 
concurrent or a combination, need to be flexible enough to allow collaboration 
between partners that are geographically distributed. This is due to the grow­
ing trend towards globalisation in the engineering industry during the last two 
decades. In addition to this is the intense pressure from the customers and the 
need to develop quality products that could penetrate international markets in 
minimum time. This has led to the concept of distributed product development 
which is captured in the following statement:
“As a result of increasing global competitive pressures, corporations in 
every industrial sector are addressing product development challenges 
by focusing on what each does best and turning into partnerships 
to supplement internal abilities. In the manufacturing sector, this 
trend is manifested through joint manufacturing ventures, increased 
outsourcing and supplier partnerships, often with geographically dis­
tributed partners” (Erkes et al, 1996)
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In a distributed environment, partners with complementary competencies collab­
orate to design, manufacture and market a product. These partners who may 
be geographically separated, virtually co-locate over wide area networks (WAN). 
This virtual co-location leads to a distributed organisation which is also referred 
to as a Virtual Enterprise (VE). The potential of such organisations is yet to be 
fully realised in creating new business ventures. Byrnes (1993) pointed out that 
such a distributed environment must offer competence and trust with no formal 
boundaries. The long term success of distributed organisations largely depends 
on their ability to collaborate in order to exploit the market opportunities in 
innovative ways while adapting to market and technological changes in nearly a 
real-time manner.
1.3 Collaborative product development
The focus of the next generation product development is on developing products 
in collaboration using the expertise and facilities that are distributed over WANs. 
Researchers have proposed collaborative approaches based on intelligent software 
agents [Gensereth and Ketchpel (1994)] and Computer Supported Cooperative 
Work [CSCW] (Grudin, 1994), collectively referred to as Collaboration Technolo­
gies (CT). The former approach focuses on synthesising specialised software tools 
which are characterised by their autonomous decision making capability [Ndumu 
and Nwana, 1997]. The latter relies on real-time co-location of humans into work­
groups using multi-media communication tools for collaborative decision making 
[Grudin (1994) and Klein (1990)]. Both approaches have received significant 
attention in recent years regarding their potential application in collaborative 
product development.
1 I n t r o d u c t io n
1.3.1 CSCW  based collaboration
The research in office automation in the 1980’s led to the concept of Computer 
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) [Hirschheim (1985)]. Initially the ap­
proach was meant to bring communication facilities such as fax and telephone to 
support group decision making and informal negotiation. With rapid advances 
in communication in the last two decades, the present day CSCW focuses on 
real-time virtual co-location of humans to support team work. Cutkosky, et al, 
(1996) investigated sharing of product data and function over wide area networks. 
Their investigation led to the conclusion that it was time efficient to exchange 
product related drawings by fax and have the recreated by humans at a different 
geographical location than to use data exchange protocols such as Initial Graph­
ics Exchange Specification (IGES) that may not ensure cross compatability at all 
times. Some of the efforts of Grudin (1994), Reinhard, et al, (1994) and recently 
by Schiffner (1998) were on integrating attributes of face-to-face communication 
such as eye contact, gestures and voice with off-the-shelf desktop tools such as 
MBone with shared whiteboard.
In CSCW-based collaboration, the tasks of decision making and reaching group 
consensus have been largely left for humans to resolve. The conflict resolution 
expertise required to reach consensus resides in the humans themselves in the form 
of establishment of priorities, previous experience in group decision making and 
cognitive skills for bargaining. This according to Johansson, et al, (1994) could 
increase the mental work load for humans and could be a cause for irrational 
decisions. This suggests that there is a need for integrating tools for rational 
decision making and conflict resolution in a CSCW based collaborative process. 
It can be argued that the software agent based approaches could complement a 
CSCW based process by providing such tools.
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1.3.2 Agent supported collaboration
Agent supported computing is a relatively new paradigm for developing intelligent 
software applications2. An agent is a computer program situated in an environ­
ment and is capable of autonomous decisions. In addition to autonomy, it should 
also exhibit qualities such as ability to communicate using some formal language 
and negotiate using some rational mechanism. An agent may also possess adapt­
ability to orient its preferences by perceiving its own environment [Woolridge and 
Jennings, 1995]. These qualities make software agent-oriented techniques a useful 
means for collaborative problem solving, especially if the tasks are repetitive and 
highly specialised [Berker and Brown (1996)].
There are several instances of agent supported techniques for collaborative prod­
uct development but largely the focus has been on software considerations (eg., 
network communication and interoperability between heterogenous systems [Hard­
wick et al (1995), Vernadat (1996a)]. There is, however, very little information 
on the agent’s synthesis techniques applied to engineering problem solving. In 
particular, the synthesis techniques need to be explicit to study how the agents 
generate their preferences. For example, work by Balasubramanium and Nor- 
rie (1996), Nwana and Woolridge (1997), Ndumu and Nwana (1996, 1997) and 
Boden (1994) provided merely a theoretical description with little evidence to 
support the validity of their techniques.
Since the agents have their own preferences on a common design goal, a multi­
agent system often manifests conflicts between the agents. These conflicts need 
to be resolved and their resolution would ideally require formal reasoning and 
negotiation procedures. Agent supported conflict resolution has received great 
attention in non-engineering e-commerce applications (eg., buyer-seller scenarios 
of bargaining) as reported by Oliver (1996). In engineering, agent supported 
conflict resolution has only been treated as a domain specific issue [Berker and
2 The term agent is used to imply a software agent unless stated otherwise.
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Brown (1996)] and there are no known schemes for domain-independent conflict 
resolution in collaborative design and manufacturing. Even here, there is little 
evidence of a formal mechanism being applied for agent based reasoning and 
negotiation although some protocols do exist outside agent based research, for 
example, see Badrinath and Rao (1996), Kusiak and Wang (1996), Oh and Sharpe 
(1995) and Kanappan and Marshek (1993). Moreover, the existing literature in 
agent supported conflict resolution tends to be abstract with little emphasis on 
the agent’s actual negotiation protocol or even on negotiation techniques [for 
example, Dunskus et al, (1995), Berker and Brown (1996)].
1.4 Conflicts in collaborative product develop­
m ent
The techniques discussed in Section 1.3 offer solutions covering individual aspects 
of collaborative design and manufacturing (e.g., communication, problem solving 
and conflict resolution). Specifically, the discussion highlighted the traditional 
human-centred approaches and certain problem-specific agent based techniques 
to support collaborative product development.
Pahl and Beitz (1996) have divided the design process into three main stages: 
conceptual, embodiment and detailed design. These are followed by the physi­
cal realisation of the product. During these stages of product development, the 
agents need to collaborate to make decisions on relevant aspects of the product 
and its processes. The conceptual design stage involves the generation and selec­
tion of the conceptual solutions for a design problem. The formulation of these 
solutions is based on the functions of the product, leading to a working structure 
of the product at the conceptual level. Any differences between designers on the 
formulation of solutions at this level are resolved via informal face-to-face discus­
sions based on some technical or economic criteria. Collaboration between the
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designers at this stage can be facilitated using the CSCW approach.
During the embodiment design, the individual sub-problems are identified and 
physical solutions to support the design concept are determined. Solutions for 
each sub-problem, depending on its complexity and nature of solution, can be 
carried out by one or more designers. Any differences between the designers will 
be at the schematic level eg., about sketches and flow charts. Collaboration at 
this stage can still be supported using CSCW approach.
The detailed design stage often involves the deployment of computer-based tools 
such as CAD/CAM software, optimisation programs and engineering analysis 
tools. Increasingly, such computer based tools are capable of decision making 
in their specific area of expertise and tend to have a resemblance with software 
agents. Design conflicts at this stage should be treated as a collaboration issue 
between agents.
To address the problem of collaboration between agents in collaborative product 
development, agent synthesis and conflict resolution need to be addressed as 
an inter-related issue. The reason for this inter-relation is that the ability for 
automated conflict resolution will depend on the underlying decision mechanism 
used by the agents. Therefore, an agent model should be synthesised with an 
appropriate decision mechanism that will be conducive to conflict resolution. 
The agent’s preferences will need to be captured in the agent model by some 
formal means to represent the autonomous behaviour. The conflicts between 
agent preferences will need to be resolved using some rational scheme.
The following points emerge from this discussion:
• Need for an approach for software agent synthesis;
• Need for a formal scheme for conflict resolution between agents.
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Based on the preceding discussion, the objectives of this research are identified 
next.
1.5 Research objectives
The aim of this research is to enhance the computer-based techniques for collabo­
rative product development. Specifically, the research has the following objectives 
to support the detailed design:
Objective 1: To develop an effective technique for agent synthesis to support 
collaborative design;
Objective 2: To develop a novel scheme for conflict resolution between agents.
1.6 Research m ethodology
The methodology employed to achieve the objectives of this research consists of 
the following steps:
1. Review of previous research related to collaborative product development 
and identify key outstanding research issues.
2. Analyse existing approaches for modelling software agents and adopt or 
modify these for constructing software agents to collaborative engineering.
3. Development of a scheme for conflict resolution in an agent supported prod­
uct development process.
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4. Validation of the new software agent synthesis approach and conflict reso­
lution scheme by means of laboratory-based design and manufacturing case 
studies.
1.7 Thesis outline
This thesis on conflict resolution in a agent supported product development pro­
cess is organised as follows.
Chapter 2 presents a review of literature related to collaboration and conflict 
resolution based on intelligent software agents and Computer Supported Coop­
erative Work (CSCW); the area of software agents including agent synthesis is 
explored in detail. This review covers agent related research based on its rele­
vance to conflict resolution in design and manufacturing. The existing conflict 
resolution schemes are reviewed and the outstanding research issues are identified 
in accordance with the aims of this research.
In Chapter 3, a novel technique is proposed for synthesising Multi-Agents. This 
technique is based on the concept of Single Function Agents (SiFAs) which are 
modelled using the Habermas’s theory of action. Internal structure of the new 
SiFA model is discussed. The chapter concludes with a description and two 
examples of how single function agents can be combined to form multi-agents.
Chapter 4 presents a novel scheme for conflict resolution in a multi-agent deci­
sion process. First a background is presented on conflict resolution in product 
development. Then two key approaches for conflict resolution namely constraint 
relaxation and game-theoretic negotiation techniques are discussed and a need 
for a unified scheme is identified. A new conflict resolution scheme developed 
in this thesis is presented in detail. The underlying reasoning and negotiation 
agents have been explained to show how these could be used to assist rational
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decision making.
Chapter 5 presents a comparative case study aimed at benchmarking the new 
conflict resolution scheme by applying it to the collaborative design of a poppet 
relief valve. Comparison with previous research work in conflict resolution is 
made on the basis of this case study.
Chapter 6 presents a case study on the design and manufacture of a Geneva 
mechanism to validate the agent synthesis and conflict resolution scheme in a 
wider collaborative process consisting of software agents and human decision 
makers.
In Chapter 7, conclusions of this research are drawn and comparisons made with 
the other work in collaborative product development in the context of conflict 
resolution. The key contributions to knowledge and understanding of the sub­
ject area of conflict resolution using software agents are highlighted. Finally, 
limitations of this thesis and scope for further research are identified.
Chapter 2
Review of agent synthesis and 
conflict resolution
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a review of previous research relating to software agent 
synthesis and conflict resolution between agents in collaborative product devel­
opment. The review focuses on the issues related to the objectives of this research, 
identified in Chapter 1. The literature review is intended to provide the reader 
with necessary background for the rest of this thesis. Accordingly, this chapter 
is organised around the following aspects:
• A background to the trends in collaborative product development is pre­
sented. This will give an overall picture of collaborative product develop­
ment based on the approaches of Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
(CSCW) and software agents.
• A detailed review of software agent based technique for collaborative prod­
uct development is presented. This is to highlight some key characteristics
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of agents and the application of agents in design and manufacturing.
•  A review of agent synthesis: Single Function Agent (SiFA) based approach 
for synthesising software agents is presented and a comparison is drawn 
with Multi-Agent approach.
•  Existing schemes for conflict resolution relating to collaborative design are 
reviewed. A need for an explicit scheme for the resolution of conflicts be­
tween software agents is identified.
•  Identification of relevant research issues and formation of two hypothesis 
for this research.
This review has drawn on various sources including journal articles, conference 
proceedings, text-books and magazines. In addition, it also includes a few private 
communications between the author and experts from the academia and industry.
2.2 Collaborative approaches
In collaborative product development partners with complementary competen­
cies virtually co-locate to design, manufacture and market a product. Brynes
(1993) was one of the first authors to state the attributes of a collaborative dis­
tributed organisation. According to Brynes, a distributed environment involves 
seamless integration across partnerships without formal boundaries. This implies 
that extensive infrastructure support of collaboration technologies (CT) would be 
necessary to overcome barriers such as geographical separation. The CT has been 
broadly identified to be comprising of both hardware and software, the specific 
details of which will depend on the environment.
There has been extensive research since the 1980’s in the areas surrounding collab­
orative work [for example, see Hirschheim (1985)]. Two key techniques emerged
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out of this extensive research, namely CSCW and software agents. Though the 
common goal of these techniques was to support collaborative work, their evolu­
tion has been independent. In the context of distributed product development, 
these techniques address a wide range of issues highlighted in Chapter 1 such 
as communication, interoperability and decision making. In what will follow, an 
overview of CSCW and software agent based approaches is presented.
2.2.1 CSCW  based approaches
Research in group working and office automation in the 80’s led to the con­
cept of Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW)1 [Hirschhiem (1985)]. 
In its early stages CSCW was mainly intended towards integrating single-user 
applications to support desktop working. The * CSCW-based research has em­
ployed video conferencing technology to assist human-centred virtual business 
meetings [Ishii, et al., (1994)], collaborative design and manufacturing [Gay and 
Lentini (1995), Schiffner (1998)]. Humans orchestrate all major decisions in a 
CSCW-based setting and software tools are only viewed as vehicles to assist the 
collaborative work. This enhances the sense of control and trust between team 
members [Talbert, (1997)].
Though Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) has found success in 
several applications (e.g., distributed manufacturing), it suffers from various limi­
tations. Vast amount of CSCW literature covered mainly the tools (eg., InPerson 
for video conferencing, email, telephone and fax) that assist collaboration rather 
than how effectively they assisted the process. For example, the studies by Ishii, 
et al., (1994) reflect this where the focus was on providing a set of tools for 
collaborative work rather than on issues such as resolution of conflicts between 
humans.
1CSCW is also known as Groupware, Workflow and Group Decision Support Systems 
[Grudin, (1994)].
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Increase in mental workload is seen as one of the factors that tend to diminish 
human performance and be a cause for irrational decisions [Johansson, et al.,
(1994)]. The humans in a collaborative design process have individual prefer­
ences towards a common design attribute (e.g., strength, cost) which often lead 
to conflicts. These conflicts need to be resolved based on some formal approach 
rather than by some ad hoc means where the conflict resolution expertise rests 
on humans themselves. Thus there is a need for tools to assist humans in col­
laborative problem solving in the context of maintaining rational decisions and 
resolving conflicts. The research in the area of software agents could complement 
CSCW with respect to providing such tools.
2.2.2 Software agent-supported approaches
The software agents came into existence in the 1990’s but their roots date back 
to distributed Al research in the 1980’s where the work by Gasser (1988), in­
vestigated ways of building functioning, automated problem solvers for specific 
applications [Gensereth and Ketchpel (1994)]. For example, one such outcome of 
research in distributed Al was Contract Net [Gasser (1988)]. This software could 
exchange data but lacked problem solving ability. Later in the 1990’s, due to 
the innovations in Internet-based applications, there was a need to develop soft­
ware that could ensure reusability, problem solving ability and compatibility for 
data exchange across heterogenous platforms [Woolridge and Jennings, (1995)]. 
Thus the very idea of software agent based research was to develop systems that 
were capable of benefiting end-users rather than a specialised group. Some of the 
recent work in software agent based research demonstrates their wide applica­
bility in work-flow management [Huhns and Singh, (1994)], electronic commerce 
[Sandholm and Lesser, (1998)], digital libraries [Durfee, et al, (1996)], negoti­
ation in virtual markets [Oliver, (1996)] and conflict resolution in parametric 
design [Berker and Brown (1996)].
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2.3 Software agents in collaborative product de­
velopment
The objective of this section is to present some introductory aspects of the soft­
ware agent technology and examine how these aspects are realised in real-world 
scenarios in the context of conflict resolution between agents.
2.3.1 W hat is a software agent ?
The objective here is to highlight those characteristics that will differentiate a 
software agent from an ordinary software program. Though there are several 
published articles on agent based approaches, there is still a lack of agreement 
between researchers on the characteristics that define agent-hood [Ndumu and 
Nwana, (1997), Lander, (1997) and Shoham, (1999)]. Shardlow (1990) was the 
first to define a software agent as: “Agents are the ones that act”. Shardlow’s 
definition is not too dissimilar to the meaning of the term agent given in the 
Webster’s comprehensive dictionary which is “One who or that which acts or 
has power to a c t . .”. These definitions merely indicate involvement of actions 
associated with each agent rather than its characteristics. In general software 
agents should possess key functionalities such as autonomy, adaptability, abil­
ity to communicate and resolve conflicts, interoperability and pro-activeness. A 
more precise definition of a software agent would require an explanation concern­
ing specific behavioural qualities such as belief, desire and emotions. In addition 
to this, it would require a precise definition of the actions the agent is expected to 
perform and goals the agent wishes to achieve. Some of the software agent char­
acteristics commonly referred in the literature are defined next [Lander (1997), 
Woolridge and Jennings (1995) and Shoham (1999)].
• A utonom y: Autonomy gives an agent the ability to make decisions inde-
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pendently with minimal human intervention. An autonomous agent may 
not blindly obey commands but will have the ability to modify requests 
made by other agents or even refuse them in a given context such as bar­
gaining [Etzioni and Weld, (1994)].
• A daptab ility : This enables the agents to perceive their environment such 
as computer network or manufacturing plant and respond to changes in a 
timely manner.
• A bility  to  com m unicate: An agent should have the ability to commu­
nicate formally using a language such as Knowledge Query Manipulation 
Language (KQML) with other agents to accomplish its goals. This also 
refers to the use of precise vocabulary in the process of communication.
• A bility  to  resolve conflicts: An agent should be able to resolve con­
flicts (e.g., in situations where agents have differing preferences towards a 
common goal) by means of some formal mechanism. This mechanism could 
make use of formal procedures such as game theory or informal means such 
as domain-specific rule-based techniques.
• In teroperab ility : This gives an agent the ability to interact with other 
agents in a heterogenous environment. For example, interoperability is nec­
essary if two agents that are supported by different software and hardware 
platforms wish to exchange data or functions.
• P ro-activeness: This refers to the agent’s ability to take the initiative and 
exhibit opportunistic behaviour in complex problem solving environments.
A given agent may not possess all the characteristics presented above but only 
some of them. This has resulted in agents to be classified as weak or strong [Wool­
ridge and Jennings, (1995)]. According to Takeda, et al, (1996) a strong agent 
would possess additional capabilities such as belief, emotions, learning ability 
and obligation. Any agent that does not have these capabilities is termed weak.
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Figure 2.1 shows several agent-hood characteristics put forward by researchers 
and highlights the variety in defining agent-hood. However, there is agreement 
on some of the common features an agent may possess such as autonomy, com­
munication, interoperability and ability to resolve conflicts which distinguish a 
software agent from an ordinary computer program. In later sections it will be­
come obvious as to the extent to which the characteristic of conflict resolution 
























































Figure 2.1: Characteristics of agent-hood.
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2.3.2 Application of software agents in collaborative de­
sign and manufacturing
This section reviews key research carried out in agent-supported product devel­
opment with emphasis on distributed product design and manufacturing2. The 
review is presented with respect to the extent to which the agent-characteristic of 
ability to resolve conflicts is realised in real world collaborative problem solving.
• McGuire, et al, (1993)
This is one the initial efforts in the line of agent-based product development. 
Their effort was termed SHADE (Shared Dependency Engineering) and involved 
four geographically distributed partners - Lockheed, Stanford University, Enter­
prise Integration Technologies, and Hewlett-Packard. The main aim of this work 
was to exchange information between software agents. They addressed this using 
KQML to provide the means for formal exchange of knowledge expressed in KIF 
format, in addition to data sharing [Finin, et al, (1995)]. Though their work 
proved the importance of communication by means of formats such as KIF, it 
failed to identify other agent functionalities such as negotiation which are nec­
essary for collaborative problem solving. For example, the agents communicate 
using match-making, a technique similar to blackboard technology. This implies 
communication takes place based on the content field description in the KQML 
message structure [see Appendix C]. Their protocol applies to cases where there 
is only one match and did not consider a case where conflicts between agents 
occur due to individual preferences. In situations such as this, the agents may 
need to negotiate using some formal techniques such as game theory to pick a 
particular match. These agents demonstrate communication, interoperation and 
task-solving ability and hence are categorised as weak.
2The available literature in software agent based research is voluminous and varied. For 
the present research, the choice of references cited here was made based on their relevance to 
conflict resolution in design and manufacturing.
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• Lewis, et al., (1994)
Lewis, et al., provided software agent services (e.g., design and manufacturing) 
distributed over a network (CAMnet) to enable data-sharing between geographi­
cally separated partners. Though the principal aim of this work was data-sharing, 
this differed from the work by McGuire, et al, in two key ways. First Lewis et 
al, provided Web-based interface to applications and did not make use of formal 
languages such as KQML. The sharing of product data was achieved by using 
exchange standards such as STandard for the Exchange of Product model data 
(STEP). They also provided wrapper mechanisms to enable data interoperability 
between agents but functional interoperability was not achieved. The aspect of 
conflict resolution between agents left out by McGuire, et al, (1994) was not 
further addressed as a major issue. The agents presented in this study showed 
ability for communication, interoperation and task solving, and can be classified 
as weak.
•  Erkes, et al, (1996)
They presented an expanded effort by the CAMnet project group to enhance reuse 
and functional interoperability between heterogeneous agents, issues that were 
not covered by Lewis, et al, (1994). Figure 2.2 shows the product development 
architecture proposed by Erkes, et al, that includes networked agent services, 
and legacy software.
The main objective of this architecture was to maximise the automated agent- 
based services (e.g., design, simulation) and integration of legacy software through 
CORBA3. They demonstrated this in the context of a distributed snap-fit design 
problem where information exchange between a legacy FORTRAN code and a 
database was facilitated through CORBA. Based on their identification, their 
agents point towards a weak definition of agent-hood - the only capabilities iden­
tified being communication, interoperability and problem solving ability but not 
the ability to resolve conflicts. However, their initial success prompted them to
3Iona Technologies, Inc., USA. http://www.iona.com
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Figure 2.2: Distributed product development architecture of Erkes, et al.
point to certain aspects of agent-hood such as autonomy and pro-activeness which 
can be inferred from their statement: “In the Object agent-model, system com­
ponents dedicated to individual users are agents acting on behalf of those users”. 
Careful interpretation of this statement in the context of their effort would reveal 
that only specific functions (e.g., automated message passing between software 
agents, invoking legacy software functions using Remote Procedure Call) can be 
executed on behalf of human users. This is due to the dearth of evidence in 
their work and elsewhere that would let a software agent perform other human 
attributes such as motivation, belief and decision making in uncertainty [For 
example, see Shoham (1999)].
• Yang and Ho (1994)
Yang and Ho proposed a framework for agent-based distributed product devel­
opment with emphasis on negotiation and flexible open architecture. They pre­
sented a framework consisting of intelligent software agents and used terms such 
as decision making, coordination and communication that gave a theoretical de­
scription. The authors made extravagant claims, such as all processes within 
their framework were software agent-controlled, without giving any details of the 
mechanism of control. For example, the authors quote, “...all problems (sic) solv­
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ing procedures are executed automatically. Problem requesters need not know how 
a problem can be solved, they only need to specify what problems they want to be 
solved”. This statement suggests the agents actually generate solutions for the 
posted problems. Another statement by the authors contradicts their previous 
statement as, “The artificial I A ’s execute tasks orderly according to the algo­
rithms (in the problem specification base) we have given, but will not work well 
i f  undefined problems are posted”. They presented a somewhat poorly organised 
framework for distributed problem solving with little attention given to identi­
fying their agent’s structure, its characteristics such as negotiation and realising 
its merits in implementation.
• Balasubramanium and Norrie (1996)
Balasubramanium and Norrie developed an agent-based framework for concur­
rent product development. The central theme of their work was to agentify pro­
cesses such as design, scheduling and negotiation. Much of their explanation is 
on theoretical aspects of product development processes such as design-shopfloor 
coordination. The authors present little about their agent characteristics, details 
of which are only limited to the imagination of the reader. This is evident in at 
least two instances. For example, the authors quote, “This negotiation mecha­
nism helps resolving conflicts among instantiated features automatically to a large 
extent”. No negotiation mechanism for conflict resolution or any pointers to any 
existing mechanisms were actually given. In another instance the authors quote, 
“Every tool in the shop-floor is represented by an autonomous tool agent. Each 
tool agent has knowledge about its shape, schedule and tolerance capabilities in 
combination with a particular machine and work material...” There was no men­
tion of how the knowledge is represented internally (e.g., in the form of rules) 
or how their agent would carry out autonomous actions. Such claims without 
proper representation of agent-hood could at best lead to theoretical solutions 
and cannot be regarded as a proof-of-concept.
Berker and Brown (1996)
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Berker and Brown presented a Single Function Agent (SiFA) based approach 
for conflict resolution. They showed that using SiFAs it was easier to visualise 
the internal structure of agents closely (e.g., design functions at the parametric 
level, conflict resolution mechanisms). Their agent-model had several meta-levels 
of decision associated with each SiFA. However, the actual conflict resolution 
procedures within these levels were not stated explicitly.
Though a conceptually elegant approach, these unlimited levels of decisions to 
support conflict resolution made it hard to implement their agent model as they 
themselves acknowledged. One of the flaws of their approach, in common with 
that of Yang and Ho (1994), was the assumption, “Our work uses software agents 
instead of human agents” which only proved to be difficult at the end for the 
authors to substantiate. They emphasise on agent-characteristics such as informal 
communication using speech act theory and problem solving ability which place 
their agents in the weak category.
•  Frost and Cutkosky (1996)
Frost and Cutkosky proposed a framework for distributed manufacturability eval­
uation. The framework encapsulated design and manufacturing software agents 
that communicate using KQML [Finin, et al, (1995)]. While the effectiveness 
of KQML has been demonstrated by several others including McGuire, et al, 
(1993), this work differed in one key respect. Frost and Cutkosky developed 
agent-templates for KQML-based communication in Java. Hence their agents 
exhibited a truly platform-independent behaviour. In addition, the agents were 
also encapsulated in a Web page as Java applets that enhanced portability. Frost 
and Cutkosky provided only generic information about agent’s internal structure 
that consisted of design rules, constraints and simulation procedures. But their 
results indicated that the inclusions of simulation procedures actually enhanced 
the problem solving ability of agents. They demonstrated this in the context of 
the chatter problem detection during milling operations. There was also consid­
erable emphasis on mapping of geometrical features (e.g., generalised cylinders)
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between CAD and process planning agents thus addressing the interoperability 
at data and function level. However, issues such as negotiation and autonomy 
were not taken into consideration. Their agent-hood can at best be described as 
weak.
• Orbst, et a l, (1997)
Most of the agent-based frameworks reviewed previously covered mainly commu­
nication and interoperability. Orbst et al, introduced belief and autonomy in 
addition to communication and task processing. They effectively captured the 
data exchange process in a typical setup involving a large number of agents (e.g., 
design, stress, manufacturing, and monitoring agents). They presented details of 
how the agents use rules in goal-task mapping that enable autonomy during a de­
sign process. In order to relate the autonomy of agents with their tasks, Orbst et 
al, developed a Task-Builder tool that displayed an explicit control logic for the 
execution of tasks. However, they failed to bring out explictly how beliefs were 
modelled in their agents. In addition, Orbst, et al, failed to acknowledge the 
existence of multiple preferences (marked by autonomy) which could often lead 
to conflicts between agents. Their agents demonstrated autonomy, goal-oriented 
behaviour, communication and interoperability which places them in the weak 
category.
• Zeng and Sycara (1998)
The Bazzar negotiation model of Zeng and Sycara (1998) presents evidence of 
agent based conflict resolution and learning through interactions. They presented 
agent negotiation from a utility point of view and examined cases: (a) when all 
agents learn, (b) when no agents learn and (c) when one agent learns. The 
effect on joint utility was also examined. Though Bazzar model captured the 
key aspects of a typical negotiation scenario (e.g., formation of utility functions, 
evaluation of trade-off, etc.), the focus was on learning mechanisms that support 
conflict resolution. Their agents demonstrated autonomy, learning capability, 
and ability to negotiate which places them in the weak category.
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Having presented application of agents as seen by previous research, the next 
section will identify some of their merits and limitations in collaborative product 
development.
2.3.3 M erits and lim itations of software agents
Realising the appropriateness of software agent technology lies in evaluating its 
merits and limitations applied to distributed product development. These are 
summarised below.
Merits
• Agent-based techniques offer efficient solutions to collaborative problem 
solving by hiding the complexity of the problem from other agents and 
at the same time delivering the solutions in a time-efficient manner. For 
example, the personal assistant agent developed by Takeda, et al, (1996) 
demonstrated the problem solving ability of agents that carry out simple 
tasks (e.g., preparing schedules, booking venues for meetings, e-mailing 
project partners, etc.) on behalf of humans. Such specific problem solving 
ability of agents in the manufacturing domain was highlighted by Shen 
and Norrie (1999) where the agents prepare the schedule for manufacturing 
operations (e.g., assigning a machine tool, a fixture, etc.).
• Influence of agent learning in task processing [e.g., Bazzar model of Zeng 
and Sycara, (1998)] shows how learning can influence a decision process. 
Even though learning mechanisms are still at the development stage, these 
have proved to be useful in the light of some specific applications (eg., 
conflict negotiation, process scheduling) [Ndumu and Nwana, (1997)].
The above merits offer valid justification that software agent technology will en­
hance the construction of complex distributed systems given sufficient develop­
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ments in agent synthesis (e.g., air traffic control, patient monitoring and space­
craft fault detection systems). However, the concept of software agents is not 
magical and suffers from some limitations. These are summarised next.
Limitations
• One of the major problems highlighted in Section 2.5.4 was the aspect of 
overselling agent technology without enough evidence on its synthesis and 
conflict resolution mechanisms. Most of the existing research did not focus 
on providing schemes for conflict resolution between agents. Some the ex­
isting conflict resolution procedures including of Berker and Brown (1996) 
were domain specific. Similarly, the negotiation protocol of Balasubrama­
nium and Norrie (1996) was also not explicit with respect to the conflict 
resolution knowledge.
• One of the issues was replacing humans by software agents. This is clearly 
beyond the scope of the present technology and is well brought out by Wool­
ridge and Jennings (1995) in the context of decision making: “Those un­
familiar with the achievements (and failures) of Artificial Intelligence (Al) 
often believe that agents are capable of human-like reasoning and acting. 
Obviously, this is not the case: such a level of competence is well beyond 
state of the art in AI. Thus agents may sometimes exhibit smart problem 
solving behaviour, but is still very much limited by the current state of the 
art in machine intelligence”. This argument was well supported by Shoham 
(1999) based on his comments on the current trends of software agent tech­
nology.
•  Finally, there is a lack of standards in synthesising agent-based systems 
including standardised support for conflict resolution, tracking and mon­
itoring processes, run-time management, etc. For example, most of the 
existing agent-development platforms such as JATLite and JAFMAS pro­
vide a base for KQML-based communication. By providing a standardised
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support, these platforms could do more than just exchange KQML mes­
sages.
Having presented the limitations of agent-supported technology, the the SiFA 
based approach for the synthesis of software agents is reviewed. This review is 
necessary to support the first thread of this thesis which is synthesis of software 
agents as stated in Section 2.1.
2.4 Software agent synthesis
Research work in the area of Multi-agents (MAs) covers different domains such 
as information systems, task processing and mediation. These MAs are large 
grained; their granularity refers to the large information contained in such agents. 
Some of the examples of such large grained agent based systems are SHARE [Toye 
and Tanenbaum (1993)] and ABCDE [Balasubramanium and Norrie (1996)].
The treatment of the building of such large grained agents has been abstract in 
the literature [Berker and Brown (1996)]. For example, details of mechanisms for 
communication, problem solving procedures, and schemes for conflict resolution 
are generally not presented. Thus, the internal structure of the agent is opaque 
[for example, see Balasubramanium and Norrie (1996)]. In an attempt to study 
these agents at a finer level of granularity, Dunskus, et al, (1995) proposed an 
approach based on Single Function Agents (SiFAs).
2.4.1 Background on agent synthesis
Single Function Agents (SiFAs) are a way of constructing multi-agent systems. A 
single function agent is meant to achieve a single objective based on a single target
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which is a design variable [Figure 2.3]. In a problem solving process the SiFAs 
interact with other agents based on a pre-defined strategy. A strategy is usually 
a number of rules and constraints that guide an agent into taking appropriate 
actions during various stages of problem solving.
The SiFAs contain limited knowledge for task solving and conflict negotiation 
[Shakeri (1998)]. This knowledge is identified as design knowledge and conflict 
resolution knowledge. The design knowledge relates to the design variables, and 
engineering design methods whereas the conflict resolution knowledge includes 
strategies such as game theoretic techniques.
Design
parameter















Figure 2.3: Levels of decision in Dunskus, et al, (1995) and Berker and Brown 
(1996)
Background work on SiFAs is rather limited and not as extensive as work on 
multi-agent systems. SNEAKERS was the first SiFA-based system developed by 
Brown (1992). The system consisted of several task-specific SiFAs that assisted 
the user by suggesting and criticising solutions to a design problem. Brown 
did not, however, demonstrate the applicability of SNEAKERS to a case study. 
Victor, et al, (1993) used a SiFA based approach, known as I3D, a parametric 
design system. Agents in I3D was responsible for individual tasks of design 
evaluation, cost estimation and manufacturing. The I3D system did not have a 
conflict resolution mechanism as the choice of design variables was fixed at the 
start of the design process. One key enhancement from Brown’s work was that 
Victor et al, practically demonstrated the SiFA approach in the context of the 
design and manufacture of ceramic components.
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Dunskus, et al. (1995) presented the SINE project and a theoretical overview 
of SiFAs. For example, they discussed interaction patterns of exchange informa­
tion between SiFAs. However, their work remained largely generic and was not 
evaluated from the perspective of its practicality and suffered from the lack of 
case studies. As shown in Figure 2.3, the proposed SiFA model had several de­
cision levels that remained too abstract to be defined. Berker and Brown (1996) 
refined the approach of Dunskus et al., in terms of identifying certain types of 
SiFAs (e.g., suggestors, advisors, etc.). Though Berker and Brown presented 
an agent model based on SiFA, they placed little emphasis on: (a) explaining 
the formal procedures their agents would adopt for problem solving, (b) conflict 
resolution schemes and (c) communication mechanism. These aspects remained 
largely generic with some minimal information presented in the context of the 
design of a wine glass. They also did not relate how SiFAs combine to form MAs. 
Before attempting to visualise the transition from SiFAs to MAs, it is necessary 
to see their distinguishing characteristics.
2.4.2 Differences between M ulti-Agents and SiFAs
From the view point of developing software agents, it is important to underline 
the distinction between SiFAs and Multi-agents (MAs). Table 2.1 presents a set 
of four criteria that compares SiFAs with MAs.
A Multi-agent system often has several associated perspectives (e.g., design, man­
ufacturing) whereas SiFAs deal with a specific design perspective such as com­
pressive strength. Creation and maintenance of ontologies are simple in the case 
of SiFAs as they refer to a particular design attribute. In the case of Multi­
agents, making compatible ontologies is often difficult due to the heterogeneity of 
agents and perspectives. Thus communication support will need to be robust (by 
means of effective capturing of ontologies) in a Multi-agent environment. Agent 
behaviour is more predictable at the attribute level as in the case of SiFAs (e.g.,
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Table 2.1 Comparison o f Multi-agents and SiFAs
Criteria M ulti-agent systems Single Function  
Agents (SiFAs)
Perspectives
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simple and involves 
sharing o f parameters
Behaviour
formulation
Individual preferences are 
often non-deterministic 
and fuzzy (e.g., colour)
Behaviour is predictable 
and is often well defined 
(e.g., mathematical functions)
evaluation of stress, etc.). In Multi-agent systems, individual preferences exist; 
these often lead to conflicts. These conflicts often occur at a higher level of ab­
straction and are often fuzzy, for example, preferences on appearance or colour 
of a product [Kusiak and Wang, (1995)]. As highlighted in Section 2.3.5, there 
are no known schemes for resolution of conflicts between agents in a domain- 
independent manner. With the objective of developing such a scheme a review of 
conflicts and available schemes relating to collaborative design is presented next.
2.5 Conflict resolution between agents
The literature relating to conflict resolution is voluminous and varied, embracing 
contexts such as business, jurisprudence, international relations and engineering 
[Nash (1950), Binmore (1985), Klien (1993) and Rao and Freheit (1991)]. In this 
section a subset of this literature relating to computational models for conflict 
resolution relating to parametric design is reviewed. The key aim of this review is 
to uncover the conflict negotiation expertise applied to collaborative design and 
manufacturing involving both software and human agents.
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2.5.1 W hat is a conflict?
There is not yet a universal definition for the term conflict According to Rahim 
(1986), a conflict occurs when there is a disagreement between two objects. The 
cause for this disagreement could be due to several factors such as objects hold­
ing different viewpoints towards a decision variable or the evaluated decision 
variable fails to satisfy one of the objects’ interests. March and Simon (1993) 
defined conflict as a situation where a group experiences difficulty in choosing al­
ternative actions due to a breakdown in the decision making mechanism. Berker 
and Brown (1996) viewed conflicts as an occurrence in a design process where 
one or more design constraints are violated. A similar view was also adopted by 
Kusiak and Wang (1996, 1995) and Wang (1994). Most definitions of conflict 
seem to centre around the argument that there is some dissimilarity between 
two agents towards a common goal [Nash (1950), Rahim (1986), Kanappan and 
Marshek (1993), Rao and Freheit (1991), Wellman (1990)]4. These preceding 
characterisation of conflict have been modelled and captured in discrete sym­
bolic and mathematical forms (e.g., truth maintenence, Al-based reasoning and 
game theory) and have been applied to group decision situations in collaborative 
design. For example, Medland (1992) developed constraint-based modelling pro­
cedures for collaborative design. These rule-based procedures are encapsulated 
in a modelling software5 which conducts a search to determine a state where the 
rules are true. Such modelling techniques are valuable in contexts where inter­
dependencies between product life-cycle processes exist [Gonikhin and Medland 
(1990)].
Having presented the different views of conflicts, the author has chosen to define 
a conflict in parametric design as: A collaborative decision situation where two
4 The discussion here is restricted to the definitions of the term conflict put forward by 
researchers mainly in the context of collaborative design. A more discursive treatment on 
classical vs. non-classical conflicts (e.g., international business negotiation, strategic warfare, 
etc.) is not presented here as it is beyond the scope of this work.
5CAMFORD: Reference manual, Constraint modelling collaborative group, Department of 
mechanical engineering, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK.
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or more agents with individual preferences disagree on a mutually shared design 
goal It is this mis-alignment of multiple preferences that lead to conflicts between 
agents. A generic taxonomy is presented next which will identify the conflicts 
due to individual preferences in a wide spectrum of conflicts.
2.5.2 A generic taxonom y of conflicts
Klien (1993) presented a generic taxonomy of conflicts encountered in collabo­
rative design. Klien’s taxonomy is adapted and extended in Figure 2.4 which 
shows several levels of conflicts that are generally encountered during a product 
development process. Certain types of conflicts presented in this taxonomy, as 
identified by shaded regions in Figure 2.4, were identified by Klien. This tax­
onomy divides conflicts into three major types: (a) hard conflicts, (b) medium 
conflicts and (c) soft conflicts. The reason for this classification is that every con­
flict resolution needs a unique combination of different techniques and allowable 
resolution time. For example, the resolution of conflicts arising due to a lack of 
semantics may need less time and resources as compared to the ones arising due 
to differing preferences.
Hard conflicts
Hard conflicts are perhaps the most difficult to resolve since the conflicting agents 
are not always in a hurry to reach a compromise. Jelassi and Foroughi (1989) 
have considered some conflicts which are difficult to resolve as a win or lose game. 
This type encompasses a variety of conflicts ranging from constraint violation in 
product design to socio-cultural differences in decision making. Key stages in 
approaching hard conflicts involve identification of a conflict and applying some 
standard negotiation schemes such as game theoretic approaches to generate a 
trade-off between agents. For example, in a pressure vessel design problem, an
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Figure 2.4: A taxonomy of conflicts
agent’s objective might be to minimise the weight whereas another agent’s interest 
may be to maximise the volume [Rao, et al., (1997), Lewis and Mistree (1998)]. 
Such a scenario where there is a set of preferences for each individual agent on 
shared or interacting parameters could lead to a hard conflict.
In a different case, an agent’s preference may be on a certain fuzzy characteristic 
such as the colour of a product. In such cases a fuzzy logic based approach of 
Kusiak and Wang (1995) could be applied to enforce a settlement between con­
flicting agents. Researchers have focused on many such schemes for negotiation 
but still a wide spectrum of hard conflicts remains unexplored [e.g., n-agent ne­
gotiation, threats in bargaining]. Many of the traditional approaches based on 
constraint relaxation, game theory and MCDM techniques assume tha t the pref­
erences of agents remain constant. This assumption is often flawed when agents 
wish to change their preferences in a dynamic problem solving environment and 
thereby give rise to secondary conflicts. As Vincent (1981) stated, such decision 
making under uncertainty is quite complex and a generic solution covering all 
aspects may be almost impossible.
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Medium conflicts
Medium conflicts arise mainly due to approximate estimation, performance fail­
ure or any other unexpected delays (e.g., caused due to accidents) in the product 
development process. This type of conflict often requires what is called approx­
imate cooperation [Lewis and Mistree (1998)]. As Ward (1995) pointed out, at 
Toyota, the designers often deliberately come up with approximate specifications 
initially when interacting with suppliers. This is done in order to save time and 
resources at the start of the design process. However, such an initial specifica­
tion could lead to a conflict between feasible design values for a product. One of 
the key approaches to resolve such conflicts is to create approximate expressions 
for decision variables in the absence of full information. Mathematically this is 
accomplished by using a Taylor’s series expansion of first or higher order terms 
of the agent-controlled variables [Hacker and Lewis (1998)]. Other instances of 
medium conflicts are due to performance failure where the intervention of au­
tomated design experts is often suggested [Klien and Lu (1995)]. In this case, 
machine learning techniques such as case-based reasoning could be applied in 
conjunction with an automated negotiation system [Sycara and Lewis (1991)].
Soft conflicts
Soft conflicts usually occur between agents in a communication process. These 
often occur due to semantic mis-match or a lack of information that is easy to 
rectify. Though no rigorous procedures are adopted for the resolution of soft 
conflicts, they still need to be resolved in a timely manner. Klien and Lu (1995) 
and Berker and Brown (1996) suggested the use of speech act theory based ap­
proaches. The schemes include formal communication and use of formal languages 
such as KQML.
Given the three classes of conflicts, a conflict situation is rarely pure. There could
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be cases involving a hard conflict on parametric values, a medium conflict due 
to approximate specification and soft conflicts due to imprecise communication, 
thus requiring a combined negotiation strategy for conflict resolution. Discussion 
of such strategies in the author’s research will be centred around two distinct 
approaches based on game theory and dependency based reasoning which have 
been applied in the resolution of hard conflicts.
2.5.3 R esolution of hard conflicts
Conflicts are inevitable in any design process. Conflict resolution has been stud­
ied in a variety of industrial cases ranging from human conflicts (Nash, 1950) 
to product design conflicts. Researchers including Nash, and Klien (1990) have 
sought to build models for the resolution of conflicts to gain deeper understanding 
of issues that affect negotiation outcomes. Unfortunately, adequate models for 
conflict resolution do not exist except for certain polar cases of perfect conflicts6. 
For example, Rangaswamy and Shell (1997) reported a low success rate in their 
international business negotiation experiments (of which only 4 out of 34 cases 
reached consensus) even with an explicitly imposed preference structure. They 
also reported the non-deterministic nature of the process as marked by systematic 
deviations from rational behaviour. Oliver (1996) stated the need for computer- 
based models to improve the quality of negotiated settlements by providing means 
for enforcing rational behaviour. As opposed to such broad based conflict sce­
narios presented by Rangaswamy and Shell, parametric design processes offer a 
consolidated platform to analyse the conflicts in a more deterministic manner.
As the design process evolves it is frequently confronted with problems from 
various perspectives (e.g., design functions, manufacturing and maintenance, etc.) 
These conflicts could occur between humans and software agents. Detection of
6A perfect conflict depicts a situation where the conflicting agents opt for fair bargaining 
without the presence threats or opportunistic behaviour
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conflicts at an early stage is essential as it directly affects the product development 
time. For the resolution of conflicts in a design process, there is a variety of 
techniques broadly identified:
• Group decision support and rule based techniques7
•  Game theory based techniques
•  Dependency based constraint relaxation
(a) G roup decision support and  rule-based schemes 
Klien (1993)
Klien (1993) and later Klien and Lu (1995) suggested the use of a generic scheme 
for domain independent conflict resolution based on two key tenets: explicit cap­
turing and efficient organising of conflict resolution expertise. The conflict res­
olution expertise is represented in the form of meta-knowledge and the conflicts 
are arranged as an abstract class hierarchy. Klien’s negotiation model differed 
from the traditional over-the-wall approach as it was aimed at enhancing the co­
operative design spirit by means of well coordinated interaction between human 
agents. While Klien presented a generic class of conflicts (identified in the con­
text of a building design problem) the actual schemes necessary to support the 
negotiation process were not presented. For example, a part of Klien’s model was 
aimed at studying conflicts between humans during a group decision situation. 
Some of the conflict resolution expertise resided in the humans themselves and 
the nature of such expertise was not explicitly stated.
7There are formal as well as informal rule-based constraint relaxation techniques. For ex­
ample, Berker and Brown (1996) presented a rule-based approach for conflict resolution. These 
rules were based on speech act theory which use statements such as Agent A disagrees with 
Agent B without explicit reference to the object of disagreement. This approach is highly 
informal and lacks genericness compared to the formal truth maintenance based approach of 
Medland (1992) and that of Kusiak and Wang (1995).
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Berker and Brown (1996)
Berker and Brown (1996) and previously Dunskus, et al, (1995) presented a 
Single Function Agent (SiFA) based informal approach for conflict resolution be­
tween software agents. They identified a type of conflict due to the violation 
of design constraints and presented some informal schemes based on constraint 
relaxation. This, however, is based on some arbitrary variation of violating con­
straints and not according to dependencies between design parameters. Chapter 
4 also highlighted the lack of generic negotiation strategies in their SiFA based 
model. For example, their work lacked focus on preference-led conflicts which is 
of importance in a group problem solving situation.
(b) Game theory based techniques
Kanappan and Marshek (1993)
Kanappan and Marshek studied conflict negotiation applied to parametric design 
problems, specifically to the design of a poppet relief valve. Their negotiation 
protocol was based on the following:
• Conflicts always occur between two agents;
• Preferences of agents are stated as utility functions;
• Negotiation is based on Nash and Kalai-Somordinsky techniques.
Well defined analytical formulae were used to represent the objective of each 
agent. In addition, the agents’ preferences over a parameter were restrained 
from change during a design process. As two agents are involved in a design 
scenario, conflicts due to differing preferences are detected on variables that are 
shared between the two agents. The agents use game theory based techniques for 
conflict settlement. However, their study excluded the following aspects:
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• Inter-dependencies between design variables;
• Final negotiated single-point solutions;
• Global consistency of design solutions.
Parametric dependencies do exist and their effect needs to be propagated through­
out the design domain in order to obtain consistent solutions. Though work of 
Rao (1987) prior to Kanappan and Marshek demonstrated the use of game the­
ory based techniques for resolving design conflicts, the former used mathematical 
objective functions directly relating to the conflict parameter whereas the lat­
ter used a utility based approach which represents an index (or ranking) of the 
conflict variable 8. At this point it is interesting to note the view that Raiffa 
[Raiffa, 1972], one of the key contributors to the development of game theory, 
once expressed: “I  never really used the techniques of game theory - concepts and 
ideas, yes, but techniques, no - in my roles as negotiator....the qualitative frame­
work of thought was repeatedly helpful - not its detailed, esoteric, quantitative 
aspects. Simple back-of-the envelope analysis was all that seemed appropriate”. 
Rothkopf and Hanstad (1972) also echoed this view of Raiffa. However, this view 
is no longer true due to the recent developments in the areas of machine learning, 
automated decision support and electronic commerce which have been fostering 
many changes to the landscape of collaborative product development.
Several other game theory based protocols presented in the literature including 
that of Rao and Freheit (1991), Badrinath and Rao (1996), Lewis and Mistree
(1998) have applied existing techniques such as Nash and Stackelberg games to 
human centred conflict resolution. They did not, however, consider the effect of 
parametric dependency or provide means for isolating a final negotiated solution.
Sycara and Lewis (1991)
Sycara and Lewis (1991) studied conflict resolution in co-operative design using
8 The utility based approach is often preferred in circumstances where non-determinate func­
tions could exist, for example, see Nash (1950).
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Case-Based Reasoning (CBR) and qualitative assessment of strategies. CBR was 
used with a view to making the conflict resolution process dynamic, as agents’ 
case base is constantly enriched with new experiences that could be reused at a 
later stage. Their approach allows change of preferences while negotiation process 
is on going, an aspect that is not present in the work of Kanappan and Marshek 
(1993). The approach of Sycara and Lewis is often referred to as an aspiration 
based approach and has been applied in the context of the group decision situation 
by Kersten (1988) and Davey and Olson (1998).
(c) Constraint relaxation techniques
Kusiak and Wang (1995, 1996)
Kusiak and Wang approached conflict resolution based on qualitative and quan­
titative reasoning in a constraint network representing a design perspective such 
as manufacturability. Each perspective has several sub-problems which are de­
scribed by analytical formulae. The conflicts that occur within a perspective are 
studied on the basis of the violation of design constraints. The aspiration based 
approach of Kersten (1988) was adopted to represent the preferences of each 
perspective and sub-problems. Kusiak and Wang demonstrated the importance 
of consistency maintenence of solutions applied to the design of a poppet relief 
valve. However, they failed to capture explicitly the role of designers in a negoti­
ation process. More importantly, their iterative constraint relaxation process was 
not shown to converge in a general situation. For example, Kusiak and Wang 
assumed certain relaxation levels for the conflicting parameter controlled by dif­
ferent perspectives (e.g., design and manufacturing). By relaxing the constraints 
belonging to conflicting perspectives, it cannot be stated unconditionally that 
their approach would converge to a final settlement of the conflict. Moreover, 
constraint relaxation as proposed by Kusiak and Wang presented a case where 
each point within a feasible design space represents a negotiated solution [Wang
(1999)]. This could lead to secondary conflicts (in cases where preferences exist)
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and hence such a possibility should be avoided.
2.5.4 R elative merits of conflict resolution schemes
The game theory, constraint reasoning and other rule-based techniques offer cer­
tain prescriptive solutions when applied in isolation but however, suffer from 
certain limitations as identified in Figure 2.5. In order for agents (both human 
and software) to negotiate effectively, they should be aware of parametric de­
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Figure 2.5: Key merits and limitations of the conflict resolution approaches 
The following key points are summarised from the above review:
• Despite the success of certain prescriptive solutions for conflicts resolution, 
the previous approaches remain mutually isolated and have failed to coa­
lesce into a coherent scheme for negotiation;
• Whereas the constraint-based approach give a feasible solution space, game- 
theoretic approaches give single point solutions;
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•  None of the implemented negotiation protocols combine game theory with 
dependency based constraint relaxation in the context of conflict resolu­
tion. Such a combination in the author’s view could assist in maintaining 
rationality in a preference based decision process;
• Most of the techniques do not provide additional mechanisms for isolating 
a solution from a feasible set;
• Need for humans as an explicit aid for conflict resolution under uncertainty.
Thus there has been no known attempt prior to the author’s work that directly 
addresses the third hypotheses which is to align goals in a decision process where 
agents (both software and human) have preferences. Prior to exploring a new 
scheme for negotiation, a range of possible conflicts in a generic product devel­
opment environment is explored.
2.6 Identification of research issues
In the context of collaborative product development the survey identified two 
parallel approaches based on CSCW and software agents. In CSCW based ap­
proach, conflict resolution is a task left for humans to resolve. This, as highlighted 
in the review, may not always lead to rational solutions (eg., parametric design 
problems involving a large number of variables) since this is limited by human 
cognitive skills. Based on a critical review of research in agent based design and 
manufacturing, conflict resolution between software agents emerged as a key is­
sue which needs further investigation. To address this issue further, additional 
review was carried out on the following two inter-related strands:
• Synthesis of software agents;
• Schemes for resolving conflicts between agents.
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It is evident from the review that very little research has been conducted which 
directly addresses the need for a rational process of conflict resolution in a col­
laborative product development process where agents have individual preferences 
[as highlighted in Figure 2.4].
It is inevitable that agents have individual preferences towards a common goal 
in any product development process. This often leads to conflicts between the 
agents and will need to be resolved in a timely manner. Though the software 
agent research has highlighted conflict resolution as a key issue, there is very 
little evidence of formal agent based schemes for conflict resolution applied in the 
context of a case study. The existence of conflict resolution schemes (such as those 
based on game theory and constraint relaxation) in the literature outside software 
agent domain is, however, acknowledged. There is a need for demonstrating the 
usefulness of rational conflict resolution schemes that could be applied to conflicts 
involving both software agents and human decision makers in the context of 
collaborative product development. This is aimed towards enhancing the nature 
of group decision making by improving rationality and maintaining preferences 
of agents.
This leads to the principal objective of this research: to develop a scheme for 
conflict resolution between agents in a collaborative process. To address this 
objective, two inter-related hypotheses of this research were formed as shown in 
Figure 2.6.
The main issue in the present research is the development of a scheme for resolv­
ing conflicts in an agent-supported product development process. This, in the 
author’s view, is aimed at improving upon some of the methodological limita­
tions suffered by previous research to conflict resolution in collaborative product 
development. The two hypotheses form the basis for developing the work in the 
next two Chapters. The hypotheses are tested through case studies in Chapters 
5 & 6.
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Towards a novel scheme for conflict resolution between agents 
_________________in collaborative product development___________
Agent synthesis hypothesis
Hypothesis 1
A Single Function Agent (SiFA) approach 
based on action-theory offers a simplified 
m eans for modelling Multi-Agents
Goal alignment hypothesis
Hypothesis 2
The resolution of conflicts between agents 
in a  collaborative process will require a  
rational approach to negotiation
CHAPTER 3
CHAPTER 4
Figure 2.6: Hypotheses of this research
2.7 Summary
A review of research in collaborative product development based on software 
agents in the context of conflict resolution has been presented. In particular, 
this review covered two distinct areas: synthesis of software agents and conflict 
resolution schemes. This led to the identification of outstanding research issues 
and the formation of two hypotheses of this research. The following chapters are 
aimed at building new models for agent synthesis and conflict resolution based 
on these hypotheses and testing them through engineering case studies.
Chapter 3
Modelling of software agents
3.1 Introduction
This chapter is aimed at the modelling of software agents. A review of the SiFA 
approach by Berker and Brown (1996) presented in Chapter 2 ignored important 
issues such as the transition from SiFAs to Multi-agents (MAs). In this chapter 
the spotlight will be on the following key issues:
• An investigation into the Single Function Agent (SiFA) approach by Berker 
and Brown (1996) for modelling software agents;
• Modelling of software agents using the theory of communicative action;
•  How SiFAs combine to form Multi-agents.
Emphasis is placed on examining how Multi-agents (MAs) are formed as a com­
bination of Single Function Agents (SiFAs). This is important to gain a clearer 
understanding of the agents’ actions. The internal structure of a software agent is 
explored in the context of an example of a material agent. The chapter concludes
44
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by highlighting the key differences between the present and key previous research 
relating to the approach for modelling software agents.
3.2 SiFA m odel by Berker and Brow n
3.2.1 Model description
SiFAs are specific for a task and information associated with them is specialised. 
Each SiFA can be considered as a building block of a Multi- agent system. Though 
Berker and Brown (1996) presented knowledge-based approach to model SiFAs, 
this was not systematically evaluated or applied to a design problem. They 
presented seven types of SiFAs associated with each design attribute as shown in 
Figure 3.1.


















Figure 3.1: Single Function Agent (SiFA) model by Berker and Brown (1996).
The functions of seven types of SiFAs shown in Figure 3.1 are summarised as 
follows:
Advisor: An advisor agent produces the values of a design variable using 
well defined parametric relations. For example, in a specific problem, an
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advisor agent would generate the values of shear stress.
• C ritique: A critique agent performs a safety check on the parametric values 
such as maximum allowed stress level. For example, for a given material 
and loading conditions on a structural member, static deflection could be 
a criterion for criticism. If the critique agent observes any violation of such 
criteria, the agent issues a warning to other agents.
•  E stim ato r: The estimator agent estimates the outcome of a problem with 
insufficient description. This estimation of a design attribute is approximate 
and usually given as a range (e.g., varying between 10-15%).
• E valuator: Evaluates the goodness of a variable and is usually expressed 
as a percentage of the ideal value.
• P ra iser: In a scenario where there are several constraints to be met and 
where the design values are successful in satisfying only some of these con­
straints, the praiser agent will comment only on the satisfied constraints. 
The remaining unsatisfied constraints are object for the Critique SiFA.
• Selector: A selector agent is responsible for selecting parametric informa­
tion from a list of possible values. For example, for a specified material, a 
selector agent would return the values of material properties such as mod­
ulus of elasticity or Poisson’s ratio.
• Suggestor: The suggestor agent resolves conflicts that may arise between 
any two types of SiFAs.
Berker and Brown (1996) proposed a hierarchical model of SiFA’s such that for 
each type of SiFA presented in Figure 3.1, there can be one or more further 
sets of SiFAs at deeper levels of abstraction. At each of these levels appropriate 
knowledge needs to be present for execution of tasks at that level. For a given 
case, several of these levels of abstraction may not even exist and it is necessary 
to analyse these levels in the context of an engineering design problem.
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3.2.2 Analysis of the model with example of spring design 
problem
Since Berker and Brown (1996) did not provide a detailed example of their model, 
the author has considered the analytical design of a spring [Figure 3.3] here to 
evaluate their SiFA model. In particular, the design case is aimed at exploring 
levels associated with a spring design variable which is shear stress (rs). Figure 3.3 
shows the expanded levels associated with (rs) Advisor(l-l) alone. For the sake 
of clarity, only the Advisor SiFA is expanded to the first four levels.
Figure 3.2: Schematic of a helical spring
At level-1, Advisor(1-1) generates the value of t s based on available analytical 
relations. In this case, this parametric relation is defined by t,  =  where 
shear stress (ra) is a function of spring coil diameter (d ), mean diameter (D ), 
solid force (Fs) and spring constant (K s). W ith respect to A dvisor(l-l), agent 
behaviour is more deterministic, ie., the agent generates a quantitative value for 
t s . Since, at level-1, the outcome for t s is predictable, the functions of Selector(1-
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are formed between design variables. 
For example, the relationship necessary 
V fo r  computing rmax. ✓
Meta
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Role of Estimator, 
Evaluator and 
Selector absent/
Figure 3.3: Decision levels in SiFA model for the spring design problem
5) and Estim ator(l-2) are not required. Critique(l-7) could make use of IF-THEN 
rules to check a constraint such as Ts < T m a x . If shear stress value exceeds the 
allowable stress (rmaa;) value, a conflict is detected between Critique(1-7) and 
A dvisor(l-l) SiFAs. Though Berker and Brown did not present a mechanism to 
resolve such conflicts, the author believes that Suggestor(1-6) could make use of 
protocols based on game theory.
Level-2 presents a slightly different case. Unlike the level-1 A dvisor(l-l), 
Advisor (2-1) is concerned only with establishing mathematical relationships lead­
ing to the analytical expression for evaluating ts. As at level-1, the roles of 
Estimator(2-2), Evaluator(2-3) and Selector(2-5) have been diminished to zero. 
The nature of the outcome at this level is not quantitative. For example, the
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Critique agent(2-7) may offer its criticism on Advisor(2-l) based on dimensional 
analysis (such as based on Buckingham’s ir theorem). It can be seen that the 
outcome at level-2 is qualitative; an aspect not acknowledged by Berker and 
Brown.
Level-3 as shown in Figure 3.3 presents even more generic situation. The role 
of Advisor (3-1) is seen as realising the parametric terms such as wire diameter 
(id), etc., in a context such as the design of a spring. The key objective here is 
to acquire knowledge leading to spring design. The roles of Estimator, Evaluator 
and Selector are absent at level-3. The role of Critique(3-7) agent is to analyse a 
design concept rather than a design attribute (e.g., allowable stress) as at level-1. 
Thus Critique(3-7) agent could offer its criticism on a design philosophy or the 
need for using springs in a given context. As can readily be seen, the Critique 
SiFA is no longer as finely granular as the Critique SiFA at level-1; level-3 SiFAs 
address much broader issues.
Level-4 presents a case of further meta-level abstraction. The role of Advisor(4- 
1) at this level is to identify the need for the design of a spring. The knowledge 
contained in each of these SiFAs at this level has not been explored by Berker 
and Brown.
Interestingly, Berker and Brown (1996) allow possibilities of conflicts across all 
levels as highlighted in Figure 3.3. However, this appears to be unrealistic due to 
the lack of global negotiation strategies. They localised the generic negotiation 
knowledge intertwined with design knowledge at that level. This makes the ap­
plication of generic negotiation strategies difficult. It is worth noting that local 
strategies lead to sub-optimal solutions as rightly stated by Klein (1993)1. In 
this case even the existence of conflicts between Advisor(l-4) and Critique(4-7) 
is questionable due to the lack of a common goal between the agents highlighted 
in Figure 3.3. In the view of Berker and Brown, violation of design constraints is
1 Klein (1993) suggested that conflict resolution knowledge should be independent of domain 
specific design knowledge in order to allow the generation of optimal solutions.
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the way conflicts are defined and there is no consideration of conflicts due to dif­
fering preferences. The Suggestors at level four and level one could use strategies 
that may not lead to a unique settlement between conflicting agents. It is not 
even obvious what the contents of Suggestor(4-6) are since the conflict resolution 
knowledge at higher levels is not explained by Berker and Brown. The limitations 
in the Berker and Brown model are presented next.
3.2.3 Limitations of the model
To summarise this analysis, the following limitations are identified in Berker and 
Brown’s SiFA model:
•  Berker and Brown’s SiFA approach does offer benefits of visualising an 
agent’s internal structure, though in a highly pre-configured knowledge- 
based manner.
•  The number of SiFAs associated in a design problem can be expressed as, 
n7mi, where n is the number of design variables at each level and (m* =  
l....k) is the number of levels associated with each design variable; k, n € 3ft. 
The preceding analysis reveals that the presence of such unlimited levels 
could become unwieldy even for a simple problem involving only a few 
design variables. For n =  10 and rrii =  4, Vi, the number of SiFAs would 
be 23060. In addition, Berker and Brown did not present a justification for 
the existence of such a large number of levels.
•  As the number of levels increases, the information contained in each SiFA 
tends to become more generic thereby losing its finely granular nature.
• Conflict resolution strategies adopted by Berker and Brown seem to be 
implicit at each level and they tend to be specific for each design case. 
There is a need for conflict resolution strategies that are independent from 
the domain.
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•  Berker and Brown treated conflicts as violations of design constraints; an 
assumption that is unwise since real world conflict situations are depicted 
as disagreements between two or more agents due to different preferences.
Some of these limitations are overcome in the new SiFA model presented in the 
next section.
3.3 A new model for Single Function Agents
The author’s research attempts to address the limitations identified in Berker 
and Brown’s model. Specifically, it will address the following:
•  Reduction in the number of levels of SiFAs;
•  Explicit representation of agents’ actions;
•  Transition to Multi-agents;
•  Strategies for conflict resolution and reasoning in a domain.
This section presents an approach for modelling Multi-agents using a new model 
for Single Function Agents (SiFAs). Before presenting the proposed model for 
SiFA, Habermas’s theory of communicative action is outlined, on which the new 
model is based.
3.3.1 Theory of com municative action
Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Habermas, 1984) deals with cate­
gorising group interactions between humans in a collaborative problem solving
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environment. The action theory as described by Habermas is a web of coordinated 
actions taken by humans in a collaborative problem solving environment. Such 
coordinated actions will include a common language for communication, shared 
ontologies, rules and constraints in a group working scenario. In this context, 
Habermas proposed a set of rules and resources which are necessary to support 
social activities between humans in an organisation. The four action categories 





Instrumental action deals with manipulating and controlling objects using tech­
nical knowledge and tools in the environment. The technical knowledge and tools 
are known as allocative resources. In an organisational context these resources 
are inanimate objects such as software tools or manufacturing machines.
Communicative action occurs when participants of a group process get together 
to exchange knowledge in order to solve a task. This will require a medium 
of communication through which participants can share their ideas and under­
standing. The participants must possess technical knowledge of the problem and 
language. Knowledge of the language includes the syntax and semantic level of 
understanding.
Discursive action focusses on analysing the problem including the instrumental 
and communication categories that assist the discursive process. Therefore, dis­
cursive action is more specific in nature compared to communicative action. Since 
major decisions are made during a discursive process, use of precise ontologies 
and rules is critical.
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Strategic actions relates to the highest level of problem solving in a group. Each 
action in a groupwork environment is based on some strategy the participants 
adopt towards achieving a goal. Participants have the knowledge of the rules 
and constraints involved in a strategic action. However, due to the existence 
of individual preferences among participants, conflicts are inevitable. Habermas 
defined certain rules that govern strategic action in a conflict situation. These 
rules provide participants with equal chances to express their views, to reason 
based on facts and to show no bias towards a particular participant.
Habermas’s theory has been used to analyse many issues related to organisational 
workflow. For example, Ngwenyama and Lyytinen (1997) used this technique to 
study social action in a Computer Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) based 
group work environment. They measured various social action situations (e.g., 
group decision making) met within organisations. In what follows, Habermas’s 
theory is used to categorise actions in a SiFA which will be then mapped to 
Multi-Agents.
3.3.2 A ction theory based new SiFA model
Habermas’s theory of communicative action is applied here to software objects 
and has been used to model SiFAs for design. In particular, each action category 
is explored to identify the knowledge necessary to support SiFAs’ behaviour. The 
proposed approach to SiFA model is novel in two respects:
• The membership of the set of SiFAs (what can be a SiFA?);
• The composition of a SiFA (what are its capacities?).
It consists of the following steps:
• Specification of a design;
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•  Formation of a graph of design activities;
• Mapping of each activity to a specialist agent;
• Identification of design variables controlled by each specialist agent;
•  Mapping variables to SiFAs;






















Figure 3.4: New action theory based SiFA model
As shown in Figure 3.4, a design problem is specified as a set of relations which 
are expressed as functions of design variables. These functions include mathe­
matical equations, qualitative constraints and heuristic rules. Once the problem 
is specified, certain variables within these functions are mapped on to individual 
SiFAs. Only specification variables, decision variables and constants are mapped 
to SiFAs2. Once the individual SiFAs have been identified, their capabilities are 
defined by associating one or more action categories with each SiFA. The choice 
of action categories associated with a SiFA depend on its type:
2In the SiFA model by Berker and Brown (1996), all design variables (including constants, 
specification and derived) were mapped to SiFAs. Unlike the Berker and Brown model, the 
new model does not treat all variables as SiFAs.
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• Constants: Instrumental action, Communicative action
• Specification variables: Instrumental action, Communicative action
• Decision variables: Discursive, Strategic, Instrumental and Communicative 
action.
The instrumental action associated with a constant or variable would involve 
storage and retrieval of its value before it can be communicated to other agents. 
In some cases the instrumental action may not be visible to an observer. In a 
more explicit case the instrumental action will involve a designer specifying an 
initial value or making some parametric choice.
Communicative action involves exchange of values (of a constant or variable) with 
other SiFAs. It also involves the preparing of the communication object to be 
exchanged (query/reply and their format).
The discursive action deals with explicit rules or procedures to support the eval­
uation of a decision variable. This is the action which would be responsible for 
most of the computational effort of a SiFA.
The strategic action category deals with checking the violation of design con­
straints. To support this type of action certain IF-THEN rules are specified. The 
new SiFA model is next explored in the context of the spring design example 
previously considered in Section 3.2.2, to allow its comparison with Berker and 
Brown (1996).
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3.3.3 Analysis of the new SiFA model using the spring 
design problem
In this section the new SiFA model is illustrated using the spring design problem. 
Each action category of a SiFA is explored to identify the knowledge necessary 
to support the SiFA’s behaviour. Recalling equation for shear stress t s in spring 
design [Section 3.3.2], t s is the spring design function under consideration. There 
is a set of five design variables and constants associated with t s based on the 
analytical relationship. A SiFA is associated with each of these as shown in 
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Figure 3.5: New SiFA model applied to attributes in spring design 
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Implementation of the new SiFA model
In software terms, the instrumental action would involve the control and manip­
ulation of software objects. This instrumental action can be explicit or implicit 
depending on the nature of the object. For example, in the case of a human 
designer interacting with a software via a GUI, the instrumental action could 
involve the designer clicking buttons in the GUI or specifying the preferences for 
d or Fs; the agent responds to this in a pre-determined manner by opening up 
a dialog box. Since SiFAs operate at a very much finely granulated level, the 
instrumental actions are not visible to an observer. As Table 3.1 indicates the 
instrumental action would involve the use of threaded control mechanisms for the 
exchange of data (e.g., a read-write scenario). The result of such an instrumental 
action (values for d and D) could be made visible via, say a GUI.
Agents may exchange information by communicating synchronously or asyn- 
chronously. The advantage of synchronous communication is that it helps the 
agents to communicate interactively. Data to be shared between SiFAs is encap­
sulated and maintained using synchronised methods of a shared class as shown 
in Figure 3.6.





Figure 3.6: A shared class mechanism
The shared class mechanism acts as a blackboard through which SiFAs com­
municate. One important aspect during the process of communication is that 
the ontology is also shared between SiFAs. For example, the evaluation of vari­
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able rs will need to access the item with appropriate string references such as 
wire_diameter and mean_diameter.
The SiFAs resort to discursive action to execute a task. Each SiFA has built-in 
methods to support its task solving. Since all the variables associated with rs are 
either constants or specified for a given problem, the methods associated with the 
SiFAs are relatively simple. In the present case as indicated in Table 3.1, these 
methods could be simple retrieval functions (e.g., Math.PI in Java).
Strategic actions in SiFAs are more specific in nature. At SiFA level, this category 
of action deals with checking violations of design constraints, if any. The strate­
gies allow the SiFAs to probe the results of discursive action. These strategies are 
usually IF-THEN rules. In Table 3.1, for the variable K s an inner and outer limits 
K ]n, K are set to support strategic action. Similarly, the value of d could be 
valid only in the range din < d < d^t for a given specification. Therefore the 
strategic action of SiFA(d) is meant to ensure that the value of d lies in the safe 
range. The exact values for this range is determined by the physical nature of 
the problem. Table 3.1 shows that all SiFAs do not need a strategic category. 
For SiFA(Fs), there is no need for any strategic category as the value of the solid 
force Fs is specified by the designer.
Having presented details of the new SiFA model, its advantages over the model 
of Berker and Brown are presented next.
3.3.4 Advantages over Berker and Brown SiFA m odel
The action theory based new model for SiFAs offers advantages over the approach 
of Berker and Brown (1996). The following points highlight the key advantages:
• Reduced number of levels;
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• Reduced number of agents;
• Explicit representation of agent’s actions.
Reduction in the levels associated with a SiFA leads to a simpler form of rep­
resentation of the agent model. In the present approach there is only one level 
of decision compared to that of Berker and Brown (1996). Therefore it is eaiser 
to support the action categories within that one level. For example, referring to 
spring mean diameter (£>), considered in Section 3.3.3, it is easy to derive meth­
ods necessary to evaluate D. Similarly, Fs is initially specified by the designer 
and will require only methods to read from the user input. The reasoning aspect 
in the agents behaviour was kept limited to the constraint violation as a practi­
cal design consideration rather than meta-level abstract reasoning in Berker and 
Brown model. Hence the procedure for the identification and implementaion of 
methods necessary to support each SiFA is simplified compared to Berker and 
Brown’s approach.
Due to the presence of reduced number of decision levels, the number of SiFAs 
necessary is reduced. This is due to the elimination of unwanted meta-level ab­
stract reasoning. Thus the methods to support agent’s actions are deterministic. 
Explicit representation of actions associated with each agent assits in organising 
the actual methods necessary to support such actions. The author’s approach 
presented four action categories each fulfilling a unique function, whereas Berker 
and Brown (1996) did not analyse actions associated with their agents. Such an 
analysis is essential in implementing the software agents systematically. The sys­
tem designer can thus identify the necessary methods and their modularization 
(e.g., synchronised methods in a communication scenario and domain specific 
computational methods). As Table 3.1 highlighted, there was no need for strate­
gies associated with certain SiFAs [SiFA(F5) and SiFA(7r) in Table 3.1]. In con­
trast, the approach of Berker and Brown will involve unlimited levels of abstract 
reasoning with the additional difficulty of identifying the necessary methods to 
support these levels.
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The other aspects not covered by Berker and Brown (1996) which are considered 
here are the following:
• Strategies for conflict resolution;
• Transition to multi-agents.
Though Berker and Brown claimed their SiFA model to be in the context of 
conflict resolution, they did not present a scheme for conflict resolution. Their 
ideas for conflict resolution were largely informal with a cursory mention in the 
context of wine glass design. The author’s research closely relates the agent 
synthesis with conflict resolution as a key issue which is the topic of Chapter 4.
Single Function Agents (SiFAs) operate at a finely granular (design variable) level 
and their application in the context of problem solving is realised at a higher level 
(e.g., multi-agents). This is an important aspect in modelling agents which Berker 
and Brown (1996) ignored to address3. The author’s research has addressed the 
transition from SiFAs to multi-agents which is the object of next section.
3.4 Transition from new SiFAs to  M ulti-Agents
Several Single Function Agents (SiFAs) put together form a Multi-agent. But 
considering the finely granular nature of SiFAs and coarse grained Multi-agents, 
it is necessary to identify how SiFAs at the parametric level combine to form 
a collection of Multi-Agents (as seen in many Multi-Agent systems). With a 
view to gaining such an understanding, this section describes the formation of
3Berker and Brown (1996) assumed all variables in their design problem as SiFAs. In the new 
SiFA model presented here, such a view is not appreciated since the complexity in determining 
variables in a design problem are not the same. In a small-scale problem such as the wine glass 
design considered by Berker and Brown (1996) which involves only a few variables (less than 
5), this distinction may not be obvious but for a large problem involving several variables, their 
approach can become unweildy.
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Multi-Agents. In this discussion, the term SiFA refers to the new model of SiFAs 
proposed in Section 3.4.
3.4.1 How SiFAs combine to form M ulti-Agents?
Variables form the base level description of a design problem. It is by using 
these variables that explicit engineering relationships are often built. In a typical 
product development phase such as detailed design, explicit identification of a 
single variable at the base level is often not obvious. It is often necessary to 
identify a set of variables embedded in design functions (such as design cost, 
strength, etc.) to describe a desired phase. Classification and group identification 
of design variables are often used to organise various design activities which assist 
in backtracking [Kusiak and Wang (1995)]. An extended approach is adopted here 
where the transition from SiFAs to Multi-agents is carried out in successive stages 
with increasing degree of complexity. These stages are summarised below:
• Single Function Agents (SiFAs): apply to variables (including decision vari­
ables) that are specified at the start of a design process. SiFAs also refer 
to engineering constants;
• Simple Function Agents (SimFAs): they represent simple design functions 
that are formed by a mathematical or fuzzy relationship between design 
variables;
• Multi-Function Agents (//FAs): the collection of several mutually-related 
simple design functions leads to //FAs. Each //FA represents a design per­
spective with a design preference which characterises its autonomy. The 
design preference is usually captured in the form of utility functions. For 
example, for the spring design agent a preference could be to minimise 
stress;
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•  Multi-Agents (MAs): They operate at a much higher level of abstraction, 
they consist of several /xFAs. For example, a Multi-Agent for design of an 
product would include several fiFAs for individual parts or sub-assemblies.
Figure 3.7 shows the transition of SiFAs to Multi-Agents with systematic progres­
sions through the intermediate stages. Each design variable is governed by a SiFA 
at the base level. A related group of SiFAs forms a simple function which leads 
to a Simple Function Agent (SimFA). For example, shear stress(r5) in the spring 
design problem is represented by a simple function agent SimFA(rs). A simple 
function agent is formed as a result of tight coupling between design variables 
which are SiFAs.
Design param eter 
(e.g., spring wire 
diameter)________
/  Collection of 
' simple functions 
(e.g., spring design)







Figure 3.7: Stages of transition from SiFAs to Multi-Agents
For example, in spring design there would exist several SimFAs for computing 
stress, spring factor, solid length, etc. Several such Simple Functions Agents 
(SimFAs) group together to form what is defined as a Multi Function Agent 
(/xFA), for example, an agent for spring design. A collection of such fiFAs lead to 
Multi Agents (MAs). For instance, a relief valve design would involve the design 
of springs, valve body, etc. Thus MAs are usually complex (i.e. wide range of 
capabilities) and are composed of several specific and generic /xFAs.
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3.4.2 Structure of a M ulti-Function Agent
A Multi-Function Agent (/iFA) is composed of some generic components for task 
processing (e.g., communication and negotiation protocols) and some specialised 
components to achieve domain-specific objectives.
G eneric com ponents: The /xFAs communicate via the exchange of action- 
oriented KQML messages [Finin, et al, (1995)]. Some of the performatives that 
imply agent’s action are tell, ask and disagree. Apart from KQML support for 
communication, the Multi-Function Agents also provide a user interface for in­
teraction with human agents.
The /iFAs offer reasoning (based on qualitative and quantitative dependencies) 
support to parametric design agents. In addition, negotiation support is also pro­
vided to resolve conflicts on a common goal between /iFAs. A detailed discussion 
on reasoning and negotiation mechanisms is the subject of Chapter 4.
Specific com ponents: Design agents use methods that are specific to a prob­
lem domain. For instance, in the case of a spring design problem, the designer 
agent would use special functions such as shear stress, Wahl factor, etc. Each de­
signer agent would also have a set of problem specific variable s and constraints. 
The designer agent communicates with human agents via a GUI. The goals and 
constraints of each design agent are specified at the start of the design process.
3.4.3 An Example of a M ulti-Function A gent
A material agent which was developed for this research is shown in Figure 3.8. 
The material agent is responsible for returning the properties of a specified ma­
terial (e.g., AISI 1020 steel). The material agent is a fiFA which has specific as 
well as generic components. The SiFAs and SimFAs associated with the material
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agent are shown in Figure 3.9. The SiFA-based variables shown in the figure rep­
resent the base description in any material property set and they are generic to 
any material. The material agent has  two key functions: retrieval of the material 
property set [M ateria l(m ateria l.nam e)] and communication [T e ll, Ask].
Figure 3.8: Material agent
The semi-autonomous material agent provides a simple GUI for interaction with 
humans. As shown in Figure 3.8, the GUI presents an area for displaying the 
retrieved material properties as the human designer clicks the appropriate buttons 
in the GUI (instrumental action). The communication between material and 
another Multi-Function Agent is captured in a message exchange area within 
the GUI. As the threaded communication takes place, the results are displayed 
in this area. The current implementation (to demonstrate the communicative 
action) uses tell and ask performatives.
An instance of communication between design and material agents is shown in 
Figure 3.10(a). The design agent uses the performative tell to query the material 
agent regarding the value of Poisson’s ratio. The material agent uses the tell 
performative to reply with the value of Poisson’s ratio as 0.3. Another instance











Figure 3.9: Transition from SiFAs to a //FA in material agent
of communicative action is shown in Figure 3.10(b) in the context of a design 
agent sending evaluate performative to query the analysis agent about the state 
of stress in a structural member. Whereas Figure 3.10(a) uses simple message 
structure, Figure 3.10(b) presents a semantically precise message exchange. The 
figure shows that both kinds of communication are possible.
The material agent uses simple IF-THEN rules to check if a material property 
set is available and issues warning messages. Then the designer takes appropriate 
action and provides an alternative material specification. The example presented 
here shows how the transition from SiFAs to a //FA can be achieved in practice. 
The material agent will be presented in Chapters 5 & 6 in a broader context with 
other similar //FAs in a collaborative process.
3.4.4 An example of a Multi-Agent
To demonstrate the transition of SiFAs to Multi-agents, a Geneva mechanism 
design problem is considered. The details of this design problem are given in 
Appendix B. The design specification variables and some constants in Geneva
3  M o d e l l in g  o f  s o f t w a r e  a g e n t s 66
Example 1: The Design Agent sends “ask" performative to Material Agent 
to request the value for Poisson’s  ratio. The material agent uses telP 
to convey the requested value for Poisson’s  ratio.
Communicative








:T h e  n a m e  o f  t h e  a g e n t s  s e n d i n g  a n d  r e c e i v i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n
■.content <poissons_ratio 0.3> □  T h e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  v a r i a b l e  
:language<KQML> — i r e < l u e s t e d
_ l  S y n t a x  o f  t h e  m e s s a g e  
:ontology<material_property> “ ]  N a t u r e  o f  t h e
_ _ _ _ _ _ _    r e q u e s t e d  v a r i a b l e
Example 2: The Design Agent sends a  request to Analysis Agent to query
the stress due to torque loads on a structural member. The Design Agent uses
the performative ’’evaluate'' and the Analysis Agent replies with the performative "safe’’.
___________________________  Communicative
^  I r ^ l  - actionDesign agent **------------------- Analysis agent
performative: evaluate performative: safe
.-sender <design_agent> '.sender <analysis_agent>
.•receiver <analysis_agent> '.receiver <design_agent>
.'content <val ((critical_stress) (location 10,20,25))> '.content <250 critical_stress> 
:language<KIF> :language<KIF>
:ontology<strvcture> :onto!ogy<structure>
Figure 3.10: An instance of KQML message exchange
mechanism design are associated with SiFAs. For example, the specified design 
variables Ns, J*,, u  and certain material constants such as Young’s modulus are 
associated with SiFAs. Such SiFAs combine to form a simple function agent 
(SimFA) as shown in Figure 3.11.
A simple function agent for wheel angle SimFA (/30) is formed as a result of the 
combination of number of slots (N s) and the mathematical constant 7r [Fig­
ure 3.11(a)]. Similarly for the driver angle c*o as shown in figure 3.11(b)], a 
SimFA(ao) is formed as a combination of number of slots (Ns) and 7r. Fig­
ure 3.11(c) shows a simple function agent for wheel slot distance (S ) formed as 
a result of a combination of SimFA(C) and SimFA(/?o). A simple function agent 
for root stress (ctr) as shown in Figure 3.12 is formed as a combination of several 
SiFAs and SimFAs.
Several such SiFAs and SimFAs combine to form Multi-Function Agents (/iFAs).






(a) SimFA for whesl angle (b) SimFA for driver angle
SimFA SimFA SimFA
(c) SimFA for slot distance
Figure 3.11: Formation of a SimFAs in Geneva mechanism design
In the wheel design case, SimFA(oR), SimFA(u;x), SimFA(5u,), etc. combine to 
from the wheel design agent which is a fiFA. It is the support of these several 
functions that makes the wheel agent a multi-function agent. The transition from 
SimFAs to fjFAs for the wheel and driver design is shown in Figures 3.13 & 3.14.











Figure 3.12: Formation of a SimFA( c t r )  in Geneva mechanism design
The wheel and driver agents (fiFAs) combine to form the multi agent for Geneva 
mechanism design as shown in Figure 3.15. The stages of transition of SiFAs to a 
Multi-agent in the case of Geneva mechanism design are captured in Figure 3.16. 
The combination of such multi-function agents leads to a Multi-agent which is 
the design agent for the Geneva mechanism. The key SiFAs, SimFAs and /iFAs 
in the Geneva mechanism design are shown in Figures 3.13 and 3.14.





























Figure 3.13: Formation of a /iFA for wheel in Geneva mechanism design
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S i m F AS i F A
S i m F A
S i F A
S i F A S i m F A
S i F A
S i m F A
S i F A
S i m F A
S i F A
S i m F AS i F A
S i m F A




S i m F A
Figure 3.14: Formation of a //FA for driver in Geneva mechanism design
The GUI of the Geneva mechanism design agent is shown in Figure B.l. The 
agent is composed of generic as well as specific components similar to the structure 
of explained in Section 3.5.2. The Geneva mechanism agent will be presented in 
Chapter 6  in a wider context of a collaborative process.











Figure 3.15: Formation of a Multi-agent for Geneva mechanism design
3.5 Differences from previous work
Key differences regarding SiFAs between the author’s approach and that of Berker 
and Brown (1996) are drawn in this section. It highlights how some of the 
theoretical and implementational shortcomings in previous research have been 
overcome by the new model.
3.5.1 Theoretical differences
The distinction from Berker and Brown’s SiFA approach is examined with respect 
to the following key characteristics:
• Number, levels and types;
• Scalability of SiFAs to form Multi-agents;
• Negotiation strategies;
• Communication;
Berker and Brown (1996) approach associates a hierarchy of SiFAs with each 
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Figure 3.16: Transition from SiFAs to a Multi-agent in Geneva mechanism design
3  M o d e l l in g  o f  s o f t w a r e  a g e n t s 73
a very large number of SiFAs even in a simple design problem such as spring 
design. This research only creates a SiFA for the primary design variables and 
constants. Berker and Brown considered seven types of SiFAs (knowledge-based) 
associated with each design variable whereas this research considers only four 
types (action-based). As compared to the unlimited number of decision levels 
in the approach by Berker and Brown, the author’s research requires only one 
decision level to ensure design integrity at the SiFA level.
Scalability of SiFAs to Multi-agents (MAs) was not addressed by Berker and 
Brown. The present approach analysed [Section 4.4] how SiFAs can combine to 
form Multi-agents and has been systematically realised through an example of 
the Geneva mechanism design agent developed for this study.
Though Berker and Brown considered negotiation between SiFAs, the strategies 
adopted for conflict resolution were very much problem dependent and hence 
lacked generality. The present research treats conflict negotiation as a generic 
issue. Further details are given in Chapter 4.
The communication mechanism presented by Berker and Brown is based on 
KQML. Each SiFA has its own independent knowledge regarding the syntax and 
semantics of the language. In the present approach, however, SiFAs communicate 
by means of a shared class where design variables representing common ontology 
are exchanged. At the Multi-agent level, the agents use KQML to communicate 
with other agents.
The key theoretical characteristics presented here influence the implementation 
of agents and are discussed next.
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3.5.2 Implem ent at ional differences
Berker and Brown’s SiFA approach presented unlimited decision levels associated 
with each SiFA. From an implementation point of view, this approach can become 
quite unwieldy even for problems with low to medium complexity. For example, 
communication, decision and task solving knowledge needs to be encapsulated in 
each SiFA.
The author’s approach takes a different view as so much autonomy is not given 
to SiFAs at the parametric level. More importantly, the concept of unlimited 
decision levels is eliminated while preserving the design constraints. All the 
necessary support for task processing is encapsulated in each category of action in 
a SiFA. The Multi-agents modelled using such SiFAs still maintain their reference 
to categories of action. This helps in organising each agent’s actions in a given 
situation whether at SiFA or /zFA level.
3.6 Summary
A SiFA based approach for modelling complex software agents has been presented. 
A detailed analysis led to the identification of several drawbacks in the SiFA model 
by Berker and Brown(1996). The present approach addresses these drawbacks by 
means of modelling agents based on their actions. To this end, the Habermas’s 
theory of communicative action has been applied to software objects and a new 
SiFA model has been proposed. A systematic transition from SiFAs to Multi­
agents (MAs) has been demonstrated via an example of a design agent for the 
Geneva mechanism. Finally a brief overview of key differences from Berker and 
Brown’s technique was presented. The proposed approach is elegant and simple. 
The next chapter will address the issue of conflict resolution between software 
agents.
Chapter 4
Conflict Resolution between 
M ulti-Agents
4.1 Introduction
This chapter is aimed towards addressing the second hypothesis of this thesis 
which states, ’’The resolution of conflicts between agents in a collaborative process 
will require a rational approach to negotiation”. This chapter views collaborative 
product development as a negotiation process where the agents have individual 
preferences over a common objective that lead to conflicts. A review of previous 
research on conflict resolution in product development was presented in Chapter 
2. The focus of this chapter is on developing a novel scheme for conflict resolution. 
The following key points are addressed here:
•  Conflict resolution schemes based on game theory and dependency based 
reasoning.
• Development and implementation of a novel scheme for conflict resolution 
between agents.
75
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4.2 Schemes for conflict negotiation
There is a variety of approaches available for negotiation depending on the type 
of conflicts as reviewed in Chapter 2 . Here two approaches based on game theory 
and dependency based reasoning are considered in detail.
4.2.1 Game theory based schemes
Games are a composition of decision makers with set preferences on a collection 
of decision variables and strategies. Although this approach has been used mainly 
in the field of economics and strategic warfare, some of the work in the recent 
past shows its applicability in engineering design [Vincent (1981), Thomson and 
Lensberg (1989), Kanappan and Marshek (1993), Badrinath and Rao (1996), 
Rao, et ai, (1997), Hacker and Lewis (1998), Lewis and Mistree (1998)].
Four different game theory based methods, viz, Nash, Kalai-Somordinsky, Egal­
itarian and Utilitarian approaches are considered here. The Nash solution since 
its introduction in the 1950’s has been very popular for the analysis of conflicts. 
The other solutions discussed here are some of the variations of the Nash solu­
tion [Lewis and Mistree (1998), Thomson and Lensberg (1989)]. As shown in 
Figures 4.1(a) 4.1(b) there are two agents (Agent_l and Agent_2 ) with certain 
specified preferences described by their utility functions (U\ and U2)- The possi­
ble joint course of action is determined by plotting each agent’s utility functions 
as shown in Figure 4.1. The curve S  in Figure 4.2 describes this joint course of 
action in a decision space which is assumed to be strictly convex.
• The Nash solution is defined by iV(S'), such that S  €
N(S)  =  max([n?_1Z7i]) is the maximum Nash product of agent utilities. 
N(S)  is also the undominated point on S  such that it is the point of con­
tact of the highest rectangular hyperbola U\U2 = k touching S  and having
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1(a) Utility function for Agent_1
1.0
V
(b) Utility function for A gent_2 2









Figure 4.2: Joint course of action in game theory solutions
axes as asymptotes. The Nash solution in general evaluates an outcome 
which favours a particular agent with higher weight. However, there could 
exist special cases as shown by Kanappan and Marshek (1993) where each 
agent obtain the same individual pay-off.
• The Kalai-Somordinsky solution K ( S )  [Kalai and Somordinsky (1975)] en­
sures equal pay-off to conflicting agents under normalised coordinates. For 
instance, as shown in Figure 4.2, for each utility level attained by Agent-1, 
the corresponding utility achieved by Agent_2 also increases. Therefore, 
an agent is not affected negatively by expanding the utility space. It is
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on this key characteristic of expansion that K(S)  mainly rests. The pres­
ence of this non-negative influence is the main factor that distinguishes 
Kalai-Somordinsky solution from Nash solution. K ( S ), under normalised 
coordinates thus represents a point on S  such that XJ\ =  U2 =  U, which is 
the point of intersection of S  and a line joining the origin and the utopic 
points.
•  The Egalitarian solution E(S)  represents a point on S  which is the point of 
intersection of S  and a 45° line to the ordinate. E(S) represents a variant of 
the Kalai-Somordinsky solution. E(S) evaluates equal utility gain to both 
agents whether the coordinates are normalised or not
•  The Utilitarian solution U(S) represents a point on S  such that the sum
is maximum. Unlike the above three solutions, the Utilitarian 
solution presents a drawback of multiple solutions. For example, there 
could exist more than one point which corresponds to a maxima. Hence 
the applicability of Utilitarian solution is generally restricted to problems 
with convex Pareto-optimal boundaries.
Due to the characteristic of equal utilities, the Kalai-Somordinsky solution is 
generally preferred among other solutions such as Nash or Utilitarian. The Util­
itarian solution, similar to the Nash approach, favours one agent with respect to 
its individual pay-offs. These solutions apart from satisfying Pareto optimality 
must also satisfy the condition of symmetry. The condition of symmetry suggests 
that the solutions N(S) ,K(S) ,  E(S)  and U(S) remain the same if the agents are 
interchanged in the geometrical description of the problem in Figure 4.2. These 
game theory solutions are illustrated through an example next.
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4.2.2 A n exam ple to  dem onstrate game theory m ethods
A design example of a pressure vessel is considered here as a two agent game 
where agents have individual preferences on a specific design attribute1. These 
preferences influence the agents’ choice on a common design variable which lead 
to a conflict between the agents. The resolution of the conflict is demonstrated 
via the four game theory solutions presented in Section 4.2.1.
(a) Specification of pressure vessel design problem
Figure 4.3 shows a symmetric pressure vessel with hemi-spherical ends which 
is to be designed by two agents (A\ and A2) to withstand a pressure of P  = 
800KPa. The inner radius of the vessel (r) is given as 1.8m and length (I) =  
1 0 m. The constraints are: wall thickness (t) < 0.2m, outer radius (x) < 2.0m  
and crhoop < &allow2- The value for wall thickness (£) is to determined which would 
ensure safe design. The pressure vessel design equations are given below [Gere 
and Timoshenko(1991)]:
W =  Pl tni r+ t)3+ 7r(r+ t)2 — (^-nr3 + 7rr2l)] (4.1)o o
Pr
&hoop ~~ £ (4.2)
1This example is derived from a similar case considered in Gere and Timoshenko (1991) and 
Rao, et a l, (1997).
2  Only the hoop stress crhoop is considered. Due to the symmetry of the vessel, the shear
stress is ignored.
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Cross-section
Figure 4.3: Schematic of a pressure vessel with hemi-spherical ends
(b) Form ation of agent u tility  functions
As shown in Figure 4.3 the agents have different design preferences: A \  wishes to 
minimise the weight of the vessel whereas A 2 wishes to minimise the hoop stress. 
Wall thickness (t ) is a variable tha t is significant in the evaluation of weight (W ) 
and hoop stress (<7hoop) [Equations 4.1 and 4.2]. Therefore the agents control 
their individual preferences on W  and a hoop by varying t. These preferences are 
shown in Figure 4.4 as utility functions with respect to t. Figure 4.4(a) shows 
the utility function for A i  which indicates a maximum utility of 1.0 for a wall 
thickness of 0.05m. The utility curve shows a linear decrease for any increase in 
wall thickness (t ) since the weight W  of the vessel is directly proportional to t. 
Similarly variation pattern for A 2 shown in Figure 4.4(b) a maximum when wall 
thickness is 0 .2m since wall thickness (t ) is inversely proportional to the hoop 
stress (ahoop)• The utilities shown in Figures 4.4(a) and (b) are thus consistent 
with the preferences of the agents. Based on the individual utility functions, a 
feasible space is obtained as shown in Figures 4.4(c) to check the existence of 
negotiated solutions, and the range of negotiation.
(c) Evaluation of game theory solutions
For the evaluation of game theory solutions to the conflict, a joint utility curve is 
plotted under normalised coordinates as shown in Figure 4.5 to obtain the game
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(a) Utility function 
for Agent_1
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(c) Existence of a 
feasible space
Figure 4.4: Utility functions for wall thickness
theoretic outcomes. These outcomes are also indicated in the figure. The Nash 
and Utilitarian solutions N(S) and U(S) yielded maximum benefit for >U( =  1.0) 
which corresponded to a value of 0.05m for wall thickness. These solutions yielded 
the minimum possible utility for agent ^ 2( =  0.4). The Kalai-Somordinsky and 
Egalitarian solutions K(S) and E(S), however, benefited both agents equally [util­
ity values =  0.7] and resulted in a value of 0.125m for the wall thickness.
The game theory solutions obtained in the context of the pressure vessel problem 
indicated how trade-offs are obtained in parametric design. The isolation of 
single negotiated solution from a set of four game theoretic solutions is discussed 
later in Section 4.3.4. There exist inter-dependencies between variables in design 
problems such as influence of wall thickness on hoop stress. The evaluation of 
dependencies are useful for rationalising the utility functions and is discussed 
next.
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Nash and Utilitarian solutions 
N(S), U(S) __________
1.0
Kalai-Somordinsky and Egalitarian 




U(A2)0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Figure 4.5: Game theory solutions for the pressure vessel problem 
4.2.3 D ependency based reasoning
In dependency based reasoning, the domain variables are usually classified into 
several types according to their role in design problems. For example, some vari­
ables are critical to the design whereas some others may have marginal influence 
on the overall problem. Kusiak and Wang (1995) classified a group of design 
variables into five categories (decision, performance, intermediate, constraint and 
specification), of which the key types are decision and performance variables. 
The decision variables are the ones the agents control in order to reach or evalu­
ate a performance variable. Thus in dependency-based negotiation, the problem 
is to determine the effect of certain decision variables on performance variables. 
Such an analysis involves two distinct aspects: qualitative and quantitative rea­
soning. The confluence based qualitative reasoning provides a means to identify 
the possible direction of change between decision and performance variables [de 
Kleer and Brown (1984), Kuipers (1986)]. The quantitative reasoning evaluates 
the actual change in the numerical value of a performance variable based on per­
turbation analysis on decision variables [Soo and Wang (1992), Kusiak and Wang 
(1995)].
A typical dependency network graph is shown in Figure 4.6 and can be expressed
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as G =  {V,E,  f2, where V  is the set of vertices, each representing a design 
variable and E  is a set of directed edges between these vertices. Q and \I/ are 
respectively the sets of qualitative and quantitative dependencies between the 
design variables [Wellman (1991)].
<^13,^13 \   ( n )—^ ----------- Y y^ ---  ^34,^34
Figure 4.6: A sample network graph (G)
(a) Qualitative dependency
The qualitative dependency between two design variables Vi and V2 is symbolically 
represented as 5Vl)V2 € fi, and is defined as follows:
+
^Vl,V2 — i
if Sy-^  I , —^ V^2 I , and
if 6Vl =  , =£• 5V2 =  — 
if Sy^  — "I-, —rr Sy2 — , and
if &vi =  , &y2 — H"
if SVl =  +, => 5V2 =  0 , and 
if 5yJ  Sy2 =  0
Otherwise - case of ambiguity
(4.3)
The qualitative reasoning in a dependency network is achieved by using parallel 
or serial dependencies [de Kleer and Brown (1984), Kuipers (1986), Kusiak and
4  C o n f l ic t  R e s o l u t io n 84
Wang (1995)]. Figure 4.7(a) represents a parallel dependency which is expressed 
as [^ t>1 ,t;3 ©^ t»2 ,i»3 ] between the three variables v<i and v3. Figure 4.7(b) represents 
the serial dependency expressed as [5Ul>U2 ® <5U2,V3]. The © and ® are parallel and 
serial operators. This basic relationship expressing parallel or serial dependencies 
can be generalised to any network graph.
® $ V lV 2  S — S. $V 2V 3  v . — V 2)----——(^3J
Parallel /bv Serial
^ 'dependency dependency
Figure 4.7: Parallel and serial dependency networks
(b) Q uan tita tive  dependency
In evaluating quantitative dependency between two design variables v\ and V2 , it 
is usually assumed that an analytical relationship exists between the variables as 
given by,
v2 = f(vi)  (4.4)
'ViV3
Therefore the quantitative dependency between the variables Vi and V2 can be 
given as,
/ _  A v 2 Vi , a ^
^  ~  „° Avi ( ^
The relationship for ipVxV2 represents the quantitative change in V2 by perturbing 
vi by r  percent; and represent the initial or current values of Vi and v2. The 
principle of parallel and serial dependencies can be applied to the case shown in 
Figure 4.7(a) and (b) which would become [ipVuv3 +  VWal an<^  W’vi.t* x VWsl-
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(c) Reduction of design networks
In a dependency network it is often useful to know the reduced or net dependency 
between any two variables. The reduction involves the removal of intermediate 
variables from the design dependency network retaining only the decision and 
performance variables. This is done to ease the evaluation of proportional change 
in one variable with respect to a change in the other. For example, for the network 
graph shown in Figure 4.8, the qualitative and quantitative dependencies [SVl,V4 , 
'ipvi,u4] are expressed as,
^ V \ ,V 4 =  [^V l ®  i $ V 2 ®  (^ U 5 ®  ^ 4 ) ) ]  ®  ®  ^ 4 )  ( ‘^ • ^ )
tfivi ,V4 =  [fax  ^  i^Pv 5 X /lpv 4) ) ]  +  (dV3 X (4 - 7 )
A general reduction procedure is presented in Section 4.3.2.
Reduction
algorithm
Figure 4.8: Network reduction process
4.2.4 An exam ple to illustrate dependency based reason­
ing
In order to explain the qualitative and quantitative reasoning in a design network, 
a simple example of a block with a bore is considered3. The variables describing 
the geometry of the block are shown in Figure 4.9.
3For the sake of simplicity, constraints on volume of bore and block are not introduced 
except for the geometric constraint: bore diameter(d) <  breadth of block (b) [Figure 4.9].
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h
Figure 4.9: Schematic of a block with a central bore 
(a) C onstruction of network graph
A network graph (G ) is constructed for the block based on a given set of domain 




Ibh -  VH (4.9)
ibh ^  4
(4.10)
where h =  height of the block, VH =  bore volume, I =  length and VB =  volume 
of the block.
Each variable in the analytical expressions Equations 4.8 and 4.9 represent the 
vertices (or nodes) of a directional graph (G ). These vertices are shown in Fig­
ure 4.10(a). Based on the analytical relations, edges are drawn between the 
vertices as shown in Figure 4.10(b). For example, variable d appears in the ex­
pression for Vh • Therefore an edge is drawn from vertex d to vertex V#. The 
same principle is applied to obtain the complete network in Figure 4.10(b). This 
presents the construction of the dependency graph. Each edge (E ) connecting two 
vertices in the graph has its associated qualitative and quantitative dependencies. 
Their evaluation is presented next.
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(a) N odes of g raph
Edge
(b) Full netw ork g raph
Figure 4.10: Network for the block example
(b) Q ualitative dependencies
The volume of bore (Vh ) and volume of block (Vb ) are considered to examine the 
qualitative influences. Figure 4.11 shows the influences on Vh and Vb separately. 
As shown in Figure 4.11(a), the influence of bore diameter d on Vh is £+ ’ since 
in Equation 4.8, increasing d will show a corresponding increase in Vh assuming 
there are no constraints on h. Therefore a £+ ’ sign is assigned to the qualitative 
influence Sd,vH- Similarly, from Equation 4.10, the qualitative influence Sd,vB of d 
on Vb is *—’ since increasing d will decrease Vj5 . The influence of T  and ‘6 ’ on Vh 
are ‘0’ since I and b do not appear in Equation 4.8 for Vg. Thus 5iyH =  6b,vH =  0.
=  +
(a) Influences on  b o re  volum e (b) Influences on block volum e (c) Influence of b lock th ickness  
on block volum e
Figure 4.11: Sub-network for the block example
To demonstrate the case of ambiguity represented as *?’ in Equation 4.11, the 
influence of h to Vg is considered as shown in Figure 4.11(c). The direct and
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indirect influences of h on Vb need to be combined to obtain the effective quali­
tative influence 5' h,vB- A symbolic form of representation of Figure 4.11(c) is:
&h,vB =  ® fox • Vb ) © fa,vB
=  (+<S>-)© +
= ( - © + )
= ? (4.11)
Equation 4.11 suggests that there are both £+ ’ and ’ parallel influences of h 
on Vb* Therefore, Sh,vB represents a case of ambiguity and is assigned £?’. In 
engineering problems, the qualitative dependencies alone are not sufficient for 
reasoning and therefore the quantitative dependencies between design variables 
also need to be determined to resolve qualitative ambiguities.
(c) Quantitative dependency
To illustrate the effect of quantitative dependencies, the block in Figure 4.12 is 
again considered. To enable the demonstration of the concept, some values are 
assigned to the geometrical variables as indicated in Figure 4.12. The various 
quantitative dependencies are:
Tpd;VH =  ^ * = 1 . 0VHo A d
^h,VH =  h° =  1 . 0  Vffo A*
=  Vy  =  0.067
Vb° Avh
^hyB — {tphyn x V7v„yB) +  V7h,vB =  +0.33 (4.12)
Thus the ambiguity *?’ in the qualitative reasoning for tfh V in Equation 4.11 can
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Bore
Block d = 0.1 m,
h = 0.1m
b = 0 .25 m
I =  0.5 m
Figure 4.12: Quantitative values assigned to geometric variables of the block
be eliminated by the corresponding quantitative dependency iph,vB fr°m Equa­
tion 4.12. In this case the influence of h on Vb is resolved to ‘+ \
(d) Network reduction
It is always convenient to express dependencies in the reduced form. For Fig­
ure 4.10, and the nominal dimensions in Figure 4.12, the effective dependencies 
between the variables h and Vg are therefore obtained as follows:
=  x ^Vh ,Vb) +  i>h,Va — +0.33 (4.13)
$h,vB =  ($h,vH ®  5 v h ,v b ) 0  5h,vB =  l+ r (4-14)
The above equations represent the effective dependencies for a simple network 
graph in Figure 4.10. A general network reduction procedure developed for this 
study is presented in section. Having presented the game theory and dependency 
based reasoning schemes, their comparison is presented in the next section.
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4.2.5 A comparison of game theory and dependency based  
reasoning techniques
This section presents a comparison of the two approaches to conflict negotiation 
based on certain factors4  that influence a conflict situation. Figure 4.13 shows 


























Figure 4.13: Factors influencing a conflict situation
Domain description
In engineering, the analytical formulae are often used to characterise the rela­
tionship between design variables in a domain. An approximate relation between 
design variables (e.g., using response surface methodology) often leads to conflicts 
with respect to its idealised values. In game theory based techniques the domain 
is described using well-defined analytical formulae, whereas in dependency based 
constraint relaxation, a network graph is used to represent the relationship be­
tween design variables. Parametric classification is also used in conjunction with 
these approaches as a means to separate the critical variables from the non-critical 
ones.
4  These factors have been identified from various isolated sources including that of Klien 
(1989), Badrinath and Rao (1996), Nash (1950) and Rao (1999).
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Number of agents
Although neither the game theory nor the constraint relaxation approach poses 
any restriction on the number of agents, the former has mainly been studied 
in the context of two-player games. In some isolated cases game theory based 
methods have been extended to address n-agent bargaining by means of coalition 
building techniques [Rao (1999)]. Building such coalition and a unified mathe­
matical function representing a common coalition objective is often difficult due 
to the restrictions imposed by the Arrow’s impossibility theorem 5. However, 
if such common objectives are collectively stable, then game theory would yield 
negotiated solutions (e.g., as in wage bargaining). But due to the inability in 
guaranteeing unconditional stability, such coalition formations are not generic. 
In the case of fully cooperative conflicts, the dependency based constraint relax­
ation schemes have been applied to cases where the number of conflicting agents 
is more than two 6 [Kusiak and Wang (1996)].
Condition for conflict identification
Appropriate well-defined conditions for conflict detection are necessary to de­
velop efficient negotiation schemes. These conditions include design constraint 
violation and variation in preferences between agents. Constraint relaxation ap­
proaches check for the violation of any design constraints. In game theory based 
methods, conflicts are identified when there is a difference between the individual 
preferences of agents on some shared design attribute.
5 Arrow’s impossibility theorem [Arrow (1964)] states that it is always not possible to con­
struct group utility functions representing preferences of a group. Suppose there are three 
alternatives A i, A 2  and A 3  and their preferences are stated as A i >- A 2 , A 2 >- A3 , A3  >- A\ (>- 
indicates is preferred to). As can readily be seen, in a typical bargaining situation such group 
preferences could stay ad infinitum in a loop. Arrow argued that any coalition that expresses 
such a preference structure is irrational and intransitive; irrational due to the fact that the 
group may choose to keep the cyclic preferences just to stay in the loop. As a consequence, any 
negotiation process that portrays intransitive preferences is doomed to failure.
6 However, it should be emphasised that the way Kusiak and Wang (1996) treated conflict 
situation differs in important ways from that considered by the author; the key difference being 
the fact that in author’s research conflicts occur due to difference in preferences whereas Kusiak 
and Wang presented conflicts as violation of design constraints. In this sense, Kusiak and Wang 
eliminated the restrictions on preference-formation imposed by Arrow (1964).
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Extent of cooperation
Full cooperation in negotiation means that any point within the feasible space 
represents a solution. However, usually agents do have preferences and total 
cooperation seldom exists in a decision process. Dependency based constraint 
relaxation does not provide any direct means for representing agent preferences. 
The game theory based Nash or Kalai-Somordinsky techniques offer means for 
obtaining a solution which is usually not the ideal one (shown in Figure 4.2 of 
Section 4.2.1 as utopia or utopic point). Therefore game theory can be applied 
to situations where total cooperation between agents cannot exist due to their 
set preferences.
Scheme for conflict negotiation
The main approaches are based on game theory and dependency based reasoning. 
There are, however, variations from these such as informal constraint relaxation 
approaches, for example, Berker and Brown (1996), or the use of if-then rules. 
There is no definite basis to favour a particular approach: choice of the approach 
is dependent on the conflict situation (e.g., conflicts in parametric design).
Threats and opportunistic behaviour
The presence of threats and opportunistic behaviour cannot be ruled out in a 
conflict situation, particularly in non-cooperative conflicts. While the constraint 
relaxation based approach does not take into account such behaviour, some game 
theoretic techniques can include weighting techniques to model threats in bar­
gaining. In game theoretic methods these are often identified as the threat value 
of an agent which can be used to influence other agents to reach an agreement. 
However, rational quantification of threats is required to include their consider­
ation within a formal method.
Genericity of schemes
Game-theoretic approach can be applied to problems with well defined analytical 
formulae or some mathematical representation such as the use of utility functions.
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The genericity of a game-theoretic approach has been tested outside the engineer­
ing domain [e.g., wage-bargaining, international business negotiation, etc.]. The 
constraint relaxation based approach is generic enough to be extended to any do­
main of conflict. However, this is subject to the existence of exact or approximate 
relationships between design variables.
Communication
Communication is central in any coordinated group activity. In both the ap­
proaches communication could take place in an informal manner or via some 
formal language such as KQML requiring formal semantics [Finin, et al, (1995)]. 
Formal mechanisms for communication are preferred to avoid inaccuracies in in­
formation exchange, for better understanding between the conflicting agents and 
possibilities of secondary conflicts.
Nature and consistency of negotiated solutions
This is one of the key factors that influence a conflict. In the constraint based 
approach, the feasibility space bounded by rationality7 leads to a set of solutions 
acceptable to all conflicting agents. Hence in a constraint relaxation approach 
there could be a typically large feasible set for a given conflict problem. On the 
other hand, the game theoretic solutions lead to single-point solutions within 
the feasible space bounded by each agent’s preferences. Though game solutions 
such as Nash and Kalai-Somordinsky solutions could lead to several single point 
solutions, the number of solutions is finite as compared to an infinite set generated 
by constraint-based approaches.
In the constraint relaxation approach [Figure 4.14], assuming that all perspectives 
fully co-operate, each perspective (Pj) proposes a solution (5^). A negotiated 
solution exists only if S\ fl £ 2  D ... H Sn ^  {</>}. When such a non-empty set 
is formed, it consists of all feasible alternatives for the design [feasible space in
7Rationality in this context refers to an agent’s ability to coordinate its actions to its goals 
in a problem bounded by design constraints. Rationality thus characterises the choice of an 
agent’s action based on a given set of constraints.
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>. F easib le  /
Agent 3 
perspective
Figure 4.14: Constraint relaxation process
Figure 4.14 ]. To form a feasible space one has to go through several iterations 
and the convergence of the solution cannot be guaranteed. But assuming tha t 
such a set is evaluated, no efficient methods are present for isolating a single 
solution as compared to single-shot game-theoretic methods.
The constraint relaxation approach as presented by Kusiak, et a l ,  (1996) and 
Kersten (1988), however, offers a weak method of contraction to isolate a single 
solution as shown in Figure. The process of contraction begins by gradually 
relaxing the aspiration levels of each perspective by some small increments (e). 
This process is continued until a single point solution is reached [Figure 4.15]. The 
extent of relaxation from each perspective is entirely governed by the aspiration 
level8 of the perspective and the degree of cooperation between perspectives. For 
example, in a fully cooperative process, P\ may choose to relax its aspiration 
levels whereas Pi  and P3 may not choose to relax their aspirations at all. Thus
8 Aspiration level indicates a range within which a constraint may be relaxed
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the process of contraction of feasible space immediately presents two drawbacks: 
(a) this is an additional iterative process requiring to check for consistency of 
feasible space for every iteration and (b) convergence to a single solution cannot 
be guaranteed at all times.
Generally in negotiation, full co-operation between perspectives should not be 
assumed, as pointed out by Davey and Olson (1998). This is due to the fact th a t 
negotiating trade-offs is critical in processes involving multiple agents as conflicts 
due to individual preferences are inevitable. The contraction technique (shown 
in Figure 4.15) is further weakened when agents belonging to each perspective 
have individual preferences.
Figure 4.15: Contraction process
The constraint relaxation technique discussed by Kusiak, et al., (1996) does not 
present a scenario where co-operation between perspectives could only be par­















relaxation) seem to differ is the condition assumed for identification of conflicts.
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In the constraint relaxation approach, constraint violation is often imposed as 
the main condition for conflict detection [for example, see Kusiak, et ah, Berker 
and Brown (1996)]. From a negotiation perspective this is a weak condition es­
pecially where preferences are allowed to exist within the Pareto space. In other 
words, constraint violation could act as an additional condition for reaching an 
agreement between conflicting entities. In so doing, the central role played by 
the agents in negotiation will be consistent with the real world situations.
The game theoretic approaches evaluate a single point negotiated solution but 
the effect of dependencies between design variables is generally ignored. This 
could lead to localised solutions as stated by Kusiak et ah, (1996). In order to 
maintain a global consistency in the negotiated solutions the use of qualitative 
and quantitative reasoning in directed network graphs assist in propagating the 
effect of parametric deformation uniformly throughout the domain. In addition, 
the use of aspiration levels relates well to the real world scenario where decision 
makers change their preferences in the midst of a negotiation process9. In most 
of the game-theory based approaches the utility variation for each agent involved 
in the conflict is held constant. This decreases the flexibility of the negotiation 
process and could also affect the formation of a combined utility space between 
the conflicting agents.
For effective conflict negotiation in product development, there is a need to com­
bine dependency-based constraint relaxation with game-theoretic approaches. 
Such a combination would be necessary to develop efficient conflict resolution 
schemes with consistent solutions in an agent-supported collaborative process. 
This is the object of the next section.
9 This view is also well supported in the literature by several researchers [Davey and Olson 
(1998), Sycara and Lewis (1991), Kersten (1988)].
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4.3 A scheme for agent-supported conflict reso­
lution
A comparison of game theory and constraint relaxation approaches emphasised 
the need for consistent design solutions. Therefore a conflict resolution scheme 
with the advantages of the two approaches could be considered beneficial. Such 
a scheme would capture the following key attributes:
• evaluation of dependencies
• agent’s preferences
• single point solution
Each agent’s preferences need to be explicitly stated for negotiation to be real­
istic. This is carried out by specifying certain utility functions for each agent 
involved in a conflict. A single-shot game-theoretic technique would yield a nego­
tiated settlement. Based on the global constraint network the effect of negotiated 
solution is propagated throughout the domain to ensure the obtained solutions 
are consistent.
4.3.1 Identification of conflicts
A collaborative process (Pc) consists of expert agents (A*, i =  l....n, n e  9ft). 
Each agent Ai corresponds to a perspective (Pj, j  =  l....ra, m  € 9ft) e.g., de­
sign, manufacturing and marketing stages in product life-cycle design. Expert 
agents associated with each perspective (Ai = P j , m  =  n) are responsible for 
task processing. Each perspective consists of several design variables V  such 
that V  C (Ai = Pj). An abstract view of the negotiation process is shown in 
Figure 4.16.
















*|  Design ]*-*{ Agent A^j 
♦{Manufacturing]*—*! Agent Ag j
*( Design ]«_»[ Agent Ag]
♦{Manufacturing]*—»[A9ent A4
Final design
Figure 4.16: An abstract view of a negotiation process
• The problem specification is usually captured as a set of design variables 
Vs € V  which are assigned values at the start of the design process. This 
set of variables contains certain common requirements which are common 
to all agents.
• Each agent (Ai) in the decision process is assumed to have a set of prefer­
ences UAi over a set of shared variables Vsh £ V  such that UAi ^  {<f>}.
• The evaluation of unknown variables including the decision [Vb € V] and 
performance variables [Vp € V] are carried out and a initial design is 
formed.
• Each agent (Ai) in a decision process controls certain key decision variables 
which are also directly related to the performance variables.
• As the agents interact to examine the acceptance of the initial design, a 
conflict could be detected due to differences in preferences over shared vari­
ables, [i.e., Ai(VSH) ±  Aj(VSH),i  #  j]-
A new scheme has been developed which combines game theory and dependency 
based reasoning in order to resolve such conflicts [conflict type identified in Section 
2.5.2, Figure 2.4]. A detailed reasoning procedure is presented next which is used 
to evaluate the effective qualitative and quantitative dependencies.
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4.3.2 Reasoning on a design network
A design network graph (G) is formed based on the analytical formulae [of the
form f ( V ) ]  which describe the domain. Such a network is useful in propagating 
any changes throughout the domain. This network provides quantitative (VO as 
well as qualitative (£) dependency information between any two design variables. 
The Figure 4.17 shows a directed graph G represented as a four tuple G =
( V e, 6 £  Cl and V> € where:
E  is the set of directed edges.
8 is the qualitative dependency of each edge (E).











Figure 4.17: Graph (G) showing the start (Vd ) and the target (Vp) vertices
When a full network is specified it has a non-empty set of edges, vertices and 
dependencies. Of immediate interest are the decision and performance variables 
and the link between them. Thus the aim is to establish effective dependen­
cies between the decision and performance variables. A reasoning procedure 
reduce_network is outlined as follows:
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Begin
Procedure reduce_network 
{£7} =  {4>}; initialise all variables
W  =  M ;
VVp G V  and Vb G V, specify a pair: (Vp, Vb )
V d  ~  N s t a r t
Vp =  iVend 
for each Vb, create P i n f o  
P i n f o  — { C n , C 'p j C 'p l ,  V'} 
push P i n f o  I n s  stack 
while INS #  {<£}, do 
Ci pop (INS)
r e t r i e v e  from  C j; Cn, Cp , C p l ,  'tp 
for each A dj(C jv), do 
A n  <— Ad j  (C  n )
A n p l  Adj (C p l  +  1)
C p (A n ) 4—C p  +  Adj(Cjv) 
i f  A n  =  Vb, th e n
6i =  &vD,Vi ® 5 vd ,v2.......-..... ® &Vn,Vp
tpi =  ^Vb,^I x  ^Vb,V2............. X ^Vn.Vp
store {C pjC pL ,^,^}  (i =  l...n ,n  G 3ft) 
e lse
new  P in f o  =  {A dj(C //),A A rp£„ A dj(C jv)pa^ , ^ }  
p u sh  P in f o  —^  -Tats s t a c k  
end  i f  
end  do  
end  f o r  
end  f o r  
en d  f o r
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V stored paths, evaluate effective dependencies,
6 ef f  =  ® 6 2  ® ............ ® 6 k
0 e / /  =  0 1  +  0 2  + . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . +  0 J f c
end fo r  
End
Given a source vertex (which is usually a decision variable, Vb) and a target vertex 
(which is a performance variable, Vp) the first step towards reduction is to identify 
all paths from Vb to Vp. Path identification is carried out by creating a path 
information object P i n f o  which consists of the current node (Cat), the current 
path (Cp), the current path length (Cpl) and the corresponding quantitative 
dependencies (0). For example, if Cn =  Vb, then the values for Cp, Cpl , and <j> 
are (Vb, 0 , 0 ) respectively. The P i n f o  object contains information including the 
path traversed at any instant from the start node and the corresponding path 
length by keeping track of the number of paths traversed. Each time a P i n f o  is  
formed, it is pushed into a stack waiting to be retrieved. Thus each stack item is 
unique in terms of its contents.
Whenever a P i n f o  object is popped out of the stack, its contents are extracted 
and for each C n  €  P i n f o  the adjacencies Adj(CA-) are determined. Since the 
procedure reduce_network is a modification of the depth-first search technique, 
the effective dependency of each path is obtained as a product of dependencies. 
Once all possible paths between the source and the target are determined, the 
final effective dependency is obtained as the sum of individual path dependencies.
4.3.3 Exam ple to dem onstrate the reasoning procedure
A sub-set of the design example of block with a helical spring [adapted from 
Juvinall and Marshek (1991)] is considered here to demonstrate the construction
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of network from domain equations and reasoning procedure. A helical spring with 
squared and ground ends is required to exert a certain force F  with constraints 
on length. The designed spring must fit inside a bore of a rectangular block with 
constraints on bore diameter as shown in Figure 4.18.
The steps involved in reasoning procedure (reduce_network) is systematically pre­
sented in the context of the design example. Based on the analytical design 
equations [given in Appendix A], a directed network graph as shown in Figure 
is generated. The focus is on the dependencies between the decision and per­
formance variables. For instance, let initial force (F ) be a decision variable and 
constraint (Hi)  on free length be a performance variable. For the sake of clarity 
a sub-network of variables connecting F  and Hi  is shown in Figure 4.19. The 
first stage is to create a P i n f o  object (explained in section 4.3.2) consisting of 
the start node, the path traversed so far, the path length and the quantitative 
dependency. As indicated in the Figure 4.20, P i n f o  is updated constantly and 
a path is retrieved as soon as the target vertex is reached. During the traversal 
process, adjacencies of each node are stored separately for further processing. For 
the case shown in Figure 4.19 the to tal number of paths was found to be four.
Once all paths between the start and the end vertex are known, the corresponding 
effective dependencies are evaluated as follows:
|  Initial force (F)
Figure 4.18: Rectangular block with a spring
For PATH 1:
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Figure 4.19: Network graph representing solid force and a constraint in the block- 
spring design problem
For PATH 2:
5 =  <$F,k <S> fa,i h  (4-17)
^  =  ^F,k x ipktfi (4-18)
For PATH 3:
5 =  Sp,k ® 5k,lc ® 5Lc,Lf ® 5itftff1 (4.19)
Ip =  i>F,k X 1pk,Lc X Ip L c L f  X 1pL f,H i (4.20)
For PATH 4:
£ =  F^,fc ® 5k,N <8 > J^V,LS ® 5Ls,Lf ® (4.21)
'Ip =  ^F.A: X X 1pN,La X f e . L ,  X 1 p L f ,H x (4.22)
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Effective dependency:
f i e f f
OR




$F,Hi © ( F^,k ® Sk,Hi)
© ( ^ F . f c  ®  fih,Lc ®  &Lc ,Lf  ®  $ L f ,H \ )
© f e j f c  ®  <^,AT ®  $ N ,L a ®  &Ls ,L f  ®  ^L /}/ f i )
&F,H\ © (^ F.fc ®
©((4,Lc <S> ^LcL/) © (^ Jk.iST ® SNjl 9 <g> 6Ls ,Lf ) ) ) )
i>F,Hi +  (^F ,fc  X +  (lpF ,k  x  i>k,Lc X
ll>Lc,Lf x  TpLftHi)  +  {lpF,k x  x  
1pN,Ls x  ^ L a,L/ x  1pLf,Hi)
i>F,H! +  (^F,A; X f a ,H i  +  ( (V ^ L c  x  ^ L c,L f ) +  
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Stack (2) Stack (7)
Stack (1)
FfN=(F.FM.VFk) 
Adj(k) =  ( H , L ,  N} F— Lc - L, — H,
F—► k —  N — L — L, —  H,
PATHS RETRIEVED
Stack (3) Stack (6)Adj(N) = { g j
F —  k —  H
PATHS RETRIEVEDPATHS RETRIEVED
Stack (4) Stack (5)
Adj(N) = { LS}J
Figure 4.20: Path identification process
4.3.4 A trade-off mechanism to enforce decisions
The reasoning procedures evaluate the qualitative as well as quantitative influence 
of decision variables on performance variables in a design network. Such evalu­
ation coupled with problem constraints assist the formation of utility functions 
for the agents. For example, in the pressure vessel design problem considered 
in section, the utility functions for the agents had to satisfy certain stress and 
geometric constraints of the problem10.
10Based on literature in game theory related negotiation, there is no known standard way 
for constructing utility functions. For example, Davey and Olson (1998) criticised the view of 
utility based approaches and questioned the generality in assigning of weights in the generation 
utility functions. Several authors including Raiffa (1972) mentioned that the utility functions 
will need to pass through some test for rationality whereas other researchers as in Kanappan 
and Marshek (1993) have assumed some functions without any description on their validity. In 
the present research (as will be seen in Chapter 6) the design constraints coupled with reasoning 
procedures are used to guide the formation of utility functions.
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Based on the prescribed utility functions for a given problem, using the Nash 
N ( S ), Kalai-Somordinsky K ( S ), Egalitarian E(S)  and Utilarian 27(5) methods, 
a one-shot compromise is reached resulting in four different game-theoretic solu­
tions in general. However, only one solution out of the four can be chosen as a 
final negotiated settlement (N ). The need for isolating a single solution is due to 
two reasons: (a) The pay-offs for each agent (27^, C/^2) obtained by the schemes 
are not always the same. Therefore, an agent may wish to choose a solution which 
yields highest possible utility to itself but not necessarily to other agents, (b) 
To prevent secondary conflicts which could delay the negotiation process. In the 
case of human conflicts, Nash (1950) suggested the use of a generic mechanism for 
breaking deadlocks in bargaining. Therefore, the following IF-THEN rules have 
been developed for enforcing decisions:
while S 7  ^ {<j>}, do,
i f  U i1 =  U£2 is true
then final solution N  =  max(27][41,27^2) in (iV(5), K(S), E(S),  27(5)} 
e lse  i f  U f1 ^  U?2
then final solution N  =  min |27^ — 27^2| in {N (S ) , K (S ) , E (S ) , 27(5)} 
e lse  N  =  Average N(S) ,K(S) ,E(S) ,U (S)  such that 
N  C S and {U f l , U?2} ±  {$} 
end i f  
end do
In the agent supported design of pressure vessel considered in Section 4.2.2, four 
game theory solutions (shown in Figure 4.5 were evaluated but acceptance of a 
single solution was not discussed. The IF-THEN rules presented above when 
applied to the pressure vessel design problem yields the Kalai-Somordinsky and 
Egalitarian as the final negotiated solution N  (corresponds to equal utility values 
U il ,U2 2 =  0.7 for both agents).
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The game theory methods, reasoning procedures and rules presented in sections 
are employed in developing reasoning and negotiation agents which is discussed 
next.
4.4 Software agents for reasoning and negotia­
tion
This section presents the software agents custom-developed for this study, viz., 
the reasoning and negotiation agents. To this end this section will cover the 
internal details of the agents such as their internal structure and the graphical 
user interface.
4.4.1 Reasoning agent
The reasoning agent [Figure 4.21] evaluates the dependencies between variables 
in a design network. First, the dependency network is input to the agent as sets 
of vertices, edges and quantitative dependencies in a directed graph as <vertex> 
<edge> <quantitative_dependency>. The reasoning agent forms the network 
graph and stores all the vertex and edge information.
The transition from SiFAs to the formation of the reasoning agent is shown in 
Figure 4.22. The key SiFAs and SimFAs in the reasoning agent are also shown 
in the figure. As indicated in Figure 4.22, the reasoning agent uses the network 
reduction procedures which was presented in Section 4.3.2 and evaluates the 
dependencies between all specified decision and performance variables.
The reasoning agent is generic and not dependent on a particular domain. The 
reasoning agent offers a GUI for interaction with human agents. The s ta r t .v e r te x
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(a) GUI of the reasoning agent (b) internal structure
Figure 4.21: Reasoning agent
ta r g e t  .v e rte x  and the network need to be specified. The results of dependency 
evaluation are displayed in a text area within the agent GUI. The reasoning agent 
also exchanges KQML messages with other agents (e.g., design agent). In the 
present implementation, however, only selected performatives such as tell and 
ask are used.
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Single Function Agents 
(SiFAs)
Simple Function Agents 
(SimFAs)
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Figure 4.22: Transition from SiFAs to a /J.FA in reasoning agent 
4.4.2 Negotiation agent
A set of four game theory techniques and rules provide the support for the ne­
gotiation agent [Figure 4.23]. The negotiation agent developed here is designed 
to solve two-agent conflicts between certain specified utility descriptions. The 
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(a) GUI of the negotiation agen t (b) internal structure
Figure 4.23: Negotiation agent
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Figure 4.24: Transition from SiFAs to a /zFA in negotiation agent
Figure 4.24 shows the formation of the negotiation agent by means of a transition 
from SiFAs to a //FA. The negotiation agent which is a /xFA consists of parsers 
for KQML messages and utility functions [shown as Simple Function Agents 
(SimFAs) in Figure 4.24]. The KQML message parser consists of a set of methods 
to process performatives such as tell or ask which are processed as ASCII string 
objects. The negotiation agent also provides a plot function that plots the joint 
utility space (also called a biloss map). The final negotiated solution is evaluated 
and the outcome is sent back to the conflicting agents. Based on the nature of 
the obtained solutions, the agent uses additional decision enforcement rules to 
finalise a settlement. In the current implementation, the negotiation is designed 
to handle conflict resolution between two agents.
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4.4.3 Im plem entation of reasoning and negotiation agents
The reasoning and negotiation agents were developed using Java programming 
language. The Java Development Toolkit-1 . 2  (JDK1.2) was used to develop the 
GUI components for the agents.
The input for the reasoning agent was specified in a file of which each line corre­
sponded to an edge of the network graph. As each line of the input file is read, 
the reference to vertices and the dependencies are stored. The data structures 
associated with storage and retrieval of vertices (e.g., hash tables, stacks, linked 
lists, etc.) in a graph were adapted and modified from Weiss (1998). The meth­
ods for parsing the input from the text fields in the agent GUI [Figure 4.21], 
procedure for network reduction in Section 4.3.2 were implemented. This pro­
cedure for network reduction is a modification of the depth first search. Once 
the start and the target vertices are specified, the network reduction procedure 
is used to evaluated the effective dependencies.
The negotiation agent was designed specifically for two agent games. The agent 
utility functions for the conflict variables (C/1, C/2 , C/3 and C/4) are read from a 
file. The four different game theory methods for the evaluation of negotiated so­
lutions were coded a priori. The rules for the isolation of a single solution [Section 
4.3.4] were also implemented. In addition, the methods for plotting graphs [’’Ne­
gotiation Graph 1  and Negotiation Graph 2 ” in Figure 4.23], displaying results 
in the GUI, were also incorporated in the agent user interface.
4.5 Summary
This chapter presented the development of negotiation schemes for conflict res­
olution in an agent-based decision process. Game theory and dependency based 
reasoning have been first individually considered and illustrated through simple
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examples of engineering design. A conflict resolution scheme has been proposed 
which has identified the positive attributes of the reasoning and negotiation tech­
niques. The implementation of the new scheme has been presented with a view 
to utilise it in the agent-based product development process. The validation of 
the unified scheme in a collaborative process is presented in Chapters 5 & 6 .
Chapter 5
Comparative case study: 
Collaborative design of a poppet 
relief valve
5.1 Introduction
In collaborative product development, software agents focusing on different as­
pects of a design have individual preferences over certain shared attributes of the 
product. This can result into different values for the shared design variables, thus 
leading to conflicts between agents. A novel scheme for conflict resolution in a 
decision process was developed in Chapter 4. There is a need, however, to apply 
and evaluate the new scheme in the context of a collaborative design process. To 
achieve this, a case study was carried out on the design of a poppet relief valve, 
aimed at comparing the new conflict resolution scheme with the previous work.
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5.2 O bjective
The objective of this case study was to test the feasibility of the negotiation 
scheme proposed in Chapter 4. The case study involved the design of a pop­
pet relief valve which enabled the comparison with previous schemes for conflict 
negotiation1.
In aerospace engineering and other industrial applications, valves are commonly 
used to regulate fluid flow and to relieve excessive pressures in closed conduits. 
Figure 5.1 shows a poppet relief valve consisting of helical spring, valve stem, 
and pipe enclosure. The helical spring and valve stem are enclosed in the pipe. 
The fluid is allowed to flow through the valve from inlet to outlet. The design 
principle here is that fluid flow occurs only when the pressure of fluid exceeds the 
cracking pressure. The fluid flow is cut off for fluid pressures below the cracking 
pressure where the helical spring presses the seal against the valve inlet thereby 

















Figure 5.1: Schematic of a poppet valve
1This example served as a useful benchmark for negotiation since it was previously studied in 
a similar context by Kanappan and Marshek (1993) and Kusiak, et al., (1996). The analytical 
formulae and design specification were taken from Lyons (1982) and Kanappan and Marshek 
(1993) and are restated in Appendix A.
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5.3 A collaborative design process
In this study, the design of poppet relief valve is viewed as a collaborative process 
carried out by several software agents [Figure 5.2]. Each agent is associated with 
a particular perspective, viz, valve design, spring design and pipe enclosure de­
sign. Given a specification, the agents carry out the design task in collaboration. 
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Figure 5.2: Design configuration of the poppet relief valve
The user inputs the design specification to the valve design agent which then 
evaluates its associated variables such as the valve outer diameter (Dv). The 
design specification and the shared variables are accessible to other agents via 
a shared class mechanism. Once the evaluation of variables by the valve design 
agent is complete, the spring- and the enclosure agents compute their associated 
variables (e.g, orifice diameter, in-line diameter, etc.). A difference in the values 
of shared variables (the internal and external diameters, Di and D0) leads to 
conflict between the agents. As a part of the conflict negotiation process, the 
human designer specifies certain preferences for the conflicting variables with 
respect to the perspectives of the agents involved in conflict. These preferences 
are represented in the form of utility functions and are input to the negotiation 
agent which evaluates a negotiated settlement. Figure 5.3 shows an overview of
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Figure 5.3: An overview of the collaborative process in the case study on poppet 
relief valve
5.3.1 Design specification
The designer specified the overall design requirements and constraints to the 
design agent as shown in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Design specification for poppet relief valve case study
Overall specification
Fluid flow rate, Q 3, m Is 25.236
p
Cracking pressure, c Pa 6.894x10 4
Max. fluid pressure, ? Pa 1.723x10*
Pressure drop, 5P Pa 1.034x10s
Fluid specific gravity, S - 1.0
Other initial variables
Valve Spring Enclosure
> II © r c j  = 0.1 A ,  =0.0005
Cf  =0.65 rc2 =0.1 A 2 = 0.0005
C  *1.3 N  =  2.5 Dv =0.0889
t ,  -0.00254 a. II o -
ri =1.0 - .
r2 *0.9 - -
Constraints
0.0216  ^ Li  ^0.0254, 7 ^  C $ 13
5.3.2 Initial design and conflict detection
The valve and spring agents evaluated the unknown variables and formed the ini­
tial design. A comparison of common variables indicated the presence of conflicts 
between the spring and enclosure agents on the values of internal and external di­
ameters (Di and D0). These were determined as: (D?,DS0) =  (0.0442m, 0.0876m)
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by the spring agent and (Df,Dl)  =  (0.0652m, 0.0896m) by the enclosure agent. 
Thus a conflict was detected between the two agents on the values of Di and D0.
5.3.3 Reasoning
The first step in conflict resolution was the dependency-based reasoning on a 
network of design constraints. The designer specified the constraint network of 
design variables to the reasoning agent. The reasoning agent determined the 
effective dependencies between the decision and performance variables, as shown 
in Table 5.2.





dependency (-0 ) 





D  —> D 0 + 0.9558 0.9519
D ^ D i + 1.0588 1.0657
d  —y D 0 + 0.0435 0.0480
d  —¥ D i 0.0588 -0.0657
rc \  -> D 0 + 0.0862 0.0865
rco -»  D i - 0.1176 -0.1184
A i  —> D 0 - 0 . 0 1 0 2 0.0057
A'l —> D i + 0.0113 0.0114
D v —> D 0 + 1 . 0 1 0 2 1.0057
d - > V s + 0.0674 .
D - > V a - 1.4869 1.4868
D v —¥ Vv + 0 . 0 2 1 0 -
C  —> Ts - - -0.0600
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The values for various dependencies compare well with those reported by Ku- 
siak, et al., (1996)2. These dependencies between the decision and performance 
variables are used subsequently in the negotiation stage which is discussed next.
5.3.4 N egotiation
The negotiation between conflicting agents was carried out by the negotiation 
agent based on the game-theoretic approach of Chapter 4. This involved the 
following three steps:
• Formation of the utility functions for controlling decision variables with 
respect to each conflicting agent perspective.
• Evaluation of the utilities for the conflicting variable with respect to each 
conflicting perspective.
• Evaluation of alternative negotiated solutions.
(a) U tilities for controlling decision variables
For the spring design agent, the spring index, C, was chosen as the controlling 
decision variable. This choice was based on the constraint on the installed length 
of the spring, Li.
For the enclosure design agent, the corrosion resistance allowance A2 was se­
lected as the controlling decision variable. This was the only design variable that 
could be relaxed to generate utility for Di without violating the design speci­
fication. The utility functions specified for the respective controlling variables
2  The minor differences can be explained by the fact that the values of constants rci and rc2 
used by Kusiak were not reported.
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U(C)
1.0 -
0.5 - 0 .5 -
C 0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0005 A2 (m)
(a) For spring agent
Figure 5.4: Specified utility functions for controlling decision variables
for the spring and enclosure agents are shown in Figure 5.4. The profile for C 
in Figure 5.4(a) is based on the fact that for the limiting constraint on C =  7, 
U(C) is zero. The utility for spring agent increases until C  =  8  where it is 
maximum and then shows a decrease. The optimal design is bounded by the 
constraints on C. As for corrosion resistance allowance (A2), the utility is zero 
at A 2 = 0.0001m. Based on experimental results reported by Lyons (1982), the 
most preferred value lies in the range 0.00015m — 0.0002m. The allowance un­
der the given specifications A2 should not exceed the maximum allowed value of 
0.0005m.
(b) U tilities for conflicting variables
The utilities for the conflicting variables Di and D0 were evaluated form the 
dependencies in Table 5.2 and the specified utilities in Figure 5.4. These are 
shown in Figure 5.5. Figures 5.5 (a) and (b) show the evaluated utilities for 
Di and D0 for the spring design agent. The utilities for Di and D0 for the 
enclosure design agent are shown in Figure 5.5 (c) and (d). Figure 5.5 (a) shows 
that for the spring agent any value for Di in the range (0.0449 - 0.0655 m) is 
acceptable with 0.0548 m being the most preferred value. On the other hand for
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the enclosure agent [Figure 5.5 (c)] any value for A in the range (0.0439 - 0.0449 
m) is acceptable with 0.0441 m being the most preferred value.
Since the negotiation on a conflicting variable would require an overlap of the 
acceptable ranges, these were plotted for each conflicting variable, A and D0, 
as shown in Figure 5.5 (e) and (f). The overlapping region of the utilities rep­
resents the negotiation range for each variable. The overlapping utilities for D0 
in Figure 5.5 (f) show a non-empty negotiation range suggesting the existence 
of a game-theoretic solution. However, for A? the negotiation range was null as 
shown in Figure 5.5 (e).
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U(D.)
0.5 0.5
0.0655 Dt (m) 0.0896 Do(m)0.0546 0.07620.0449





0.0439 0.0441 0.0447 0.0449 Di (m)
(c) Utility forZ7 : Enclosure agent
1.0 -
0 .5 -
0.0868 0.0871 0.0876 0.0878 4 M









1.0 -  
0.5 -
0
0.0439 0.0449 0.0655^D« (m) 0.0868 0.0878 0.0896 4 M
Enclosure
(f) Negotiation range for: Da 
[shaded region]
(e) Negotiation range for: D.
Figure 5.5: Evaluated utility functions for conflicting variables
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(c) Redefinition of utilities for controlling design variables
Due to the empty negotiation range for Di, agents were required to relax their 
constraints and their respective utility levels. Due to the physical nature of the 
problem the constraints for enclosure design agent could not be relaxed. For the 
spring design agent, the constraint on spring index C was relaxed to a wider range 
(4 < C <  20) and the utility function was redefined. Additional constraints were 
introduced for rc\ and rc^ (rc\ > 0.05m; rc2  > 0.05m) to ensure a negotiated 




(a) Utility forC: Spring agent
1.0
0.5 - 0 .5 -
0.0038 rci W 0.0012 0.0076 0.0127 rc2(m)0.0012 0.0025
(b) Utility for rc} \ Spring agent (c) Utility for rc2 : Spring agent
Figure 5.6: Redefined utility functions for the controlling decision variables for 
the spring agent
The re-evaluated utilities for Di and D0 are shown in Figure 5.7. Figure 5.8
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shows the negotiation range resulting from this constraint relaxation process, 
and confirms the existence of a negotiated solution for Di  and D 0.
0.5 -
0.0449 0.0477 D ‘ (m )




0.09 Do ( m )0.08 0.085
(b) Utility for D0 : Spring agent 










0.09 D ° ^0.08
(a) Negotiation range for£> 
[shaded region]
(b) Negotiation range forD0 
[shaded region]
Figure 5.8: Negotiation ranges for conflicting variables with re-evaluated utilities
(d) N egotiated solutions
The new utilities for Di  and D 0 were input to the negotiation agent to determine 
a negotiated settlement. The negotiation agent plotted the joint utility outcome 
for each of the conflicting variables as shown in Figure 5.9. Four different game- 
theoretic methods were applied to obtain alternative negotiated solutions which 
are shown in Table 5.3. The corresponding utilities for the two agents are shown 
in Table 5.4. The Nash and Kalai- Somordinsky solutions compare well with those
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obtained by Kanappan and Marshek (1993) who did not consider the Egalitarian 
and Utilitarian solutions. It can be observed that in this case the values of Kalai- 
Somordinsky and Egalitarian solutions turned out to be the same while the Nash 
and the Utilitarian solutions evaluated to mutually identical values. Due to the 
nature of Kalai-Somordinsky solution which ensured equal pay-offs for spring 
and enclosure agents, this solution was chosen as the final settlement. This final 
negotiated solution thus satisfied the design requirements and constraints while 
objectively meeting the goals and preferences of the agents.
Applet Viewer: NegotiationAgent.class  ______________
A p p le t
Agenh Vartabka



















N egotiation Graph 2
Figure 5.9: Negotiation agent showing the utility curve for the conflicting vari­
ables
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N(S) K(S) N(S) K(S) E(S) U(S) solution
Di,m 0.0441 0.0441 0.0447 0.0446 0.0446 0.0447 0.0446
D 0,m 0.0876 0.0876 0.0876 0.0871 0.0871 0.0876 0.0871




Spring design agent Enclosure design agent
N(S) K(S) E(S) U(S) N(S) K(S) E(S) U(S)
U(Di) 0 . 8 0.742 0.742 0 . 8 0.699 0.742 0.742 0.699
U(D0) 0.571 0.671 0.671 0.571 1 . 0 0.671 0.671 1 . 0
5.4 Discussion
(a) Comparison of author’s results with those of Kusiak, et al.,{1996):
In Kusiak’s approach a perspective such as design was assumed to have several 
sub-problems. Each individual sub-problem was aware of the other sub-problems 
in the perspective and was willing to fully co-operate. Thus information trans­
parency between sub-problems was allowed from the start of the design process 
to the end. Although termed as negotiation, this approach is not too dissimilar to 
optimisation by iterative search. This process differs from the negotiation process 
considered in this research in important ways.
• Each conflicting agent (representing a sub-problem) has its own priorities 
and generates its own utility functions independent of the other agents.
• An agent may choose to mis-represent its information in order to maximise 
its gain.
• As a negotiation session begins, the agents may make use of threats which
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are very common in bargaining problems. For example, the conflict sce­
nario considered in the present study could also be viewed as a two agent 
game with threats. When the first attempt to make a negotiated settle­
ment failed due to a lack of common utility space, both agents (spring and 
enclosure) were required to relax their constraints and redefine their utility 
functions. For the enclosure agent, the value of corrosion resistance al­
lowance for the poppet valve stem {A2 ) could only vary between 0.00025m 
and 0.0012m under the given circumstances. Though the aspect of threats 
was not addressed in this case study, such a behaviour can be incorporated 
if necessary. Such a possibility was not studied by Kusiak, et al
• Another major difference is that in Kusiak’s work, any solution within the 
feasible design space was considered to be acceptable (i.e., so long as design 
constraints were not violated). In practice, however, a designer often needs 
to select the best solution based on some objective criteria of its preferences. 
In the current approach therefore the agents are able to state their individ­
ual preferences. Thus evaluating a feasible region is not the final settlement 
of conflicts. Conflicts often arises due to difference in preferences, however, 
Kusiak et al, defined conflicts due to violation of design constraints.
• The present research differs in another aspect that single point solutions 
are obtained as a mark of reaching a settlement. In Kusiak’s approach 
one cannot predict a priori the number of iterations needed to make a 
compromise.
(b) Comparison of author’s results with those of Kanappan and Marshek (1993):
• The key difference between Kanappan and Marshek’s game theoretic ap­
proach, and the present research is the use of dependency based constraint 
relaxation in conjunction with game-theoretic approach. This is crucial 
in engineering problems as we demonstrated in the initial design iteration
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where the feasible design space for the agents did not intersect to form a 
non-empty negotiation space.
• Kanappan and Marshek’s approach was based on static utilities. In the 
present approach we demonstrated the agents may need to change utilities 
similar to the aspiration based approach of Kersten (1989). This truly 
depicts a conflict situation where the agents may dynamically change their 
preferences during the negotiation.
•  Kanappan and Marshek assumed only one controlling decision variable for 
each agent thereby restricting the choice of utility function for a given prob­
lem. The present study used as many as three controlling decision variables 
for the spring design agent. This was found to increase the flexibility in 
selecting a range of values for conflicting variables.
• Kanappan and Marshek did not present the solutions from the viewpoint of 
design consistency. In the present case, the consistency is ensured by means 
of qualitative and quantitative reasoning in a network of design variables.
•  The present approach included selection strategies to isolate a negotiated 
solution from a set of four game-theoretic solutions by the use of IF-THEN 
rules.
• The inclusion of four methods in the negotiation scheme provided the de­
signer with a greater choice for evaluating negotiated solutions. The Egali­
tarian and Utilitarian methods were not studied in this context by Kanap­
pan and Marshek.
5.5 Summary
Conflict negotiation in engineering design is a frequent though difficult problem.
A case study on conflicts in the design of a poppet relief valve was presented.
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A new negotiation scheme was applied which examined conflict resolution be­
tween agents in a design process. This scheme made use of a combination of 
dependency-based reasoning coupled with game-theoretic methods. The reason­
ing ensured the formation of feasible design space whereas the game-theoretic 
methods isolated four single point solutions within this space. Rules for isolat­
ing a single solution were successfully tested for isolating a single point solution. 
The numerical results thus obtained were compared with the previous work and 
showed a good comparison with that of Kanappan and Marshek (1993). The re­
sults indicate the merits of the proposed negotiation scheme, such as preserving 
agents’ preferences and maintaining rationality, over iterative negotiation models 
of Kusiak and Wang (1996). This scheme has been found to formally capture the 
combined benefits of game-theoretic and constraint based techniques applied to 
a two-agent negotiation problem.
Chapter 6
Validation case study: 
Collaborative design and 
manufacture of a Geneva 
mechanism
6.1 Introduction
This chapter is aimed at validating the agent synthesis and goal alignment hy­
potheses presented in Chapter 1  for an agent-based collaborative design process. 
The synthesis of agents including the modelling of Multi-Agents using the SiFA 
approach was presented in Chapter 3 and illustrated through the example of the 
Geneva mechanism. The problem of conflicts between the agents involved in col­
laborative design process was examined in Chapter 4 and a novel scheme was 
presented for conflict resolution by the alignment of goals. Chapter 5 showed the 
application of this scheme through the design case study of a poppet relief valve.
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Having tested the two hypotheses and related methodologies in isolation, now 
there is a need to apply and test them together in a common and elaborate 
setting of laboratory based collaborative product development, involving both 
design and manufacturing. To achieve this, a case study was carried out on 
collaborative design and manufacture of a Geneva mechanism.
6.2 Objective
The objectives of this case study were as follows:
• To validate the new Single Function Agent (SiFA) based agent synthesis 
approach;
• To validate the new conflict resolution scheme in a collaborative product 
development process, including manufacturing and consisting of both soft­
ware agents and human decision makers.
The Geneva mechanism was chosen as the test vehicle for this case study for the 
following reasons:
• It is an assembly rather than a single component;
• It has reasonably complex design function and associated functional be­
haviour. Therefore the associated design agents would also be more com­
plex;
• It represents a product of higher complexity with respect to its geometry;
-  Large number of design variables
-  Tightly coupled design variables
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-  Highly interactive geometrical features
-  Tighter tolerances
• Its manufacturing process1 would be complex;
-  Need for high quality precision tools due to tight tolerances.
-  Additional consideration of shrinkage.
-  Design of ejection mechanism.
Whereas the design of a poppet relief valve applied the conflict resolution scheme 
in Chapter 4 to software-to-software negotiation mode only, this case study tested 
the conflict resolution scheme in three distinct negotiation modes:
•  software agent - software agent (type 1  conflict);
•  software agent - human agent (type 2  conflict);
• human agent - human agent (type 3 conflict).
Therefore, this case study aims to enhance the understanding developed in Chap­
ter 5 and tests the scalability of this thesis by addressing the following:
• Increasing the complexity of the product;
• Broadening of the scope of product development process;
• Broadening of scope for conflict negotiation.
1 Geneva mechanisms are usually manufactured using metals (typically steel or aluminium). 
To suit one of the experimental objectives of including the stand-alone injection moulding ma­
chine, the present case study has considered the manufacture of the mechanism from polymeric 
materials.
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6.3 Experimental m ethodology
The case study consisted of the following key phases apart from the additional 
tasks of conflict resolution:
• Organisation
• Construction of the problem domain
• Design for function
• Design for manufacture
• Development of manufacturing tool
• Product manufacturing
Further sections will address each of these phases.
6.4 Organisation
6.4.1 Team formation
This phase involved the identification of the following:
• Skills required
• Responsibilities of each team member
• Resources
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The humans in this collaborative test-bed include individuals with relevant ex­
pertise in design, drafting, manufacturing and project management [Table 6.1]. 
The roles played by humans include manual as well as supervisory control of 
tasks. The manual control involves tasks such as mould making. Most of the 
manual tasks are carried out by HA3 and HA4. The designer (HA2 ) is respon­
sible for mould design and operation of an injection moulding machine. HAl 
is responsible for product design and creation of part drawings. Human agents 
HA3 and HA4 are responsible for mould and product manufacturing. The su­
pervisory control (exercised by HAl and HA2 ) involves tasks such as monitoring 
the machining operations, decision-making at various stages (e.g., positioning of 
the injection point on the mould, selection of plastic material), negotiation of 
conflicts and providing management support. The role of human agent HA5 is to 
advise in collaborative product development, provide management support and 
critique the results.
Table 6.1: Team members and their main roles
Members Level of Main
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Most of the interaction in this phase between humans involved face-to-face com­
munication to discuss the logistics of the experiment. The tools needed to carry 
out the experiment were identified. These tools included a platform for develop­
ing software agents, manufacturing machines and commercial off-the-shelf soft­
ware such as WebSpaceAuthor for the visualisation of VRML models. A part of
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the phase also involved the use of asynchronous tools such as e-mail in order to 
schedule meetings. The overall communication process itself was informal.
6.4.2 Configuration of the test-bed
The available facilities at the University of Bath that represented a balanced 
set of tools for collaborative work were identified. The main steps involved in 
preparing the test-bed were: the development of software agents and examine 
how agents are applied in a conflict situation.
Other commercial off-the-shelf tools that were newly identified and considered 
to be useful in collaborative were Solidworks for the conversion of AutoCAD 
drawings to VRML, WebSpace Author for the conversion of 3D VRML models 
to Inventor standards. In addition, several manufacturing facilities were also 
identified that could form a part of the collaborative process. Figure 6.1 shows 
the software tools and facilities selected for the present case study. The tools 
were configured into a test-bed for collaborative product development as shown 
in Figure 6.2.
6.4.3 The product development process
The product development process was designed and carried out to address all the 
tasks set for this case study, as outlined in section. Figure 6.3 shows an IDEFO 
model of process and the information flow in the collaborative design and man­
ufacture of the Geneva mechanism. The tasks in the collaborative process are 
jointly carried out by software agents and humans. The figure also shows the de­
ployment of conflict resolution activities in the product development process. The 
following sections describe the individual activities in the product development 
process.






















•  Mould design
•  Manufacturing
•  Negotiation
•  Mould design











r  \  
Cadview Solidworks SmartCAM
•  CAD drawings
•  Web 
compatible
•  Plug-in 
for viewing 
CAD files
•  Conversion 
of AutoCAD 
files to VRML




E-mail,WWWeaselInPerson Telephone Netscape Web Space 
AuthorCSCW
tools •  VRML model 
viewing
•  Web 
document 
generation
•  Web browsing
•  Viewing CAD 
models
•  asynchronous 
communication
•  Multi-media 
conferencing •  Communication
Design agents for Geneva 
mechanism design
•  Wheel •  Driver •  Shaft 
agent agent agent















Figure 6 .1: Components of the collaborative product development
6.5 D eploym ent of agents in the collaborative  
process
The software agents for this case study were developed using the Java program­
ming language, as Java is especially suited for networked computing. The agents 
thus developed were generic as well as problem specific. The collaborative pro­
cess shown in Figure 6.3 consisted of three generic agents. These are the material 
agent [Section 3.4.3], the reasoning agent and the negotiation agent [Sections 
4.4.1 and 4.4.2]. The problem-specific agent was itself a Multi-Agent, which was 
developed for the design of the Geneva mechanism [Section 3.4.4]. The deploy­
ment of these agents in a collaborative design process with reference to conflict 
resolution is discussed in this section. The collaborative activities can be divided 
into four stages: pre-conflict, reasoning, conflict resolution and post-conflict.
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Figure 6 .2 : Configuration of product development tools
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6.5.1 Pre-conflict stage
This stage involves the events leading up to a conflict. The problem-specific 
design agent is deployed at this stage for the design of the product, ie. the 
Geneva mechanism. The design agent here consists of two /zFAs for wheel and 
driver design [Section 3.3.4]. The key steps involved in the pre-conflict stage are 
the following:
[al.] The domain equations relating to the wheel and driver kinemat­
ics are pre-coded in their respective /zFAs.
[a2.] Each (iFA has its own performance variables pre-specified: pin
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[a3.] The controlling decision variables for each /iFA are also pre­
specified. This choice is determined by the domain equations.
[a4.] The design requirements are input to the design agent by the de­
signer. The material agent supplies the required material prop­
erties to the design agent.
[a5.] The designer specifies the primary variable for variational de­
sign, its range and the required number of design variations to 
be generated.
[a6 .] The design agent determines an initial design from the perspec­
tive of each /iFA. The initial design would contain inconsistencies 
due to the conflict between perspectives.
[a7.] The design agent identifies the shared variables in conflict.
[a8 .] A number of variational designs of the initial design in [a6 ] are
generated as specified in [a5].
6.5.2 Reasoning stage
Upon the detection of a conflict, the design agent initiates the reasoning stage by 
invoking the reasoning agent. This stage involves the determination of effective 
dependencies between the conflict variables and the controlling decision variables 
for each /iFA. The following steps are carried out to enable agent based reasoning 
during the collaborative process:
[bl.] The designer specifies the nodes and edges of the design network
graph to the reasoning agent (problem-specific information).
[b2.] The reasoning agent forms the internal graph representation.
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[b3.] The designer specifies the controlling decision variable (start ver­
tex) and the conflict variable (target vertex).
[b4.] The reasoning agent identifies all paths between the decision and
conflict variables.
[b5.] The reasoning agent obtains all edge dependencies from the
problem-specific design agent (automatically determined by the 
design agent).
[b5.] The reasoning agent evaluates the effective dependencies be­
tween the decision and conflict variables.
Steps [b3] - [b6 ] are also repeated to all pairs of decision and performance vari­
ables.
The effective dependencies are stored for further processing.
6.5.3 Conflict resolution stage
The designer invokes the negotiation agent by invoking the negotiation agent.
The following steps are involved:
[cl.] The designer specifies the utility functions for the controlling
decision variables for each /iFA (from [a3]) over the range of 
variational designs obtained in [a8 ].
[c2.] Each /iFA (eg., wheel and driver agents) constructs its own util­
ity function(s) for the conflict variable(s) by using the informa­
tion from [cl] and [b8 ].
[c3.] The design agent identifies the negotiation range for each conflict
variable using information from [c2 ].
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[c4.] If the negotiation range is not null, the design agent sends the 
utilities from [c2 ] to the negotiation agent. Otherwise it asks 
the designer to modify the utilities in [cl].
[c5.] The negotiation agent plots the joint utility between the agents
for each conflicting variable.
[c6 .] The negotiation agent determines the game theory solutions
based on the four methods discussed in Chapter 4.
The negotiation agent isolates the final negotiated solution based on the equal 
pay-off criteria.
6.5.4 Post-conflict stage
This stage incorporates the results of negotiated settlement into rest of the design. 
It consists of the following key step:
[dl.] The negotiated value for the conflict variable is used to generate
the final design. This is carried out by the reasoning agent using 
the steps in [b8 ]. The changes can be local or global depending 
on the problem at hand and are generally not known a priori.
6.6 Construction of the problem domain
6.6.1 Problem  definition
Geneva mechanisms are used widely as indexing mechanisms in machines (e.g., 
shaping tools, conveyers, feeding devices and other elements that have intermit­
tent motion). A simple Geneva mechanism is shown in Figure 6.4. It consists of 
a slotted wheel, a driver with a driving pin and a supporting or mounting base.
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Various geometrical variables involved in the design of the Geneva mechanism 
and related mathematical equations are given in Appendix C.
Generally, the design of the Geneva mechanism is carried out in the following two 
stages:
1. M echanism  selection: First the kinematic inputs are specified by describ­
ing the desired input and output motion characteristics (motion profile or 
velocity and acceleration curves) and dwell time [Yeaple (1979)]. The de­
signer then selects a mechanism with key geometric parameters based on 
data charts of motion characteristics [Hasty and Potts (1966)].
2 . D etailed  param etric  design: Given the basic geometry, this stage in­
volves the investigation of undesirable motion characteristics such as high 
contact stress between drive pin and wheel slot, and vibratory motions the 
mechanism. The design specifies the required number of slots (N s), iner­
tial load (Ii) and rotational speed of the driver (cj), and the problem is to 
evaluate the design characteristics mentioned above [Johnson (1956), Lee 
(1981)].
For the purpose of this case study, only parametric design of stage 2 was consid­
ered. The design and manufacture of the Geneva mechanism was therefore to be 
carried out by specifying Ns, cu, Ih Pmat and additional associated constraints. 
The mechanism was to be manufactured using a grade of polypropylene.
6.6.2 Specification
The designer HAl was responsible for inputting the specification for the Geneva 
mechanism to the design agent. The design of the Geneva mechanism was speci­
fied as shown in Table 6.2. This information was shared with other agents using 
the shared class mechanism.















Figure 6.4: Schematic of a four-slot external Geneva mechanism
Table 6.2: Design specification and constraints for the 
Geneva mechanism
SPECIFICATION S
Number o f slots, Ns 6
Speed o f rotation, © (T™) 1000
Inertial load, I, (Kg m 2 ) 1.1296 x 106
Material, I^ t Polypropylene
CONSTRAINTS
0.003 > wtip < 0.007; wt < 0.01m
0.05 < D <  0.07; N s <  8
C  < 0.03m;
6.6.3 Evaluation of dependencies
Following the specification, the next task was for the reasoning agent to evaluate 
the dependencies between design variables using the domain equations given in 
Appendix C. Based on the specification and domain equations, the reasoning 
agent evaluated the influence relationship for each edge as shown in Table 6.3. 
Table shows the dependencies evaluated for a Geneva mechanism made from 
polymeric materials. For the purpose of demonstration, the dependencies were 
also evaluated for plain carbon steel and are shown in the table where even the
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choice of material has an influence. The dependency graph for the mechanism 
was constructed by the reasoning agent in a computational form by using the data 
in Table 6.3, read from a file. This was done in order to enable the reasoning 
agent to carry out network reduction.
6.6.4 Network reduction
The purpose of network reduction is:
•  To evaluate the effective dependencies between decision and performance 
variables;
• To identify the best candidates for negotiation variables, based on sensitiv­
ity analysis.
Having specified the network topology, the next step was to evaluate the effective 
dependencies between the decision- and performance variables. The key decision 
variables were C, D, wtiP, rp and Sw and the key performance variables were T£, 
(7r and &t - Among the decision variables, slot width, Sw, was particularly impor­
tant as it was a common variable for both driver and wheel agents. Therefore this 
was a candidate to be used as controlling decision variable during negotiation.
The effective qualitative and quantitative dependencies between decision and per­
formance variables were determined as shown in Table 6.4 and the corresponding 
reduced network is shown in Figure 6 .6 . This required the identification of the 
number of paths (NP) and then apply the reasoning procedure based on serial 
and parallel dependencies presented in Chapter 4.
Among the three performance variables shown in Table 6.4, the contact shear 
stress (tq) between the pin and the wheel slot is of the greatest importance
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Table 6.3: Qualitative and quantitative dependencies between the design 
variables for the Geneva mechanism corresponding to the specifications (in Table 6.2)
In f lu e n c e
r e la t io n s h ip
(directed edge)
Q u a lita t iv e
d e p e n d e n c y
(S)
Q u a n t ita t iv e
d e p e n d e n c y
WO
V a r ia b le s
Q u a lita t iv e
d e p e n d e n c y
(-5)
Q u a n t ita t iv e
d e p e n d e n c y
WO
Po r d + 0.89278 X - y Y + 0.39849
Po - y  S - -0.89278 X  —y o t - -0.67473
Po h t - -1.08096 Y - y h t - -1.11748
PO hR - -5.30534 f'L ~y Ig - pp I -4.06264Steel 1 - 4  1 0 9 3 9
Po Or + 0.00162 K {  - y  o R + 1.00514
Po oco - 0.5 ° R - -0.00514
D  - y  C + 1.0 p  ~y Or + 2.19963
D ^ C l + 1.0 h r ->  a R - -1.73978
D  —y h t - -1.02476 h t —y o t - -2.99379
D  - y  w t + 1.0 r P - y  o c - -0.46537
D  ~y pm ax + 1.0 Tp —y S w + 0.89361
S  - »  h R - -14.06 Ig - y  P d + pp 0.01067
Steel ft 1 9 9 2 ft
S  — y I g - pp -0.63497 h ^ P d -
PP -f t 4 7 5 7 8
Steel - 0  6 4 3 6 1 Steel -f t 6 6 4 3 2
P d ° c + 0.48808 p - y  Ig + PP 0.99819Steel 0 .9 8 4 8 f t
P d ° R - -0.00514 Pmax ~y P d - -0.14299
P d &T - -0.67473 N S —y Ig + pp 6.16095
S teel 6  2 2 0 6 3
Wt — ► <?c - -0.46537 p - y r c + 1.0
w t - y  o r + 0.00467 P  - y  P d + 0.09784
w t —y o t - -2.29316 X  —y Pmax + 1.0
C - y S + 1.0 C l  —y S w + 0.017819
C  —y rd + 1.0 w u p - y  r L - -5.93736
C  —y I q + pp 22.5232 Wt —y Ig + 1.0Steel 2 2 9 6 5 4
u)  — y a max + 1.0 a max ~y Pd + 0.23255
u j  — y CLy + 1.0 K 3 - y  w t + 1.0
S w —y h t + 0.27257 o c - y  t c + 1.0
S w - y  I q + pp 0.81824
Steel 0  8 2 9 3 6
S w —y Pd + 0.09784
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wt
Figure 6.5: Design graph for the Geneva mechanism
in the Geneva mechanism design due to its critical influence on the life of the 
mechanism [Lee (1981)].
To make a choice for a controlling decision variable for the subsequent manu­
facturing process, the sensitivities of performance variables with respect to the 
decision variables should be considered. For a robust negotiation process the 
agents should choose the decision variable with least influence on performance 
variables. The following observations can be made from Table 6.4 with respect 
to the influences of the decision variables on Te­
rn Increasing the wheel diameter (D ) increases the shear stress (t c ). The 
quantitative dependency is ^ d ,tc =  2.56811. Thus an increase of wheel 
diameter by 10% would lead to a 25.6% increase in shear stress. An increase 
in D  was not considered desirable. Additional reasons for not increasing 
the wheel diameter are (a) manufacturing limitations and (b) possibility of 
breakage at wheel root due to high sensitive influence of D  on root stress,
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Table 6.4: Effective qualitative and quantitative dependencies be­
tween design variables including the number of inter-nodal paths
Decision Performance variables
variables rc OR t7t
D ->TC D —¥ (TR D —► (JT
D NP: 6D,tc fpD,rc NP: SD,<tr ^D,aR NP: &D,aT lpD,aT
6 + 2.56811 7 + 24.4438 8 - -2.14665
rp -> tc rp or rp -> ot
rp NP: $rp,TC V’rp.rc NP: drp,crR VVp.a* NP: firp,aT VVp,ar
3 - -0.35064 2 - -0.00120 3 - -0.88780
Sw —¥ Tc Sw —>• Or ( —¥ OT
Sw NP: S^w,Tc V,Su;,TC’ NP: &SW ,aR ^Sw,ffR NP: S^w ,&T 'Psw,<7T
2 + 0.12838 2 - -0.00135 3 - -0.99350
C ~>T( c  OR C —¥ o t
c NP: 6C,tc V'C.rc NP: SC,<rR ^C,aR NP:
2 + 2.17024 3 + 24.4384 2 - -3.0
wtip rc Wtip “ > OR Wtip OT
Wtip NP: ^WtipTC tftwtipTC NP: ^Wtip,(TR V^JtipPR NP: V^JtiP,&T I’wtxp&T
l + 2.37219 1 - -0.02498 l - -3.27936
ctr.
•  The pin radius (rp) has a negative influence on the shear stress tq- rp 
is the main decision variable of the driver agent and cannot be randomly 
increased without affecting the constraint on centre distance (C ).
•  The influence of centre distance (C ) was found to have a positive influence 
on the state of shear stress (re).
•  An increase in the value of wheel tip width (w tiP) would also lead to a 
marked increase in the value of tq . Table 6.9 shows tha t increasing w tiP 
reduces root stress (cr^) and tip  stress (o t)• However, w tiP could only 
be increased upto a certain limit without affecting the overall wheel size. 
Moreover, since w tiP is governed by the wheel agent alone, this choice is not 
in the common interest of both agents.
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Figure 6 .6 : Reduced network between decision and performance variables
• Of the five decision variables, the influence of wheel slot width (Sw) on tq 
was appeared to be minimal. This is one common design parameter that 
can be explictly approached based on mathematical relations from both 
wheel and driver design perspectives.
Based on the above observation, the slot width (Sw) emerged as the negotiation 
variable and was considered a rational choice for the following key reasons:
• Sw can be approached from both driver and wheel perspectives
• Among the other influences considered (C —t tc, D  —> tc, wtiP —> tc, 
rp —> Tc), the sensitivity of Sw on tc was found to be minimal.
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6.7 Design for function
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6.7.1 Initial design
Based on the design specification, the wheel- and driver agents evaluated their 
associated design variables as shown in Table 6.5. This also required the designer 
to make initial assumptions on the values of wheel diameter (D ) and wheel tip 
(wtip). For the purpose of generating utilities subsequently, alternative initial 
designs were generated for three different values of wheel diameter (D ).
Table 6.5 Initial design results for the Geneva mechanism 














Ns - 6 6 6
u rpm 1000 1000 1000
h K g  — m 2 1.1298e-06 1.1298c-06 1.1298e-06
Assumed
variables
D m 0.05 0.06 0.07





C m 0.0288 0.0346 0.0404
CL m 1.27e-04 1.52e-04 1.77e-04
h K g  — m 2 2.1616e-06 3.6067c-06 5.0175e-06
tl m 0.0058 0.008 0.0099
0>max r a d /s e c 2 14804.4 14804.4 14804.4
VR MPa 3.9 20.37 60.74
(Jrp MPa 0.131 0.109 0.0891





c d r m 0.008 0.0094 0.0108
P d N 3.1641 3.7944 4.2211
rp m 0.0035 0.0042 0.0049
TC K g - m 2 2.5 2.28 2.06
Td 771 0.0144 0.0173 0.0202
Note: S™h, S%r represent the slot width (Sw) calculated 
by the wheel and driver agents respectively
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6.7.2 Identification of type 1 conflict
Table 6.5 shows that the evaluation of the slot width (Sw) from the perspective 
of the two software agents (wheel agent and driver agent) resulted in different 
values (0.0085 m and 0.0094 m respectively for initial design 2). Therefore Type 
1  conflict occurred between the two software agents as shown in Figure 6.7, over 
the value of slot width2. The wheel diameter (D ) and the pin radius (rp) were 
chosen as the controlling decision variables for the wheel and driver agents.
© - ©
Conflict variable 
o . o o e 5  m y C V 0 0 9 4  m
w © ~ " 0
C o n t r o l l i n g  
d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e
C o n t r o l l i n g  
d e c i s i o n  v a r i a b l e
Wheel agent Driver agent
Figure 6.7: Conflict between wheel and driver agents on slot width, Sw
6.7.3 Formation of agent preferences in type 1 conflict
Based on the three different initial designs shown in Table 6.5, the utilities for 
wheel and driver agents were formed by varying the choices for controlling decision 
variables, D and rp as shown in Figure 6 .8 .
For the wheel agent, the utility function in Figure 6 . 8  (a) shows that the utility 
level (Ui(D)) remains constant in the range (0.05—0.06)m and then shows a sharp 
decrease. With the objective of keeping ar to a minimum, the utility variation 
in the range (0.05 — 0.06m) was considered reasonable. For the driver agent, the 
choice of utility was based on the key fact that a higher value of rp would have a 
minimising influence the contact stress (tc). These utilities were specified to the 
design agent.
These utilities were propagated through the reduced design network to obtain the
2Based on initial design 2 in Table 6.5.
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changes in the value of slot width (Sw) from each perspective and the resultant 
utilities were determined as shown in Figure 6.9 (a) and (b).
A negotiation range for slot width, common to both agents is identified under the 
shaded region in Figure 6.9 (c). The negotiation range represents the acceptable 
range of solution to both agents and its existence of negotiated solutions.




(a) For the wheel agent (b) For the driver agent
Figure 6 .8 : Utility functions for the controlling decision variables
1.0
(b) For the driver agent
1.0





Figure 6.9: Utility functions for the conflict variable
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6.7.4 Negotiation of type 1 conflict
Based on the specified utilities in Figure 6.9, the negotiation agent evaluated 
four different game theoretic solutions [Figure 6.10]. A summary of the results of 
negotiation is presented in Table 6 .6 . The Kalai-Somordinsky solution is taken 
as the final negotiated settlement due its property of equal utilities to both the 
agents. For the present case the negotiated solution evaluated to a slot width of 
0.009 m. The negotiated value of slot width Sw was propagated throughout the 









«=»j Applet Viewer: NegotiationAgent. class
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Negotiation Graph 2
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N egotiation Graph 1
Figure 6.10: Utility curve for software-software agent conflict over the slot width
Figure 6.11 shows the neighbouring variables that affect Sw. Of these, C' and 
C" represent clearance variables which can be varied from both wheel and driver 
design perspectives within a range (e.g., 0.00254 - 0.005 mm). The values for C' 
and C" are changed by +0.0005 and —0.0004 respectively3. This completed the
3The idea of clearances presented in this study is based on the limits and fits for cylindrical
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0.0095 0.0090 0.0090 0.0095
0.0090
0.0090
Utility values [no units]
0.6795 0.7566 0.756( 0.6795
Driveragent 0.0094
0.0094 0.0090 0.0090 0.0094
0.0090Utility values [no units]
1.0 0.7566 0.7566 1.0
design for function stage and was followed by design for manufacture evaluation 




Figure 6.11: Design network pertaining to slot width
parts. In particular an approximate estimate is obtained from running and sliding fits [Hasty 
and Potts (1966), Shighley and Mitchell (1984), Lee (1981), Hill (1999)].
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Figure 6.12: CAD model of Geneva wheel and driver
6.8 D esign for M anufacture
6.8.1 Manufacturability analysis
The designer prepared the part drawings using AutoCAD based on the negotiated 
functional design. The drawings of the wheel and driver were generated as shown 
in the Figure 6 .12 . These drawings were then analysed for manufacturablity.
This analysis consisted of the following key stages:
• Examine the part drawings;
• Analyse the design’s mouldability;
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• Propose any modifications in design, if necessary;
• Form a preliminary mould design.
6.8.2 Identification of type 2 conflict
The machinists (HA3 and HA4) examined the part drawings based on its dimen­
sions and limits set by the design specification. Although all geometrical and 
material constraints were identified prior to the initial design, there were some 
resource restrictions on machine tools such as the availability and sizes of milling 
cutters which could affect the depth of cut and therefore the wheel thickness (wt). 
Thus wt emerged as a variable of common interest between the wheel agent and 
the machinists.
Type 2 conflicts occur when a software and human agent differ in their choice for 
the value of the common variable, which in this case was wheel thickness wt. The 
machinists suggested a reduction in wheel thickness by approximately 25% of the 
value evaluated by the wheel agent. This need for thickness reduction was due 
to a possibility of incomplete edge formation in the manufactured product. As 
shown in Figure 6.13, a drill tool with diameter greater than 2mm  would result 
in rounded edges thus affecting the tip width and pin entry. A drill tool with 
less than 2 mm  diameter was also not preferred by the machinist agents due to 
the high depth of cut required. As a result a conflict was detected between the 
wheel design agent and the human agents on the value of wheel thickness (wt) 
[Figure 6.14].
The wheel diameter (D ) was retained (from type 1 conflict) as the controlling 
decision variable for wheel agent. The following present the key reasons for this 
choice:
• Three different values for wheel thickness (wt) were obtained by varying the







Tool dia (<J>) > 2mm Tool dia (<j>) = 2mm
Figure 6.13: Mould manufacturability: effect of drill tool on wheel tip width
Conflict variable








Wheel agent Machinists (coalition)
Figure 6.14: Conflict between wheel and machinists on wheel thickness, wt 
wheel diameter (D ) during the initial design.
• Wheel diameter (D ) directly influences4 the wheel thickness (wt) as shown 
in the Table 6.3.
The machinists chose the size of milling tools as the controlling decision variable. 
This choice was due to the following key reasons:
• Availability of milling tools
• Depth of cut required
• Safety of the manufacturing operation
• Prevention of rounded wheel tip
4 The other variable in addition to D  which influence the wheel thickness is K 3. K$  is not 
considered as the controlling decision variable due to the restrictions in its variation [Johnson, 
(1956)].
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6.8.3 Formation of agent preferences in type 2 conflict
The wheel thickness was the conflict variable in this case. For the wheel agent, 
the controlling decision variable was the wheel diameter (D ) and the utility U ( D ) ,  
same as in type 1 conflict, Figure 6.8(a). The wheel agent’s utility U \{w t) for 
conflict variable (w t) was then derived from Ui(D) ,  as shown in Figure 6.15(a). 
As can be observed from the figure, the utility shows an increasing trend with 
any increase in the value of wheel thickness (w t). This trend is consistent with 






(a) For wheel agent (derived) (b) For machinists (specified)
Shaded
region1.0
W t , m0.0065 0.0084
(c) Negotiation range
Figure 6.15: Utility functions for the conflict variable wheel thickness (w t) in type 
2 conflict
The machinists specified their utility description directly for the conflict variable 
w t as shown in [Figure 6.15(b)]. The Figure shows that the best preferred range 
for the machinists is between 0.005 - 0.006 m. Therefore any value greater than 
0.006 m shows a decrease in the utility for the machinists. The key reason for such 
a variation in the utility was attributed to the availability of the size of milling 
tools (typically 2 mm) which would ensure a safe milling operation. However, it
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Table 6.7: Effect of wheel thickness on stress levels
Effective variable dependencies
Wt &R Wt —¥ a t Wt -> tc
NP: NP: $Wt ,<TT NP: fiwt ,tc V’tUf.rc
2 + 0.0036 2 - -2.4275 2 + 0.5625
should be noted that a more accurate representation of utility in Figure 6.15(b) 
is possible and could be generated by performing a tool-breakage analysis. Such 
an analysis would include several variables such as tool material, cutting speed, 
depth of cut and work piece material, for this study, such an elaborate analysis 
was not considered necessary to determine the theoretical utility functions for 
the machinists. Figure 6.15(c) shows the negotiation range which ensures a ne­
gotiated settlement. The designer specified these utilities of the wheel agent and 
the machinists to the negotiation agent.
6.8.4 N egotiation of type 2 conflict
The utilities in Figure 6.15 were input to the negotiation agent which constructed 
the joint utility curves for the two agents as shown in Figure 6.16. The four 
negotiated solutions are shown in Table 6 .8 . Table indicates that the Kalai- 
Somordinsky value which yielded a utility of 0.59 to both agents was chosen as 
the final settlement. The negotiated value for the wheel thickness was found out 
to be 0.007 m.
The negotiated value for wheel thickness was propagated through the design 
network to obtain an updated design. As shown in Figure 6.17, a sub-network of 
all variables relating to wheel thickness was formed to this end.
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Kalai-Sonmiinsky Value 0.0090 0.0070
0.0090 I 0.0070 
0.0094 I 0.0075
N egotiation Graph 1
. •. . . j ..;.
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N egotiation Graph 2
Final SokAvn 00090 00070
Applet started.
Figure 6.16: Utility curves for software-human agent conflict over wheel thickness
The change in w t was propagated to K 3 to enable the restoration of D  to the 
original functional design as far as possible. Since K 3° is is directly influences 
w t , this was an apt choice. The corrected value of K 3 was found to be 0.1167 
as indicated in Figure 6.17. As a result of the changes occurred in the values of 
Sw and w t, an updated design was evaluated. Only the performance parameters 
(such as stress and load) were altered and not the key geometric parameters such 
as the wheel diameter and wheel tip width. The finalised design served as a basis 
for the design of the mould which is discussed next.
5The suggested range of K$ is between 0.05 to 0.14 [Johnson (1956)].
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0.0075 0.0070 0.0070 0.0075Wheelagent 0.0084 0.0070Utility values [no units]
0.6884 0.68840 .589SWt 0.0070
0.0080 0.0070 0.00800.0070
! Machinists 0.0060 0.0070Utility values [no units]
0.5161 0.5899 0.589S 0.5161
CTt
Figure 6.17: Design sub-network pertaining to wheel thickness
6.9 Development of the manufacturing tool
6.9.1 M ould design
Based on the initial design, the designer HAl created the drawings of the mould 
using AutoCAD. The mould drawings for wheel and driver without the position­
ing of the gates were generated with a 0.5mm allowance for shrinkage 6 as shown 
in Figure 6.18. Three different designs were suggested by the designer based on
6  This allowance for polypropylene was assumed based on the information provided by GE 
Plastics, Inc. USA. http://www.geplastics.com
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the following key considerations:
•  Material flow characteristics;
•  Shape of the product;
•  Ease of manufacture, time and cost;
•  Ease of ejection.
Initial design of the mould was carried out considering the flow characteristics 
(e.g., uniform pressure, symmetrical flow) and ease of operation (e.g., ejection). 
Flow characteristics would depend on the type of plastic material used, path of 
mould flow and injection parameters such as pressure, temperature and volume. 
Therefore machinists’ (HA3 and HA4) main consideration was to design a mould 
th a t would offer least resistance to the fluid flow. The machinists came up with 
a two-plate mould as shown in Figure 6.19.
Figure 6.18: AutoCAD model of product and the mould
The mould designer (HA2) examined the mould design put forward by the ma­
chinists and pointed out two distinct drawbacks:










fluid flow into 
_______ mould
Figure 6.19: Initial design of mould
• Need for very high injection pressure since the clearance for fluid flow was 
too small (of the order of 0.5 mm);
• Covering of plastic over the projection which would have made ejection 
operation difficult.
There were additional concerns such as formation of blow-holes due to a very high 
injection pressure. Therefore it was agreed between the mould designer and the 
machinists’ to modify the mould design as shown in Figure 6.20. This however, 
presented drawbacks such as machining the slot at the centre without affecting 
the critical tolerances (e.g., central hole clearance between wheel and mounting 
base). Therefore, the mould designer proposed a refined design which is shown 
in Figure 6 .21 . The key refinements in the design are as follows:
• ease of plastic flow;
• wheel dimensions remain unaffected;
• symmetry in injection.
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Additional 








' V  Bottom platen
Pin
Cavity
Figure 6 .21: Final design of the wheel mould
6.9.2 Identification of type 3 conflict
The above design satisfied the general requirements of a feasible mould stated 
above and was thus finalised. However, there was still need for an ejection mech­
anism7. Based on the brainstorming discussions between the machinists (HA3 
and HA4) and designers (HA1 and HA2), it was decided tha t ejector pins would 
need to be arranged in the base of the mould. The designers suggested an ejec­
7Several test-runs of product manufacturing were carried out to examine the ease of ejection 
without a separate ejector mechanism
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tion mechanism consisting of six ejector pins located symmetrically as shown 
in Figure 6.22(a). The machinists, however, suggested the use of two pins in 
opposite corners of the mould (also in symmetrical locations) as shown in Fig­
ure 6.22(b). Thus a type 3 conflict was detected between human agents on the 







(a) six-pin arrangement (b) two-pin arrangement










Designers (coalition) Machinists (coalition)
Figure 6.23: Conflict between designers and machinists on the number of ejector 
pins, NP
6.9.3 Formation of agent preferences in type 3 conflict
The designers identified their preferences on the required number of pins based on 
the necessity of the symmetry of pin-arrangement and uniformity of ejection load. 
Symmetric arrangement of pins would lead to symmetric loads and hence reduce 
warping or twisting of the product during ejection. Therefore the symmetry and 
uniformity of load were chosen as the controlling decision variables to define the 
designers’ preferences.
Figure 6.24 (a) shows the variation of utility U i(sy m m e try )  of pin-symmetry 
for the designers. This variation shows tha t any symmetric arrangement of pins
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would correspond to a utility of 1.0 whereas for asymmetric cases (0 and 5 pins) 
the utility is zero.
Figure 6.24 (b) shows the utility Ui(ELU) of the ejection load uniformity for 
the designers. The maximum utility of 1.0 would be attained when the number 
of pins is very large. The two utilities of the controlling decision variables were 
used as shown in Table 6.9 to form the utility of the number of pins from the 
designers’ perspective as shown in Figure 6.24 (c). The necessity of pin-symmetry 
and ejection load uniformity means that the net utility U\ (N P ) is a minimum of 
the two component utilities.









Uj (ELU) Uj (NP) = Minimum 
[Uj (Symmetry), Uj (ELU)]
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0.15 0.15 0
2 1 1 0.30 0.30 0.30
3 1 1 0.45 0.45 0.45
4 1 1 0.60 0.60 0.60
5 0 0 0.75 0.75 0
6 1 0 0.90 0.90 0.90
As for the machinists, the controlling decision variable was the manufacturing 
time which is the sum of the set-up time and machining time. For a given 
work-piece, the set-up time would remain constant whereas machining time will 
increase proportionally with the number of pins, as shown in Figure 6.25(b). The 
manufacturing time utility is shown in Figure 6.25(a) which indicates a uniform 
decrease with an increase in the manufacturing time. The machinists’ utility for 
the number of pins is therefore obtained by calculating the total manufacturing 
time for different number of pins as shown in Table 6.10 and Figure 6.25(c).
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Figure 6.24: Designers’ utilities for controlling decision variables and conflict 
variable
6.9.4 Negotiation of type 3 conflict
The utilities of the number of pins for the designers and the machinists [Fig­
ure 6.24 (c) and Figure 6.25 (c)] were input to the negotiation agent which con­
structed the joint utility curve for the two agents as shown in Figure 6.26. Table 
6.11 shows the four game theory solutions obtained for type 3 conflict. It indicates 
tha t the Kalai-Somordinsky solution yielded equal utility of 0.341 to both agents. 
The other solutions, Nash and Utilitarian, however, evaluated a negotiated solu­
tion which gave the designers their maximum attainable utility of 0.9. Consistent 
with previous negotiation, the Kalai-Somordinsky solution was accepted as the 
final settlement of the conflict. It should be noted tha t the number of pins 2.4 
corresponding to the Kalai-Somordinsky solution of 0.341 was rounded off to the 
nearest integer 2 , to obtain the negotiated value for the number of pins.
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U2 (TM) U2 (NP)
0 0 0 0 1 . 0 1 . 0
1 2 0 3 23 0.41 0.41
2 2 0 6 26 0.333 0.333
3 2 0 9 29 0.256 0.256
4 2 0 1 2 32 0.174 0.174
5 2 0 15 35 0 . 1 0 2 0 . 1 0 2
6 2 0 18 38 0.025 0.025
6.9.5 M ould manufacturing
The mould for the wheel and driver of the Geneva mechanism was manufactured 
in aluminium. The machinists (HA3 and HA4) prepared the aluminium blocks 
for manufacturing the mould by using the Matchmaker CNC milling machine. A 
flat mill tool was used to cut the blocks to the required dimensions as shown in 
Figure 6.27.
Once the aluminium blocks were ready for mould making, HA3 prepared the 
manufacturing drawings for the two parts (wheel and driver) using SmartCAM 
based on the design drawings and .DXF files supplied by HA1 . SmartCAM did 
not provide a perfect interface for .DXF files (generated by AutoCAD 2000) and 
lost some information in the design files. Therefore, HA3 had to regenerate some 
of the lost profiles. The SmartCAM generated an NC-code (shown in Appendix 
B) which was directly input to the milling machine. The machining process was 
initiated and the manufacturing process was largely automated. However, the 
machinists had to manually adjust the coolant position throughout the opera­
tion. There were also instances such as controlling the cutting rate depth, to 
prevent tool chatter and breakage problems, where HA3 reacted in a pro-active 
manner. Once the machining operation was complete, the blocks were removed. 
On inspection, the machined mould [shown in Figure 6.28 and Figure 6.29] was
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Figure 6.25: Machinists’ utilities for controlling decision variables and conflict 
variable
found to be dimensionally accurate.
6.10 Product manufacturing
6.10.1 Initial manufacturing
The key stages involved during the initial manufacture of the product were:
Mounting of moulds onto the injection moulding machine platens;
Setting the machine parameters (injection pressure, temperature and cool­
ing time);
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Figure 6.26: Utility curves for human-human agent conflict over number of ejector 
pins
• Moulding operation;
• Ejection of product from the mould.
6.10.2 Reccurence of type 3 conflict and its resolution
The two-pin ejection mechanism (presented in section 6.4.7) proved to be ineffec­
tive and often led to warping and twisting of the moulded wheel. The decision 
made by the human agents initially choose two-pins for the ejection mechanism 
was found unsatisfactory. The alternative option to use all six pins (as evaluated 
by the Nash and Utilitarian solutions in Table 6.11) was then accepted. The ad­
ditional pins were manufactured and were then fitted into the moulds as shown
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Table 6.11: Game theory solutions for type 3 conflict on the number of ejector pins
Agent
coalition
Conflict Preferred Game theory solutions Final game
Negotiated value 
for the number o f  
pins (NP)variable values N(S) K(S) E(S) U(S) solution






0.9 0.34 0.34 0.9
2.4 2 .4 = 2




0.4 0.34 0.34 0.4
NC-Contrd
unit
Figure 6.27: Instance of the milling machine operation showing the workpiece 
in the Figure 6.30.
The moulding process was carried out without any changes in the machine set­
tings. The decision to use a six-pin based ejection mechanism for the wheel was 
found to be effective as the pins safely ejected the product. For the driver mould, 
however, the earlier two-pin arrangement was found sufficient and no changes 
were needed.
Aluminium work-piece 
held in the milling machine 
vice








(a) Geneva wheel case (b) Geneva driver case
Figure 6.28: The injection points in Geneva wheel and driver moulds
Wheel mould Driver mould
Figure 6.29: The Geneva wheel and driver moulds 
6.10.3 Final product manufacture
The new mould for the Geneva wheel was used to manufacture the mechanism 
and was checked for its dimensional accuracy. The cooling patterns indicated 
a higher shrinkage in the thickness direction than expected during the design 
{'Wt 6.4mm).
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E jector p ins 1-6
Figure 6.30: Ejector pins in the Geneva wheel mould
6.11 Experim ental analysis
6.11.1 Product analysis
The manufactured product was assembled on to an aluminium base with a spec­
ified centre distance [Figure 6.31]. The assembled mechanism was functionally 
tested for its slot entry, exit and other prescribed motions [Figure 6.32]. The per­
formance of the mechanism itself was found to be satisfactory for some arbitrary 
motions. The product exhibited fair shrinkage characteristic throughout and the 
clearances such as slot width, etc, were found to be well preserved.
6.11.2 Process analysis
Communication and archiving
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G e n e v a  w h e e l
,DriverPln Driver
M ounting  
b a s e
Figure 6.31: The assembled Geneva mechanism
There were synchronous and asynchronous communication between agents (both 
software and human). As for archival, WWWeasel8 and video capture tools 
were predominantly used though session proceedings were also archived off-line 
as paper-based documents.
Information sharing
There was a variety of ways in which information was shared between agents:
• use of AutoCAD 2000 to generate and share web compatible CAD models;
• conversion of AutoCAD 2000 drawings to VRML and Inventor formats 
using Solid works;
• generation and sharing of the CAD drawings theoretically compatible with 
SmartCAM;
5Enterprise Integration Technologies, Inc. USA.
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D riv e r - f u l l y  engaed p o s i t io n  D river - e x i t  p c s i t ic n
Figure 6.32: Prescribed motions for the assembled Geneva mechanism
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• visualisation and manipulation of 3D CAD models in the shared white­
board.
The sharing and joint manipulation of 3D CAD models in the whiteboard was 
useful when the designed product had to be evaluated with respect to its mould- 
ability. For example, the 3D CAD models were imported into the whiteboard 
and the designers (HA1 and HA2) can manipulate a model (rotate, translate, 
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Figure 6.33: Information sharing between agents
6.12 D iscussion
The collaborative design and manufacturing case study of the Geneva mechanism 
examined the following key aspects:
• The need for a mechanism to ensure the alignment of goals in a decision 
process where agents have preferences. Such a conflict resolution mechanism
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needs to be flexible enough to deal with conflicts between heterogenous 
agents (both human and software);
• The agent synthesis and goal alignment hypotheses in a broader context of 
the design and manufacturing process.
6.12.1 Conflict resolution between agents
This case study viewed the conflict resolution between agents in product de­
velopment as a key issue. It investigated the conflicts due differing preferences 
that occurred between software agents and humans through the development of 
a novel scheme for conflict resolution. The scheme (developed as a combination 
of game theory and dependency based reasoning) has been found to offer con­
sistent design solutions while preserving the preferences of agents represented as 
utility functions. The conflict resolution between agents has been approached as 
a two-player game with specified utility functions. With respect to the chosen 
domain (in the class of parametric design) where parametric dependencies exist, 
the present results have justified the combination of dependency and game theory 
approach. However, this claim excludes possible situations where only fuzzy rela­
tions are established. The author’s approach is compared with other techniques 
adopted for conflict resolution. The criteria for such a comparison were identified 
in Chapter 4.
Based on the quantitative results presented in Section 6.4.4, the Geneva mecha­
nism presented a problem of higher complexity which has involved several more 
variables as compared to cases presented in Kanappan and Marshak (1993), Ku- 
siak and Wang (1995) and Berker and Brown (1996). The author’s approach has 
been validated in the context of parametric design problems with well defined 
analytical relations. The game theory based approaches need the specification 
of objective or utility functions. Therefore, the genericity of the author’s ap­
proach can be seen at par with that of Kusiak and Wang (1995) and Kanappan
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and Marshek (1993). Klien (1993) presented more generic schemes (mainly rule- 
based) for conflict resolution that are independent of the domain and hence the 
genericity of Klien’s approach is high 9.
The importance of consistency of design solutions has been demonstrated via 
qualitative and quantitative reasoning. The reasoning based approach ensured 
that the solutions are consistent and updated for any change. The design of 
Geneva mechanism showed this in instances such as the effect of the slot width 
(Sw) or stress levels (tq). With respect to design consistency, the author’s ap­
proach is superior to that of Kanappan and Marshek (1993) or Berker and Brown 
(1996). This is due to the fact that they did not consider the consistency of so­
lutions in their negotiation schemes.
Some of the previous research approaches have focused on applying standard 
techniques based on game theory to evaluate a set of negotiated solutions [for ex­
ample, see Kanappan and Marshek (1993)]. On the other hand, a weak approach 
of iterative contraction of solution space is adopted by Kusiak and Wang (1995) 
for obtaining a single point solution for a specific case. Hence most of the previ­
ous research has not focused on obtaining a single point solution nor alternative 
solution based on rational criteria. The author’s research offers additional rules 
for isolating a single solution from a set of game-theoretic outcomes.
The communication between agents has been effected via formal and informal 
means. The aspect of formal KQML-based communication between software 
agents (in the context of negotiation) has been investigated in-depth by Berker 
and Brown (1996) and Frost and Cutkosky (1996). The research of Kanappan 
and Marshek and of Kusiak and Wang did not present any mechanisms for com­
munication. The author’s research has acknowledged the importance of commu­
nication in negotiation but this is not the main issue in the author’s research.
9However, Klien (1993) did not quantify the results obtained from his generic schemes ap­
plied to a case study. This is not surprising since the schemes developed in his study were 
independent of the domain which bears a large proportion of the quantitative information.
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However, the off-the-shelf communication tools have been used extensively.
With respect to a scheme for conflict resolution, the author’s approach has devel­
oped, implemented and validated a novel scheme. Several of the previous research 
including that of Berker and Brown (1996) and Kanappan and Marshek (1993) 
did not systematically analyse their negotiation protocol. For example, Kanap­
pan and Marshek obtained negotiated solutions using game-theoretic schemes but 
did not consider the effect of parametric dependencies nor did they analyse the 
quality of negotiated solutions. Kusiak and Wang (1995, 1996), however, pre­
sented a formal dependency based procedure for reasoning in a design network 
with an exception that their procedure is not as elaborate as compared to the 
author’s research.
As seen in real-world scenarios, the author’s research takes a view that conflicts 
always occur due to differing preferences and therefore total cooperation between 
agents cannot be guaranteed. Such a view was not adopted in Berker and Brown 
(1996) and Kusiak and Wang (1996) where the existence of total cooperation was 
assumed. Finally, the author’s research and other approaches including that of 
Kanappan and Marshek (1993) have been applied to conflict situations involving 
only two agents or two coalitions. The conflicts between n-agents or n-coalitions, 
though an interesting research issue in game theory, has not been investigated by 
the author in the identified scope of this research.
The following key points emerge from this discussion:
• In a collaborative decision process, there is need for representation of agents’ 
preferences;
• For conflict resolution between agents, it is necessary to combine the game 
theory and dependency based reasoning techniques. Such a combination 
has been shown to yield a rational single-point consistent solution.
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6.12.2 Agent characteristics realised
The collaborative process in this case study consists of four software agents: 
Geneva mechanism design agent, material agent, reasoning agent and negotiation 
agent.
The software agents were synthesised based on a new SiFA model presented in 
Chapter 3. Several agent characteristics such as autonomy, communication and 
conflict resolution ability were identified in Chapter 2. The following discussion 
presents an analysis of the software agents implemented in this research with 
respect to these characteristics. Table 6.12 shows the extent of autonomy achieved 
for agents in problem solving at various levels of granularity (from SiFAs to Multi- 
Agent). As the SiFAs combine to form Multi-Agents, the degree of autonomy 
increases from the control over the type and range of design variable to the 
solution of the design problem. However, the autonomy is also constrained by 
the nature of the given agent: the autonomy of the Geneva mechanism agent 
at the Multi-Agent level reflects its ability to solve a domain-specific problem 
solving (i.e. mechanism design) whereas the reasoning, negotiation and material 
agents exhibit autonomy for relatively generic problem solving.
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Table 6.13 shows the communication ability achieved for each task agent. The
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communication ability for the four agents follows a similar pattern over the SiFA- 
to-fjFA transition. The communication mechanisms are implementation depen­
dent. The agents use a shared class to communicate at the SiFA level and use 
KQML messages such as ask or tell at the level to communicate with other 
agents.
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SiFA SimFA UFA MA
Communica­











-  Communication 
takes place v ia a 
shared class
- The variables are 
exchanged via Java 
message passing
KQM L message 
passing
- Through KQML 
messages but with 
limited performatives 
such as 'a sk ' o r  'te ll '
Table 6.14 presents the ability of agents in the context of conflict resolution. The 
reasoning agent assists in the rationalisation of preferences whereas the negotia­
tion agent reaches a final negotiated settlement for the conflicting agents.
Each agent in Table 6.14 shows certain level of reasoning and negotiation ability: 
from problem-dependent to generic. The former case involves simple rules [as 
in material agent] to support reasoning and detecting constraint violation at 
the SiFA level. The generic case involves procedures for determining qualitative 
and quantitative dependencies in a design network as seen at /iFA stage in the 
reasoning agent. Game theory methods are applied for conflict negotiation at the 
fjFA level where individual preferences between agents exist. At the Multi-Agent 
level, the Geneva mechanism agent possess the ability to detect internal conflicts.
Of the three characteristics considered in Tables [6 . 1 2  - 6.14], the main agent 
characteristic realised was conflict resolution ability. No known research prior to 
the author’s work has reported an account of this agent characteristic realised in
6 V a l id a t io n  c a s e  s t u d y 180





Levels of granularity in an agent




- Types o f values
for design variables 
a  SiFA can assume
- Range of values
- Violation o f value





• Constraint violation check
- Conflict detection 
between design 
variables
- Partial design based
on a  specific 
perspective




for its own perspective
- Prospective based design of
Geneva mechanism (wheel 
and driver perspectives)
- Identify conflicts between
perspectives
- Determine a negotiation
range























• Effective qualitative 
and quantitative 
dependencies between 






- Contributes to the
rationalisation o f 







- Range for joint 
utility
• Evaluation o f a game 
theoretic solution (e.g., 
Nash solution)
- Simple rule far isolating 
a  solution based on 
equal pay-off
- Determines a  single 





• Types of values 
for material 
properties 
- Range o f  values 
far material 
properties
- Determine values of
derived properties
- Rules to identify
properties for a  given 
material





practical studies. This is a key enhancement from the understanding presented 
in previous research on collaborative approaches to product development [e.g., 
Cutkosky, et al, (1996) and Balasubramanium and Norrie (1996)].
During the course of this case study other software agent characteristics such 
as adaptability and pro-activeness [as identified in Chapter 2 ] were not realised. 
Further research is required in realising these characteristics in the context of 
agent supported problem solving.
6.12.3 Other aspects of the collaborative process
New knowledge is gained in realising the complementary capabilities of collab­
oration technologies (software agents and CSCW approaches) in the context of 
conflict resolution. Such a realisation has not been achieved by known previous
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research which often opted for binary solutions (software agents or CSCW). This 
case study of the design and manufacture of the Geneva mechanism provided a 
reinforcement of the earlier claim (in Chapter 5) of combining the two approaches 
of game theory and dependency based reasoning for resolving conflicts.
6.13 Summary
This chapter has been aimed at the validation of the two hypotheses in the au­
thor’s research as identified in Chapter 1 . This validation has been carried out 
through the case study of collaborative design and manufacture of a Geneva 
mechanism. In particular, the case study served as a test bed for examining 
decision related conflicts between agents. The combination of game theory and 
dependency based reasoning provided a useful mechanism to deal with conflicts 
arising in parametric design problems. The authors’ research has been found 
to improve upon certain methodological limitations offered by the previous re­
search with respect to conflict resolution between agents in collaborative product 
development process.
Furthermore, the case study on the design and manufacture the Geneva mecha­
nism examined the resolution of conflicts involving software agents and humans 
in the broader context of a collaborative process. In particular, decision con­
flicts between (a) software - software agents (b) software agents - humans and 
(c) human - human designers/machinists due to variation in preferences were 
investigated in detail. The results obtained from this case study validated the 
author’s agent synthesis and goal alignment hypotheses.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
Trends in globalisation in industry have highlighted the need to support col­
laboration in distributed product development. This thesis has investigated the 
problem of conflict resolution in agent-supported collaborative design and manu­
facturing. This concluding chapter shows how the present research has achieved 
its objectives as identified in Chapter 1 and highlights its important contributions. 
Limitations of this work are also discussed and avenues for further research are 
identified.
To address the agent-supported collaboration, the problem of synthesising soft­
ware agents was considered and a new agent model was proposed based on the 
idea of Single Function Agents (SiFA) and the Habermas’s action theory. The 
transition of SiFAs to Multi-Agents was achieved systematically through increas­
ing levels of complexity: the SiFAs, the Simple Function Agents (SimFAs), the 
Multi-Function Agents (/xFAs) and Multi-Agents (MAs). At the /zFA level, the 
agents have autonomy characterised by individual preferences for their goal. A 
difference between these preferences leads to conflicts between agents. This the­
sis therefore formalised conflicts between agents in terms of differing preferences 
represented as utility functions. A novel approach to conflict resolution was pro­
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posed through a two-stage process consisting of dependency-based reasoning and 
goal alignment. The alignment of goals between agents was based on game- 
theoretic negotiation schemes. The proposed agent model and conflict resolution 
scheme were tested and validated through two engineering case studies: design 
of a poppet relief valve and design and manufacturing of the Geneva mechanism.
7.1 Conclusions
A detailed literature review conducted by the author led to the understanding 
that in the previous research on software agents for collaborative product devel­
opment, little emphasis had been placed on:
• the synthesis of software agents to support collaboration;
• the conflict resolution between agents in a collaborative decision process.
Though software agent research has focused on issues from a computer science 
perspective (e.g., networking, interoperability), the agent synthesis with respect 
to application in engineering had not been addressed. In this sense, the software 
agent synthesis issues had largely been left unexplored. Although Berker and 
Brown (1996) proposed the idea of Single Function Agents (SiFAs) for agent 
synthesis, their SiFA model suffered from various drawbacks in terms of excessive 
complexity and inability to transform to Multi-Agents. In addition, Berker and 
Brown did not deal with the issue of conflict resolution nor did they apply their 
SiFA model to a practical engineering problem.
For conflict resolution between agents in the context of engineering, previous 
research offered two key techniques based on game theory and dependency based 
reasoning. These techniques were previously applied in isolation leading to the 
following drawbacks:
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• The dependency based reasoning approach of Kusiak and Wang (1995) 
showed inability to deal with conflicts between agents due to differing pref­
erences;
• Lack of mechanisms to ensure rationality in decision making as in the utility 
based approach of Kanappan and Marskek (1993);
• Lack of impartial mechanisms for mediation between conflicting agents.
The above considerations gave the motivation for new ideas which led to the 
proposal of the two hypotheses of this research outlined in Chapter 2, which, 
if satisfied, would improve upon some of the methodological limitations of the 
previous research in conflict resolution between agents.
This research has largely progressed along two related threads of investigation. 
The first thread focused on a model for agent synthesis to support collaboration. 
This was carried out by a new SiFA based model. The agents thus modelled had 
autonomy over their individual preferences which led to conflicts between them. 
The second thread of this research has focused on conflict resolution between 
agents for which a novel scheme was proposed. The rest of this section will 
address the achievements which have emerged from this investigation.
7.1.1 Agent synthesis
The author’s first hypothesis (Agent synthesis) investigated the SiFA based ap­
proach for modelling complex software agents. A detailed analysis led to the iden­
tification of several drawbacks in the SiFA model of Berker and Brown (1996). 
These drawbacks were examined with respect to the following key characteristics:
• Number of agents, levels and types of agents;
• Use of SiFAs to form Multi-Agents (MAs).
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The author’s approach addressed these drawbacks by means of modelling agents 
based on their actions (e.g., communicative and discursive). The Habermas’s 
theory of action was applied to software objects and a new SiFA model was 
proposed that had a compact structure.
As a result, in the new SiFA model, the number of decision levels was reduced 
to one, as compared to the unlimited number of decision levels as seen in the 
SiFA model of Berker and Brown (1996). The present approach systematically 
analysed how SiFAs can combine to form Multi-Agents. The author’s approach 
took a novel view as full autonomy was not given to SiFAs at the parametric level. 
Through the transformation from SiFAs to Multi-Agents, there was an increase 
in the degree of autonomy of agents. The agents at the //FA level (representing 
design perspectives) had their own preferences which characterise their autonomy. 
These preferences were represented by utility functions. Resolution of Conflict 
due to different preferences was considered as a domain-independent task to be 
carried out via a novel scheme, as summarised next.
7.1.2 Conflict resolution between agents
The author’s second hypothesis (Goal alignment) examined the resolution of con­
flicts between collaborating agents. This was carried out with a view that indi­
vidual preferences do exist for agents in any collaborative work, a view that 
questions the cooperative assumption made in some previous research including 
that of Kusiak and Wang(1996) and Berker and Brown (1996).
The author’s research has contributed towards the development of a novel conflict 
resolution scheme. This scheme has been aimed at providing alignment of pref­
erences between collaborating agents while maintaining consistency in solutions. 
The novelty of the scheme lies in combining the key techniques for reasoning and 
negotiation:
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• Dependency based reasoning;
• Game theory based negotiation.
The reasoning technique provided a means for maintaining consistency in design 
solutions. It utilised the domain equations for a design to define the constraints 
between decision and performance variables. Due their inter-dependency, changes 
in decision variables were propagated to all the related design variables via the 
associated design network. As a result of the reasoning process, a number of 
feasible designs were generated by collaborating agents while satisfying the given 
design constraints. However, each design variation had one or more conflict 
variables - the value of which was contested between the collaborating agents. 
This required the use of a negotiation scheme. The game-theoretic techniques 
for negotiation led to one or more single point solutions within the feasible space 
which were based on rational decision criteria of agent utilities. In addition, 
the scheme also provided certain mediation rules such as equal pay-offs for the 
conflicting agents (as in Kalai-Somordinsky solution), or maximising joint utility 
(as in Nash solution).
The conflict resolution scheme was bench-marked via a case study on the design 
of a poppet relief valve. Agent-supported design of a poppet relief valve was 
considered and conflict was identified between the differing preferences of two 
design perspectives: the spring and the enclosure. A quantitative comparison of 
negotiation results with those of Kusiak and Wang (1996) and Kanappan and 
Marshek (1993) was presented. The results obtained showed the applicability of 
the new scheme for resolving conflicts between software agents. In addition, the 
results reinforced the argument that conflict resolution required both dependency- 
based reasoning (to determine a feasible design space) and negotiation (to allow 
agents to rationally agree on a single feasible solution).
The case study of the design and manufacture of a Geneva mechanism was carried 
out to validate the conflict resolution scheme in a broader context of a collab­
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orative design and manufacturing process involving both software agents and 
humans. In particular, this case study examined the conflicts at various stages of 
product development, arising due to differing preferences between (a) software - 
software agents (b) software agents - human designers and (c) human designers - 
human machinists.
The following conclusions can be drawn from the Geneva mechanism case study:
•  An engineering product development process involves a large number of 
design variables, but a small number of controlling decision variables and 
performance variables;
•  A collaborative decision process involves a number of agents, each agent 
representing specific design perspective;
•  Design agents representing specific perspectives can be synthesised using 
the proposed SiFA model;
• The dependency based technique can be effectively used to guide rationality 
in design decisions;
• Each agent has its own preferences involving controlling decision variables;
• The utility functions can adequately express an agent’s preferences for de­
cision and performance variables;
• A feasible design space can be determined from the dependency network 
and initial specification;
• Single point solutions can be obtained within the feasible space by using 
game theoretic techniques. This ensures the alignment of goals between 
agents;
• The mediation rules can be used in isolating a final negotiated solution and 
thereby avoiding secondary conflicts.
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Having presented the general conclusions which highlighted the main contribu­
tions of the author’s research, its implications in a wider industrial context are 
explored next.
7.2 The implication of this research
The significance of this research can be understood by considering its relevance to 
industrial trends. The relevance is examined along the two inter-related threads 
upon which the author chose to explore this research.
The research has demonstrated in a laboratory-based controlled environment how 
software agents could effectively address the issue of conflict resolution. The 
author addressed conflict resolution between agents in a collaborative product 
development process. Companies such as Enviros systems have used reasoning 
techniques based on qualitative dependencies to develop tools for decision making 
based on Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) in the context of chemical 
engineering processes [Brice and Johns (1999)]. It could employ the proposed 
conflict resolution schemes in the presence of competing objectives. Another effort 
by IBM T J Watson research centre presented decision making using software 
agents to minimise waste and transportation costs [Price (1999)].
Though the above efforts acknowledge the existence of multiple goals in their 
decision processes, they treated decision making largely as a problem of optimi­
sation rather than of negotiation. The agents in a decision process have autonomy 
over their individual preferences towards a common goal. As agents collaborate, 
conflicts often occur due to difference in these preferences. Depending on the situ­
ation, the agents may need to generate dynamic preferences characterised by their 
adaptability. The qualities such as autonomy and adaptability complement the 
agent’s ability to generate preferences and identify their goals in a conflict situa­
tion. Given sufficient enhancements in software agent development and synthesis
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(in the context of autonomy and adaptability), these decision making procedures 
could make use of conflict resolution scheme such as the one developed by the 
author for dealing with conflicts between agents in a distributed collaborative 
process.
To this end the discussion highlighted the possible areas where author’s research 
efforts could be utilised in practical applications. However, there still exist several 
limitations in this thesis, as identified below.
7.2.1 Lim itations of this research
This research uncovered several key issues relating to agent supported collabora­
tive product development. In particular, there are several issues related to scal­
ability and generalisation of the proposed technique that need to be addressed.
•  Though the synthesis of software agents was considered in this research, it 
was not possible to model all their behavioural characteristics. The main 
reason for this was that the primary research emphasis was on the conflict 
resolution between software agents;
• Only conflicts between two agents were considered in the present study. 
To deal with the multiple-agent negotiation (agents > 2), the present con­
flict resolution scheme will be inadequate. The scalability of the conflict 
resolution scheme also needs to be considered;
•  The agent synthesis model presented a compact way of constructing multi­
agents for engineering problem solving. However, the application of the 
SiFA model to large engineering products such as aircrafts is yet to be 
established;
•  The agents presented in this study do not have learning ability or adapt­
ability and are thus static. Such abilities would complement the agent’s
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behaviour in conflict resolution by guiding it to dynamically change its 
preferences;
• The representation of preferences is quantitative and deterministic in the 
present case which need not always be true. The agent synthesis model will 
therefore need to be scalable to incorporate a broad range preferences that 
are quantitative as well as fuzzy in nature. Such a model would address a 
broad range of conflicts from conceptual to detailed design and manufac­
turing stages;
• For large scale problems which involve technical as well as economic con­
siderations, the applicability of the agent synthesis model and the conflict 
resolution scheme would need further investigation;
Finally, real industrial problems will present a much more complex design process 
than the ones considered here. It is, however, acknowledged that a laboratory- 
based validation approach is central to all scientific and engineering research, 
and serves as an essential step towards dealing with more complex real-life ap­
plications [Johanssen, et ah, (1994), Ishii, et ah, (1994)]. The industrial cases 
will typically involve several agents, additional constraints such as cost and time, 
which were not considered in this study. Further research is required in respect 
of such dynamic constraints. Further validation of the proposed methodologies 
for agent synthesis and conflict resolution is necessary by undertaking industrial 
case studies.
7.3 Future work
This research has given rise to challenging issues that are worth exploring fur­
ther. Conflict resolution between agents as seen in this thesis is important for 
agent supported collaborative product development. However, real world design
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problems would simultaneously involve several agents. The problem of conflicts 
between n-agents has not been previously investigated as a core research issue 
except for some cursory remarks on coalition building [Rao (1999)].
Investigation into n-agent negotiation would be of immense value but it would 
require dynamics characterisation of their individual preferences, adequate math­
ematical modelling including collectively stable equilibrium, uniqueness and ge­
ometrical representation of solutions. Techniques for defining multi-agent joint 
utility functions will also need to be developed.
In engineering problems there are situations where exact domain equations can­
not be evaluated and only fuzzy or approximate characterisations can be made 
[Wang (1999)]. Thus there is a need to extend the reasoning theory particu­
larly in the direction of fuzzy and approximate representations using techniques 
such as response surface methodology [Hacker and Lewis (1998)]. Such an ex­
tension would support generic conflict resolution while maintaining rationality in 
negotiated solutions.
7.4 Final overview
The author’s research has focused on agent-supported conflict resolution in collab­
orative product development. It presented a review of collaboration technologies 
and isolated certain deficiencies in previous approaches in the context of agent 
supported conflict resolution. A new agent model based on Habermas’s action 
theory was used to build software agents for the purpose of the case studies. The 
resolution of conflicts between agents was further investigated via a novel conflict 
resolution scheme. This scheme was developed to resolve parametric conflicts 
between agents while maintaining rationality and satisfy design constraints.
Two case studies were carried out to examine the validity of the new agent model
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and the new conflict resolution scheme in the context of collaborative product 
development. Based on the results and conclusions from these case studies, it 
was found that the author’s thesis significantly furthers the state-of-the-art in 
conflict resolution using agents in collaborative product development.
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Appendix A
Additional details on the Poppet 
relief valve design case study
This appendix provides additional details for the Poppet valve design case study.
A .l  Poppet valve design
A. 1.1 Nom enclature
A(m2) =  Pipeline cross-section area 
Ai (m) =  Corrosion resistance allowance for valve enclosure 
A2(rn) =  Corrosion resistance allowance for poppet valve stem 
Ad =  Clash allowance ratio 
C =  Helical spring index
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Cv =  Valve configuration factor
C}(m) =  Radial clearance between helical spring and enclosure
Ci(m) =  Radial clearance between helical spring and poppet stem
Cf  =  Orifice coefficient
d(m) =  Helical spring wire diameter
dh(rn) =  Valve hole diameter
d eo { m )  =  Equivalent orifice diameter
d0(m) =  Orifice diameter
d3(m) =  Seal diameter
dL(m) =  Flow line diameter
D(m) =  Mean helical spring diameter
Di(m) =  Inner diameter of spring enclosure
D0(m) = Outer diameter of spring enclosure
Dv(m) =  Valve outer diameter
FC(N) =  Cracking force on helical spring
Fd(N) =  Dynamic fluid force
Ft(N) = Total force on helical spring
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g (m/sec?) =  Acceleration due to gravity 
G(GPa) =  Shear modulus of spring material 
K s(N /m )  =  Computed spring rate 
Kact{N/m) =  Actual spring rate 
K  =  Flow coefficient (head loss factor)
K w =  Wahl spring factor 
Lf(m ) — Helical spring free length 
Li(m) =  Helical spring installed length 
Ls(m) =  Helical spring solid length 
n =  Factor of safety 
N  = Number of helical spring coils 
P  (N/mm2) =  Maximum fluid pressure 
Pmati =  Material for Valve enclosure 
Pc(N /m m 2) =  Cracking pressure 
(N /m m 2) — Pressure drop 
Q(cu.m/sec) =  Fluid flow rate 
r\ =  Flow area variation ratio
P o p p e t  r e l ie f  v a l v e : a d d it io n a l  d e t a il s 208
r 2 =  Spring rate reduction ratio
r\ =  Spring outer diametral clearance ratio
r\ — Spring inner diametral clearance ratio
rh =  Valve hole size ratio
S  =  Fluid specific gravity
Smati =  Helical spring material
Sp(N /m m 2) =  Allowable stress for the pipe
tp(m) =  pipe thickness
ts(m) — seal thickness
tv(m) =  Valve thickness
<5mai(m) =  Maximum deflection
p(K g/m s) = Density of water (62.4)
Tmin (AT/7717712) =  Helical spring minimum stress 
T au ( N / m m 2) =  Allowable stress for spring 
Design equations
J  _  Q  0.5 s  0.25
a° -  29.81G/ ~KF 
de o =  do
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de o — Cv(dL) 1 .0 7
j  1.292c?r,
de0 = - j K ^
tg — dg djj
Fc =  P j t f -
Q 2Sp,F  _  00007
<S =  n %
Ft =  Fc +  F ,
r2 = ^ f
rs _  4C -  1 . 0.615 
K v  “  46’ -  4 +  T T ~
T = K  2.55F(C/   XV ty ?2
«- _  lalL Ts ~  n
C ~ l [
tv =  __
SD^Kact
Cn =  Z> C1 
C7 2 =  £>rc 2
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Ls =  d(N  +  2 )
L /  =  L i  +  T &
Di = D - % - C n
D0 — D -f- +  Cn
Li = Ls + 6 + A d5 
f    A | P  Dv
=  A 2 +
D0 = Dv -  tv 
dh — D{ tv
A. 1.2 Poppet valve design agent details
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Figure A.l: GUI of the Poppet relief valve agent
c
Appendix B
Additional details on the Geneva 
mechanism design and 
manufacturing case study
B .l  Geneva mechanism design
B . l . l  Nom enclature
A) =  Angle of Geneva wheel (deg.)
R =  Radius of Geneva wheel (mm)
D =  Diameter of Geneva wheel (mm) 
tl = Locking drum radius (mm)
Gmax =  Maximum acceleration of geneva wheel (rad/sec2)
Sw =  Wheel slot width (mm) 
wtip _  w h eei tip width (mm)
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wt =  Wheel thickness (mm)
Ns =  Number of slots
C =  Distance between centres of wheel and driver (mm) 
S =  Wheel slot distance (mm)
I I  =  Load inertia (kg/mm?)
Ig =  Moment of inertia of geneva wheel (kg/mmA)
M ATwheei — Material of the wheel
Pwheei =  Density of wheel material (kg/m m 3)
Vwheei =  Poisson’s ratio of wheel material 
Ewheei =  Modulus of elasticity of pin material (Pa) 
ot  =  Tip stress (Pa) 
or =  Root stress (Pa)
Cl =  Clearance between wheel and slot (mm) 
K i,K 2,Kz,Ki and K 5 =  design constants 
k [ ^ 2  =  Stress concentration factors 
H =  Coefficient of friction 
a0 =  Angle of driver (deg.)
7  =  Wheel locking angle (deg.) 
rp = Pin radius (mm) 
rp, =  Driver radius (mm) 
oc =  Pin contact stress (Pa)
MATpin = Material of the wheel
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Ppin =  Density of wheel material (kg/m m 3)
Vpin =  Poisson’s ratio of wheel material
Epin =  Modulus of elasticity of pin material (Pa) 
Design equations
7r
S  =  £7(1 -  sin Po) 
D = 2C cos /3q
J
rL =  ri -  § -  wtip
tUslot ^ 2Tp
wt =  K ZD
Ig = I -  N 'h  -  2 N sI2
<7T~  w
y — Y  ~ P + X
6KiPd(h 4- p/2 ) 
JGP<i(sm j3p +  m cos ffoT
=  2(5 — 0.01) sin / ? 0 — 2rp 
h = p -  (cospo)2(S -  0 .0 1 )
l2 = (S -  0.01) cos p0 sin p0 - ^  
CL «  0.0254D
P  _  ( / 0  +  / 1 )  Q m ax
■‘■m ax nH max
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Pmax — K \D
rv =  K 2D
_  w(n +  2 )
~  n
7T (n -  2 ) 
a ° =  2  n
Td =  C sin f t
^ = 3237y s
B .1.2  Geneva mechanism design agent details
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Figure B .l: GUI of the Geneva mechanism agent
A ppendix  C 
N ote  on KQM L
C .l  KQML based com m unication support
In order for an agent’s actions to be meaningful, they need to be expressed 
in a language that could be interpreted by other agents. The development of 
Knowledge Query Manipulation Language (KQML) by Knowledge Sharing Ef­
fort (KSE) provides a means for formal inter-agent communication [Finin, et a l ,  
(1995)]. Finin, et al., pointed out three distinct components in the communica­
tion protocol. These are the content, message and transfer layers as shown in 
Figure C .l.
/  COMMUNICATION LAYER \ Sample KQML m essage
TCPIP/HTTP 
support _










S e n d e r Material agent 
Language: KIF 
Ontology: m ateriaLproperty 
Content: (val(elastic_modulus)
■T'..........  J Receiver: Design agent(material AIS11040 N))
Figure C.l: KQML-based communication mechanism
The content layer represents the message in a specified language. For example, 
Labrou et a l ,  (1999) show tha t the content of a KQML message, including the
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ontology to be shared, could range from simple ASCII strings to a more formal 
syntax using KIF, STEP or any other agreed format. Figure C.l shows a sample 
KQML message with content expressed in KIF format. The message layer deter­
mines the kind of interactions the agent may choose to perform. This is governed 
by a set of performatives (e.g., tell, ask, agree) which is a term used to refer to the 
agent’s action. The communication or transfer layer describes parameters such 
as the network addresses of the sender and recipient that are identified as unique 
names as shown in Figure C.l. This layer is supported by transport mechanisms 
such as TCP/IP or HTTP.
Major research is underway in adjacent areas such as a language for maintain­
ing and building ontologies using Ontolingua [Gensereth and Ketchpel, (1994)]. 
JATLite developed at Stanford University and JAFMAS developed at University 
of Cincinatti, are some of the available templates for agent development and use 
KQML for support. KQML has also captured the attention of many companies 
such as British Telecom and Siemens [Labrou, et al, (1999)].
